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ABSTRACT

In the study of government accountability, there have long been arguments about
which model is superior. These arguments, which are largely made by those in the
performance and political accountability camps, state that their particular model is the
best, and indeed only legitimate approach to ensuring accountable government. At the
same time, there is growing research in policy tools but little in how accountability
models and policy tools are linked in policy design.
This study makes use of the context provided by the critical cases of the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA). With such large sums of money in play at a time of serious economic downturn
and mounting federal deficits, government clearly has a responsibility to ensure
accountability so that the public can be assured not only that its funds are being spent
properly but also more generally, that accountability as well as policy tool choice is in the
minds of officials as they formulate, adopt and implement public policy.
The intent of this study is to present an argument in two main areas using the
critical case studies of TARP and ARRA. First, that no one accountability model fully
explains most policy tool choices in TARP or ARRA and that the use of multiple models
is superior. Second, that we can link policy tool choices and accountability models in
policy design. The standards used to establish what models explain what tool choices are
in the models themselves. Each policy is explored individually in a chapter, and the
lessons and results of this study are then presented in the final chapter.
i

The data presented in this study indicate that a single-model approach may
explain a few, but not most and certainly not all, policy tool choices in TARP and ARRA.
Indeed, a multiple model approach proves superior to a single-model approach in all but a
few instances. As for the connections between policy tools and accountability models,
the data presented in this study show that they were strongly impacted by the policy
formulation process itself, specifically the way in which the policy problem was framed
and the speed with which it was undertaken.
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Chapter 1: Introduction, the Research Questions and Methodology
Accountability has been a core concern of American government since the
country’s founding. As James Madison famously wrote in Federalist 51:
"In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is
submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are
guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate
departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion
allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a
double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will
control each other; at the same time that each will be controlled by itself
(Hamilton, Jay, & Madison, 1787-1788).”
Indeed, the separation of powers system suggested in Federalist 51 and present in
the US Constitution was designed, in no small part, to help ensure accountable
government (Hamilton, Jay, & Madison, 1787-1788; United States Constitution, 17871788, pp. Arts. I-III). Yet, while accountability has long been a core principle of
American and indeed all democratic governance, there is widespread disagreement on
what accountability is and how best to ensure it. This study has found that the literature
contains no less than eight different and commonly referenced models of accountability,
each of which has its own decision rules, assumptions and advocates who claim that their
model is the best, and often, only proper model to utilize to ensure accountability.
In the study of government accountability, there have long been arguments about
which model is best. These arguments are largely made by those in the performance and
1

political accountability camps, who state that their model is the best and indeed only
legitimate approach to ensuring accountable government. At the same time, there is
growing research in policy tools but little in how accountability models and policy tools
are linked.
Concerns about accountability have become particularly acute in the policy
responses to the current economic crisis. It is easy to see why that has been the case, as
the federal government has authorized expenditures of over $1.5 trillion between the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA) alone (ARRA, 2009; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,
2008). With such large sums of money in play at a time of serious economic downturn
and mounting federal deficits, government clearly has a responsibility to ensure
accountability so that the public can be assured both that its funds are being spent
properly and, more generally, that accountability is in the minds of officials as they
formulate, adopt and implement public policy. However, this study is not really about
TARP or ARRA but rather about the accountability models themselves, and the policy
tools they utilize, as ways to help us understand how accountability is defined in both
theory and practice.
This study seeks to explore ways to understand policy choices aimed at ensuring
accountability in a complex context. It seeks to address limitations in the existing use of
models of accountability in the existing literature. More specifically, it asks the question
of how effectively any of the four most commonly used models of accountability explain
the policy tool choices selected to address accountability issues in TARP and ARRA.
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These four models are: (1) political accountability; (2) professional bureaucratic; (3) legal
and (4) performance.
This study consists of five chapters. This first chapter will explain how the study
uses a case study analysis of TARP and ARRA to assess how well the most widely used
models explain the choice of policy tools used in these programs to ensure accountability.
This chapter will also explain the research strategy and methodology to be used in that
effort.
The second chapter will discuss the state of the literature with respect to the
models’ theoretical assumptions and their decision rules and will identify the most
important gaps in the modern accountability literature. It will also discuss policy tools
literature in order to provide proper framing for this study.
The third and fourth chapters will describe in more detail the cases of TARP (in
chapter 3) and ARRA (in chapter 4) and the basic findings related to what policy tools
were used and which accountability models were used in relation to tho1se policy tools.
It will focus on description, with analysis saved for the final chapter.
The fifth and final chapter will then proceed to analyze the data, focusing on what
the study argues are three primary gaps in the literature. First, the assumption that a
single model of accountability is best and that models of accountability are separable.
For example, Robert Behn writes repeatedly that the only correct way to approach
government accountability is to utilize “tactics and strategies that seek to enhance the
performance of the public sector-to improve the ability of government agencies and their
nonprofit and for-profit collaborators to produce results (emphasis in original) (Behn,
2001, p. 26).”
3

Second, there is no existing case in which accountability models are tested side by
side. Particularly since TARP and ARRA are different approaches to the same
overarching set of problems caused by the 2008 economic crisis, this should allow us to
see what impact accountability models have on policy tool choice.
The third literature gap is that very little literature matches policy tools and
accountability models in policy design. Perhaps if certain policy tools and accountability
models match up, something can be learned about both. Since this is a critical case study,
it is necessary to focus on cases which are atypical but important. It is precisely in such
cases that models are put to the ultimate test, and it might then be possible to make
generalizations from these cases, atypical as they are. If those in the field can start
thinking of accountability model mixes as the proper way to evaluate accountability
rather than single models. This could lead to a deeper examination of previously
undiscovered facets of government accountability and their connections to policy tools.
This study focuses on the following research question: How effectively do any of
the four most commonly used models of accountability explain the policy tool choices
selected to address accountability issues in TARP or ARRA? In order to answer this
question, this study focuses on two research hypotheses. First, that no one model
explains all the policy tool choices in TARP or ARRA. Second, that using multiple
models will better explain most of these policy tool choices. Answering this question
should help us advance accountability and policy tools literature.
The thesis of this study is that no single accountability model adequately explains
policy tool choices and that a multiple model approach is superior. In addition, the
conditions and problem statement on which a policy is based impact policy tool choice.
4

The background and basis for this thesis will be explored in more detail throughout this
study.
THE CASE: TARP AND ARRA AS PUBLIC POLICY
In order to understand the appropriateness of TARP and ARRA as a critical case
study, it is important to understand in more detail what TARP and ARRA are and how
they came about. The following section will therefore briefly discuss the history and
design of TARP and ARRA (both are described in far more detail in chapter three for
TARP and chapter four for ARRA). This section will then conclude with a discussion of
how TARP and ARRA is both an appropriate and feasible critical case study to test how
accountability models explain policymaker choices.
In order to solve the problems caused by the collapse of the housing bubble, the
US Department of the Treasury asserted that it needed to help banks remove so-called
“distressed assets (US Department of the Treasury, 2008b)” from the financial system in
order to stabilize banks and other financial institutions. As the US Department of the
Treasury stated in proposing the first version of what later became TARP1, “When the
financial system works as it should, money and capital flow to and from households and
businesses to pay for home loans, school loans and investments that create jobs. As
illiquid mortgage assets block the system, the clogging of our financial markets has the
potential to significantly damage our financial system and our economy, undermining job
creation and income growth. (US Department of the Treasury, 2008b).”

1

The bill was formally titled the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), of which TARP was
by far the largest component in both the original and final bill (SIGTARP, 2009, p. 43).
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TARP proposed to do so by adopting an approach similar to that used by the
federal government in the Savings and Loan crisis of the late 1980s, wherein it provided
temporary loans to financial institutions in order to ensure their stability (Seidman W. L.,
1996; US Department of the Treasury, 2008b). Once they were able, these financial
institutions would then pay back these loans, thus meaning that the cost to the federal
government would be far less than the initial $700 billion price tag (Seidman W. L.,
1996; US Department of the Treasury, 2008b).
While originally intended as a program designed to purchase toxic assets in order
to stabilize financial institutions, TARP in fact spent very little money purchasing such
assets ($5 billion as of September 30, 2010) (SIGTARP, 2010b, p. 237). Instead, it spent
by far the most funds pursuing three primary tasks: (1) purchasing an estimated $280
billion in stock in trouble banks and investment institutions such as Citigroup, JP Morgan
and Bank of America; (2) providing $40 billion in loans to prevent the potentially
catastrophic collapse of American International Group (AIG) and (3) providing nearly
$80 billion in loans to American auto manufacturers in order to prevent their collapse
(SIGTARP, 2010b, p. 237). An additional $45 billion was appropriated to help prevent
home foreclosures but as September 30, 2010 only $600 million had actually been spent
and the administration had yet to come up with a plan to spend the remaining funds in
this area (SIGTARP, 2010b, p. 237). As a result, of the total of $387 billion actually
expended under TARP, greater than 90% of it went directly to assisting banks,
investment houses, AIG or auto manufacturers, far from the original intent of purchasing
toxic assets.
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Yet even with its hefty price tag, it was clear that TARP alone was not enough
since it only assisted a small part of the American economy. Shortly after taking office in
2009, President Barack Obama proposed an additional stimulus plan entitled the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) (Baker, 2009; Obama, 2009b; US
GPO, 2009). ARRA utilized a variety of policy tools such as tax cuts, aid to states and
local governments to limit their budget cuts, increased unemployment benefits and direct
federal spending largely on infrastructure projects (Baker, 2009; Obama, 2009b; US
GPO, 2009). The Obama administration argued that this direct federal spending where,
unlike for TARP, the initial cost of the bill was expected to be the final cost as little to no
repayment was expected, was the best and arguably only way to stabilize the economy
and promote job growth (Baker, 2009; Obama, 2009b; US GPO, 2009). Unlike with
TARP, ARRA had no trouble sailing through the legislative process and was signed into
law on February 17, 2009, less than a month after President Obama took office (Baker,
2009; Obama, 2009b; US GPO, 2009).
ARRA is composed of three primary components (Recovery.gov, 2010c): (1) a
$288 billion package of tax cuts and tax expenditures for both business and personal
taxpayers; (2) $224 billion in aid to states to help preserve entitlement programs
(primarily unemployment benefits), health care and education programs which were
otherwise in danger of being cut and (3) $275 billion in federal contracts, grants and
loans to fund a series of projects, from infrastructure to research to environmental
preservation and beyond (Recovery.gov, 2010c). It is this last $275 billion that has
received by far the most scrutiny since it is the portion of ARRA that allows for the
greatest spending discretion and thus required the closest scrutiny.
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Although clearly different, TARP and ARRA share two main characteristics
which make this study more manageable. First, they are wide-reaching and together rely
heavily on spending in both the public and private sector in order to be successful.
Second, they are short-term policies, with TARP beginning to wind down in late 2009
and early 2010 and most of the funds in ARRA already spent by mid-year 2010. This
short time-frame makes the cases easier to frame and thus manageable for this study.
TARP and ARRA: A Useful Context to Challenge Accountability Models
Now that this study has given a brief overview of the history and design of TARP
and ARRA, it will briefly discuss why these cases are critical cases. In order to
determine if they meet the standards for a critical case study, we must meet the three
criteria established by Yin and Flyberg: that the case be atypical, critical to theory
development and testing and have enough data to conduct the study (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp.
219-225; Yin, 2008, pp. 46-59). The following section will address each of these points
in turn.
TARP and ARRA are unique policies created to solve the unique problems posed
by the economic downturn which began in 2008. The scope of these two policies
together touched nearly every aspect of both private and public life and thus required two
uniquely different, if related, responses. Their combined appropriations of more than
$1.5 trillion are substantial and rely on both the private and public sector to implement.
An effort of this size and scope is clearly a unique case and one that cannot be assessed
using anything but critical case study methodology.
TARP and ARRA are also important to theory testing and development. This is
because, again taken together, they comprise the two ends of the modern government
8

accountability spectrum, with TARP largely intended to rely on market and performancebased accountability models while ARRA was intended to rely heavily on a legal
accountability approach (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009; Recovery.gov, 2009b).
Inherent in both was political accountability, both in terms of what was in the policy
when it was designed, passed and then tracked by members of Congress and the public at
large, and bureaucratic accountability because, in the end, public administration
professionals had and still have a role in how both policies were designed. The
combination of these four accountability models in this atypical and important set of
circumstances makes clear why a critical case study approach is justified.
Third, this study is feasible both because a significant amount of data exists and
because they are short-term policies and can thus be framed properly. This second point
is particularly important since one problem inherent in case studies in general is the need
to frame them properly in order to limit the number of variables present in a case. The
short-term nature of these policies makes that possible. As for data availability, there is
arguably more data than needed to conduct this study, rather than too little. In any case,
however, TARP and ARRA meet the three criteria established above and therefore an
appropriate choice for a critical case study methodology. The following section will
briefly discuss the research process as well as the data acquisition strategy for this study.
THE RESEARCH PROCESS AND DATA ACQUISTION
As noted above, the empirical setting for this research is the two major stimulus
bills enacted in response to what has become commonly known as the “great recession
(Samuelson, 2010)”, which began in 2008 and is arguably still ongoing (Samuelson,
2010). In order to allow for the proper framing of this case study, however, the study will
9

consider the time period from September 7, 2008, the day Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
were placed under government control, until February 1, 2010, slightly more than one full
year into the Obama administration (New York Times, 2009). This allows for research to
explore the background, enactment and much of the implementation of both TARP and
ARRA.
The primary sources for this study were the legislation itself as well as the myriad
of reports produced by the agencies responsible for ensuring accountability in either
TARP or ARRA. Most of these reports were prepared by the five organizations charged
with ensuring accountability for TARP and ARRA: (1) the Congressional Oversight
Panel (COP); (20 the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (RATB); (3) the
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP); (4) the US
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and (5) the US Department of the Treasury
(Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009g; Recovery.gov, 2009c; SIGTARP, 2009e; US
Department of the Treasury, 2009; Government Accountability Office, 2009; US GPO,
2009). In the specified case period, these five organizations alone produced more than
175 reports on various aspects of TARP or ARRA accountability (Congressional
Oversight Panel, 2009g; Recovery.gov, 2009c; SIGTARP, 2009e; US Department of the
Treasury, 2009; Government Accountability Office, 2009; US GPO, 2009). When added
with the legislation itself as well as other implementing guidance provided by OMB and
other federal agencies, there clearly was sufficient data to conduct this research (Office of
Management and Budget, 2009c; Office of Management and Budget, 2009d).
In addition to this content analysis, I conducted interviews in February 2012 in
Washington, DC with a Senate Finance Committee staffer, the former two top staffers at
10

the COP, a Congressional Research Service employee who worked on ARRA and a
group of GAO employees led by Chris Mihm who worked on both TARP and ARRA.
These interviews were semi-structured, with interviewees being sent a set of 10-15
questions several days in advance. Interviews began with those questions as a base and
then flowed from them into the areas deemed appropriate by either the interviewee or
myself. These interviews, which took 30-60 minutes each, were not recorded due to the
request of the interviewees, but copious notes were taken by myself and each interview
was written up the same day it was conducted to minimize data loss. These documents
and these interviews combined to comprise the basis of the data from which this study
was conducted. The next section will discuss the data collection strategy for this
research.
Data Collection: Care is Needed but there are no Significant Barriers
The data collection strategy for this case is straightforward since this case is a
public event and the emphasis is on the formal selection of policy tools. The purpose
here is to see how well the models explain behavior in the form of the ultimate decisions
taken rather than the motives of any individual participants. The primary sources of
evidence are public records such as accountability reports, the legislation itself and other
implementing guidance/regulations. These sources were appropriate to use for four main
reasons: (1) they are easily available; (2) they allow for the creation of a chronology for
the case in order to allow for the case to be properly framed; (3) these sources, taken
together, given a fairly complete view of this case and (4) these data come from
trustworthy sources and thus provide a reliable record of the case.
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This data collection approach was not without potential challenges, three of which
are particularly worth noting (Swanborn, 2010, pp. 76-95; Yin, 2008, pp. 101-123). First,
the data available from these documents may not provide all the information one needs to
understand the accountability systems in this case (Swanborn, 2010, pp. 76-95; Yin,
2008, pp. 101-123). While it is certainly true that full understanding of the accountability
systems in this case may not be possible with this, or any, data source, it is nonetheless
believed that more than enough data exists to understand how the four accountability
models were applied here. Second, the data are largely framed around the results of the
policy and not the accountability systems themselves (Swanborn, 2010, pp. 76-95; Yin,
2008, pp. 101-123). This is where a policy tools approach is useful because, by
identifying the policy tools inherent in each element of this case, it can help connect them
to the four models and thus solve the framing issue. Third, the data may indicate
causality where none exists, particularly in relation to the impacts the policies had on the
external environment (Swanborn, 2010, pp. 88-94). However, since this study was not
about TARP’s or ARRA’s effectiveness but rather about their accountability models and
the policy tools that were utilized in their design, this is not really a problem here. In any
event, these three problems with the data set are not likely to present significant
obstacles. While certainly not perfect, the data collection strategy used in this project
should provide sufficient data to complete this study.
Data Analysis: Coding and ATLAS
The data analysis strategy for this study is straightforward. A database was
created in ATLAS with all 237 documents collected for this study. The documents were
then divided into categories based on source (such as GAO, SIGTARP, Treasury, etc.),
12

type of document (such as regulations, legislation, accountability report, etc.) and
whether they addressed TARP or ARRA. Codes were then created for each of the policy
tools listed in the next chapter and for the four accountability models as well. Each
policy tool also had one code created for each of the accountability models addressed in
this study (so, for example, the policy tool “Contracting” has codes that read
“Contracting-Political”, “Contracting-Legal” and so on). Each document was evaluated
on the basis of the criteria listed below with passages coded when they met the standards
of one or more codes. Passages were often coded with more than one code because it
was found in several instances that although only one policy tool was in play, multiple
accountability models were. When in doubt, the inclination was to code more passages,
and use codes more frequently, in order to avoid missing any possible data points.
The resulting codes were both summarized numerically and then evaluated
passage by passage to ensure accuracy. A decision was then made first as to which
policy tools were most in use in each policy and second whether and how each of the four
accountability models were or were not used. In addition, documents were coded where
other accountability models appeared to be present so as to evaluate whether the choice
of the four models for this study was proper. These codes were then evaluated to see
where trends existed and these trends comprised the majority of data upon which this
study was conducted. These data were then supplemented with input from the interviews
as appropriate. The interviews also helped to confirm, add to, or deny the findings made
in the original data analysis. For example, without the interviews it would not have been
known that GAO played such an important role in designing ARRA’s implementing
regulations. These two types of data, which constitute the raw findings of the study, will
13

be discussed in chapter three (TARP) and chapter four (ARRA). Although other
researchers using with the same documents and conducting the same interviews might
find slightly different results, it is believed that the robustness of the coding (and the
evaluation and analysis of the coding), will ensure that such differences are small and not
significant.
FRAMING THE MODELS: USING STANDARDS FROM THE MODELS
THEMSLEVES
Perhaps the most important part of this study’s methodology is in how to
determine when models are or are not present. This study uses standards from the models
themselves. In other words, we ask whether the standards and approaches match those of
each of the models in their literature.
Political Accountability:
For political accountability, we will find that the model is present when at least
two of three conditions are met. First, political accountability is utilized in cases where
authority or responsibility exists for action within a system (Mayhew, 2004, pp. 110115). For example, in the American system, Congress has the responsibility to oversee
the federal bureaucracy (Finer, 1941, pp. 335-338). The act of doing so is by itself an act
of political accountability. Second, actors utilizing political accountability must consider
whether their actions are in concert with the interests of political actors and stakeholders
(Fenno, 1978, pp. 133-138; Mayhew, 2004, pp. 22-25). If conduct is in not in the
interests or at the behest of such actors and stakeholders, it is hard to see why the political
system would undertake any action. Third, political accountability is called on when a
problem is perceived as a political, and not a professional or mechanical, problem
14

(Fenno, 1978, pp. 133-138). If there is a public outcry to respond to a particular problem,
it almost by definition becomes political (Finer, 1941, pp. 335-338). Absent such an
outcry, a problem can often be handled within the existing professional bureaucratic
system and thus may not rely on political accountability (Finer, 1941, pp. 335-338).
Professional/Bureaucratic Accountability:
For professional or bureaucratic accountability, we shall find it exists when at
least two of the following three standards are met: First, when a policy requires
determining what the public needs as judged by a professional assessment of problems,
contexts and opportunities; second, when the policy calls for professionals determining
what is in the public’s best long term interests once short term political demands are
filtered out and professional judgment is applied; and third, when the policy calls for
determining how best to utilize professional and technical expertise to meet these
interests (Levitan, 1946, pp. 565-575; Long, 1952, pp. 809-812; Long, 1954, pp. 23-25).
What separates this from the political model is this essential focus on professionals
determining how to serve the public interests, rather than responding only to the political
demands of those in power at any one time. The reasoning is that while political changes
may and will occur with some regularity, the day to day administration of the public’s
business has to able to respond to a range of requirements including representation of the
long term public interest as viewed by professionals (Levitan, 1946, pp. 565-575; Long,
1952, pp. 809-812; Long, 1954, pp. 23-25). Professional administrators are needed to
ensure that this large body of work, which should not be about politics, can be done and
that the lower order politics are adjusted by professional knowledge and values
(Friedrich, Beyer, Spero, Miller, & Graham, 1935, pp. 58-65).
15

Legal Model:
When it comes to the legal model, the standards for determining usage of the
model are inherently broad. This study will therefore rely on the following dictum, “the
actions of governmental officials must have their basis in public law, not in the pecuniary
interests of private entrepreneurs and owners or in the fiduciary concerns of public
managers (Moe & Gilmour, 1995, p. 138).” This broad definition is necessary because
legal accountability can differ in appearance based on the official or organization that is
taking the action and on the type of situation that is involved (Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe &
Gilmour, 1995; Rohr, 1986). It also depends upon the type of legal question that is raised
for resolution. For example, legal accountability can depend on whether an issue is
constitutional, statute-based, procedural or factual (Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe & Gilmour,
1995; Rohr, 1986).
As to the official and organization, the choice of rule is based on whether the
action comes from Congress, an administrative agency or concerns an individual official
or municipal corporation (Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe & Gilmour, 1995; Rohr, 1986). These
decisions are then also informed by case law in an Anglo-American common law system.
The last is the basic point: legal accountability exists when authority for action and the
mechanisms for tracking such action lie within the legal system itself.
Performance-Based Management Accountability:
This study shall find that performance-based management accountability (often
called performance accountability) exists when we find that measureable standards are
used in an attempt to improve government efficiency and effectiveness. This stems from
the basic tenet of this approach, which is the assumption that government is inherently
16

inefficient and ineffective. In order to fix this problem, government should use its
resources in a way that most efficiently produces “performance” via measureable
standard, such as those used in the private sector (Behn, 2001, pp. 152-155; DeLeon,
1998; Kassel, 2008; Radin, 2006, pp. 240-244). Performance accountability argues that
waste and ineffectiveness can only be determined by utilizing measureable standards.
The standards are applied in combination with financial auditing by OMB, the GAO and
other agencies so that the government and the public will be able to determine how
effective government is and how government can best utilize its resources
(ExpectMore.gov, 2009). Tools such as OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool
(PART) provide examples that have been used to measure whether agencies have met
these standards (ExpectMore.gov, 2009).
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY: GENERALIZABILITY, TIME FRAME, LIMITED
MODEL CHOICE AND NO POLICY EVALUATION
Every study has its limitations. In this case, there are four main ones. First, due
to the unique nature of both the events that led to the creation of TARP and ARRA as
well as TARP and ARRA themselves, it might well be that some of the policy tool
choices are not representative of a typical case. Alternatively it might be the case that the
nexus between a particular policy tool and the accountability model that explains it might
be different than what one might normally see. This study presents the analysis as a
critical case study in which the issues are drawn more clearly than normal. However, the
strength of critical case studies is that they can isolate key relationships and address
important questions as well as general hypotheses. Indeed, it is in such dramatic cases
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that the relationships among the varied models and their explanations of behavior would,
or at least should, be particularly clear and significant.
A second potential limitation of this study is related to the limited time frame in
which the case is considered (September 2008-end of January 2010). It is likely true that
more data and perhaps more findings would result if this time frame were extended.
However, in a case study situation, a critical concern is always balancing the value of the
additional data with the complexity that expanding the case might bring. While
additional data will develop over time as to these policies and some data already exists
for the period after the end point of this study, the emphasis here is on policy formulation
and not on implementation. The case already contains more than enough data to examine
the policy tool choices, their development and implementation.
Third, on a related point, a potential limitation is the choice to focus on only four
of the eight accountability models discussed in the literature review. It is possible that
including the four additional models would increase the value of this study at some level.
Nonetheless, when doing research one must always balance the value of any additional
findings with the complexity the additional areas of focus add. It is certainly the case that
future research to examine the explanatory power of the other four models along with the
findings of this study could be valuable. A further discussion of this point is contained in
chapter two.
Fourth, a potential limitation of this study is that it does nothing to evaluate the
effectiveness of the policy tools choice or the resulting policy. It might well be
interesting, for example, to see whether there might be a difference between the
effectiveness of particular policy tools and whether the accountability model that best
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explains the tool choice is a factor in their effectiveness. That is another study for
another day, however, and does not fit within the bounds of this study. The question of
the choice of any particular policy tool is not a statement about whether it was the best
choice or even a good choice.
Conclusion:
This chapter has introduced the study, described the methodology and standards
of analysis as well as the data collection method and some limitations of the study. The
next chapter will discuss the state of the accountability and policy tools literature and
more fully explicate the literature gaps this study intends to address.
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Chapter 2: Framing Policy Tools and Accountability Models
Introduction:
While the first chapter focused primarily on laying out the basic groundwork for
the study as well as the methodology and research strategy, this chapter will focus on the
state of the literature. It will do so in three parts. First, it will explain the state of policy
tools research in order to frame that essential part of this study. Second, it will explain
the state of the accountability literature as well as discuss why this study chooses to focus
on four particular accountability models. Third, it will describe in greater detail the
literature gaps and how this study intends to address them. This chapter will thus make
clear the state of policy tools and accountability research, the existing literature gaps,
why these gaps are important and how this study will address them.
FRAMING THE ANALYSIS: ACCOUNTABILITY MODELS, POLICY TOOL
CHOICES AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS
As discussed in the introduction, this proposal asks how effectively accountability
models explain the policy tool choices chosen to address accountability issues in TARP
and ARRA. In order to best explain the policy tool choices in TARP and ARRA, the
study will focus on the explanatory power of the four main accountability models most
commonly discussed in the accountability literature. These are: (1) political; (2)
professional bureaucratic; (3) legal and (4) performance. While the other four models
discussed below might well add some value to this study, they are not as important to
either the practical or theoretical development of the accountability literature. The
following paragraphs will discuss policy tools literature so that one can understand what
is meant when policy tool choices are discussed.
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Public administration scholars Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram define policy
tools as, “techniques the government uses to achieve policy goals (Schneider & Ingram,
1990, p. 527).” The study of such tools represents one of the most important fields of
new research in modern public administration (Salamon, 2001; Salamon, 2002). As
Lester Salamon writes, “A massive proliferation has occurred in the tools of public
actions, in the instruments or means used to address public problems. Whereas earlier
government action was largely restricted to the direct delivery of goods or services by
government bureaucrats, it now embraces a dizzying array of loans, loan guarantees,
grants, contacts, social regulations, economic regulations, insurance, tax expenditures,
vouchers and more (Salamon, 2002, pp. 1-2) (emphasis in original).”
Salamon argues that there are thirteen different policy tools that government
generally uses when designing public policy (Salamon, 2002, p. 21). They are: (1) direct
government; (2) social regulation; (3) economic regulation; (4) contracting; (5) grants;
(6) direct loans; (7) loan guarantees; (8) insurance; (9) tax expenditures; (10) fees and
charges; (11) liability law; (12) government corporations and (13) vouchers (Salamon,
2002, p. 21). Each of these tools has three primary characteristics: (1) a product/activity
in which it engages, (2) a vehicle it uses to implement this product/activity and (3) a
delivery system to carry out the specific implementation of the product/activity (Salamon,
2002, p. 21).2
Yet, not all policy tools are created equal. As Cooper writes, “there are two types
of devices involved in the general category that is termed “policy tools” and that should

2

Salamon has a chart of each of his thirteen policy tools and their product/activity vehicle and delivery
system on page 21 of his book. (Salamon, 2002, p. 21).
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be recognized as distinct (Cooper P. J., 2009, pp. 230-231).” Cooper titles these two
groups “policy mechanisms (Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231)” and “policy instruments
(Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231).” Policy mechanisms are “devices that operate on the basis
of some identifiable mobile force that makes them attractive to use in certain
circumstances (Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231).” These policy mechanisms are, in Cooper’s
view, well encapsulated in Salamon’s list of policy tools (Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231;
Salamon, 2002, p. 21).
By contrast, policy instruments are the “authoritative policy documents and
processes that put those devices into operation (Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231).” They are, in
short, the actual resulting policies themselves, such as statutes, regulations, treaties and
executive orders (Cooper P. J., 2009, pp. 230-231). Cooper argues that is important to
recognize this distinction because policy mechanisms and policy instruments operate on
“different principles (Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231)” and thus must be considered to be
distinct, if closely related, phenomena.
For the purposes of this research, we focused primarily on what Cooper would
call policy mechanisms (Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231) . This is because while the
overarching policy itself is clearly a policy instrument, the main level at which
accountability models operate is believed to be at the mechanism level. Although it is
certainly true that exploring the intersection of policy instruments and accountability
models might well be a future research topic worth pursuing, it was not pursued here.
Since these policy tools lend themselves so well to comparison with our
accountability models, and since they are well accepted within the field, this study will
frame the study of each of its accountability models in policy tools literature. This will
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allow for the analysis of this case and these four models to be doubly grounded in the
established literature of both policy tools and accountability models. The following
section will discuss in more detail the research process and data collection strategy this
study proposes to utilize.
THE ACCOUNTABILITY LITERATURE: DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE
PROBLEM AND HOW TO ADRESS IT:
British scholar Peter Barberis wrote that, “the main components of accountability
are set out under five headings: who is accountable; for what; to whom (or what); through
what mechanism; and with what kind of accountability outcome (Barberis, 1998, p.
466).” Each model of accountability discussed in the literature answers these questions
in different ways. Eight primary models of accountability are commonly discussed in the
literature: (1) political accountability; (2) professional bureaucratic; (3) legal
accountability; (4) performance-based; (5) ethical; (6) market; (7)
managerial/organizational and (8) contract. All of these accountability models provide a
different answer to the five questions posed by Barberis and thus address different ways
of ensuring accountable governance.
Yet for all the accountability literature that exists, there still exist three major gaps
in the literature. First, there is the false assumption that there is one universally best
model of accountability; second, there is a lack of side by side testing of accountability
models, third, there is lack of literature matching policy tools and accountability models
in policy design. This study seeks to address these gaps.
This chapter will provide a description of each model, as well as a discussion of
policy tools, including its leading figures, theoretical bases and primary approaches
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(sometimes called decision rules). While only the first four models discussed will be
examined in full due to the fact that they dominate the accountability literature, it is
important to examine the full state of the literature before continuing. The study develops
these models more fully when they are applied in the following chapters; the purpose
here is primarily to introduce them so as to explain the varied approaches and the
problems that remain despite these approaches.
Political Model: Accountability through Representation and Oversight
The oldest and most established accountability model in the literature is political
accountability. It traces its roots back to Aristotle’s politics, through Locke’s treatises on
government, then through the federalists and beyond to modern political scientists such
as Fenno and Mayhew (Aristotle, 350 BCE; Fenno, 1978; Finer, 1941; Hamilton, Jay, &
Madison, 1787-1788; Locke, 1689; Mayhew, 2004). It ranges in scope from broad
treatments of political theory, to the relationship between politics and administration, and
to contemporary debates about the operation of political systems. Yet while the way
authors have described political accountability has differed throughout the model’s long
history, the guiding theoretical bases and decision rules are all grounded in the political
as the core focus of accountability judgments.
There are three basic theoretical bases for political accountability that are
commonly employed in this literature: First and foremost, political accountability
focuses on pursuing the public good, whether narrowly defined in terms of a single
member of Congress or broadly defined as the nation as a whole or in terms of what has
been called the “virtuous life (Aristotle, 350 BCE, pp. Book I-2)”. While the definition
of public good in any case can be problematic, the principle on which is based is doing
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what is in the best interest of the public, or at least the best interest of most of the public
(Finer, 1941, pp. 335-338; Storing, 1964, pp. 40-42). Second and perhaps most
importantly, political accountability relies on being within a legitimized and accepted
system in order to be effective (Mayhew, 2004, pp. 110-115). Thus, political
accountability is commonly thought to require a formally accepted political system since
it draws its power from the legitimacy of the system itself. Third, political accountability
relies on following the political processes of its system in order to ensure accountability
(Mayhew, 2004, pp. 110-115). In other words, political accountability is defined as
primarily based on process and not necessarily outcomes.
There are three primary approaches that those who utilize political accountability
often employ in their decision of how policymakers who operate from the political
perspective actually make their decisions. First, political accountability is utilized in
cases where authority or responsibility for action exists within a system (Mayhew, 2004,
pp. 110-115). In the American system, for example, Congress has the responsibility to
oversee the federal bureaucracy (Finer, 1941, pp. 335-338). The act of doing so is by
itself an act of political accountability. Second, actors utilizing political accountability
must consider whether their actions are in concert with the interests of other political
actors and stakeholders (Fenno, 1978, pp. 133-138; Mayhew, 2004, pp. 22-25). This is
particularly true in the modern context, with its focus on interest groups and on building
coalitions. Third, political accountability is called on when a problem is perceived as a
political, and not a professional or mechanical, problem (Fenno, 1978, pp. 133-138). If
there is a public outcry to respond to a particular problem, it almost by definition
becomes political. Lacking such an outcry, a problem can often be handled within the
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existing professional bureaucratic system and thus may not rely on political
accountability (Finer, 1941, pp. 335-338). Scope does not matter to this last point as a
political problem can be either large or small in scope. It is the fact that it is or becomes
a political problem that counts.
The Professional Bureaucratic Model: Trusting the Professional Expertise of
Administrators to Act in the Public Interest
The history of professional bureaucratic accountability (more commonly called
professional or bureaucratic accountability) is largely the history of modern public
administration, and it traces its roots back to Woodrow Wilson’s well-known 1886
treatise on public administration (Wilson W. , 1886). The professional bureaucratic
model evolved during the progressive era reforms that sought to borrow skills in
administration of public programs and institutions from the emerging professions,
including the scientific management movement. The model thus developed as it was
becoming increasingly apparent that “the amount and complexity of specialized skill
required in connection with every kind of human enterprise (has) vastly increased
(Urwick, 1937, p. 51)” and that technically skilled public administrators were needed
order to handle these complexities. Wilson’s famous article made clear that one needed
to get beyond mere discussions of the political aspects of public work to look at the
techniques by which it was carried out. Indeed by the 1930s when Gulick and Urwick
edited “The papers on the science of administration,” the focus had shifted almost
completely to the political aspects (Friedrich, Beyer, Spero, Miller, & Graham, 1935;
Urwick, 1937; Wilson W. , 1886). The more complex aspect to come was a discussion
started by Fredrich and Finer and further developed by authors like Long and Levitan
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about the role that professional public administrators would play in accomplishing tasks
professionally within a political setting (Levitan, 1946, pp. 565-575; Long, 1952, pp.
809-812; Long, 1954, pp. 23-25). This argument is more commonly known as the
professional vs. political balancing act, and it remains one of the more enduring debates
in public administration to this day.
The theoretical basis of the professional bureaucratic model is the assumption that
the best way for government to remain accountable is by utilizing the technical expertise
of professional administrators (Friedrich, Beyer, Spero, Miller, & Graham, 1935, pp. 5865). Accountable governance should therefore concern itself primarily with doing what
is in the long-range interests of the public (Friedrich, Beyer, Spero, Miller, & Graham,
1935; Jackson, 2009, pp. 66-70; Mulgan, 2000, pp. 555-560). This is intended to help
counterbalance the political leadership of many government branches and to help make
sure that governance is both responsive to the political needs and wants of the day and
mindful of long-term goals and responsibilities (Friedrich, Beyer, Spero, Miller, &
Graham, 1935; Jackson, 2009, pp. 66-70; Mulgan, 2000, pp. 555-560). In short, the role
of public administrators is to be a steadying force to help ensure accountable and
effective governance and delivery of services, even as the political winds invariably shift
over time.
Approaches utilizing this model primarily focus on determining three items: (1)
what the public needs as judged by a professional assessment of problems, contexts and
opportunities; (2) what is in the public’s best long term interests once short term political
demands are filtered out and professional judgment is applied; and (3) how best to utilize
professional and technical expertise to meet these interests (Levitan, 1946, pp. 565-575;
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Long, 1952, pp. 809-812; Long, 1954, pp. 23-25). What separates this from the political
model is this essential focus on professionals determining how to serve the public
interests rather than responding only to the short term political demands of those in power
at any one time. The reasoning is that while political changes may and will occur with
some regularity, the day to day administration of the public’s business has to able to
respond to a range of requirements including representation of the long term public
interest as viewed by professionals (Levitan, 1946, pp. 565-575; Long, 1952, pp. 809812; Long, 1954, pp. 23-25). Professional administrators are needed to ensure the quality
of the large body of work that is not political and to assure that longer term matters have
their lower order politics adjusted by professional knowledge and values (Friedrich,
Beyer, Spero, Miller, & Graham, 1935, pp. 58-65).
The Legal Model: The Core Role of Law as a Basis for Governance, Judicial Review,
Monitoring and Consistent Processes
Legal accountability enjoys a long and storied history, and it is probably the
oldest model of accountability other than political accountability. It is based on the
principal that, as Robert Christensen writes, “the essence of public administration is the
detailed and systematic execution of the public law (Christensen, 2009, p. 602).” More
specifically, it operates from the assumption that we operate under the rule of supremacy
of law, which makes public administration and questions of accountability very different
from the private sector. This topic has been discussed by many authors over the years,
including Moe, Gilmour, Cooper and Rohr among others, and it is also often implied, if
not also expressly discussed, in many legal decisions (Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe &
Gilmour, 1995; Rohr, 1986).
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The theoretical basis of legal accountability is that, “the actions of governmental
officials must have their basis in public law, not in the pecuniary interests of private
entrepreneurs and owners or in the fiduciary concerns of public managers (Moe &
Gilmour, 1995, p. 138).” Indeed, what makes government different from the private or
even the non-profit sector is that in the end, responsibility is due to the system of laws
itself and not to any individual. Those who argue for legal accountability argue that this
reliance on legal systems is essential for effective governance (Gilmour & Jensen, 1998;
Moe & Gilmour, 1995; Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, 2005). This explains why those who
rely strongly on legal accountability are deeply troubled by trends such as government
privatization, which can result in a “wholesale loss of government accountability
(Gilmour & Jensen, 1998, p. 247).” Legal accountability additionally serves as the basis
for legitimate governance according to these authors since those who govern must have
the authority to act and do so within the limits of the law. These authors believe that it is
the departure from this approach that has created difficulty in contemporary governance
(Moe R. C., 1987, pp. 453-454). As Ronald Moe wrote, “a line must separate that which
is public or governmental (while other meanings of public are important, these terms are
used here interchangeably), and that which is private. The configuration of the line may
vary over time and with circumstances, but it is a vital line nonetheless and the
fundamental basis of the line is to be found in public law, not in economic or behavioral
theories (Moe R. C., 1987, p. 454).” This connection between government action and
public laws is thus viewed as the core of American governance and therefore of
accountability.
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Legal accountability has a number of well-established approaches based on the
official or organization that is taking action and on the type of situation that is involved
(Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe & Gilmour, 1995; Rohr, 1986). Legal accountability also
depends upon the type of legal question that is raised for resolution. Thus, decisions
about which rules to apply and how to apply them depend on whether the issue is
constitutional, statute-based, procedural or factual (Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe & Gilmour,
1995; Rohr, 1986). As to the official and organization, the choice of rule is based on
whether the action comes from Congress, an administrative agency or concerns an
individual official or municipal corporation (Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe & Gilmour, 1995;
Rohr, 1986). These decisions are then also informed by case law in an Anglo-American
common law system. What follows are the five main situations in which legal
accountability applies and how it is implemented in each case.
First, legal accountability can be used as a check to ensure that government
action has legal authority to support it, is exercised within an appropriate jurisdiction and
does not violate other provisions of law. In this kind of situation, courts must decide
whether the agency’s actions exceed this standard or, if not, whether they violate
someone’s constitutional rights (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 1984; US Code, 2007, p. 5 USC. 706(2)(A). In the 2007 Supreme Court
decision Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, for example, the US
Supreme Court found that the EPA’s decision not to regulate carbon dioxide emissions
was arbitrary and capricious and thus invalid (Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2007). There are many such legal decisions that have helped define the reach
and therefore the limits of government discretion and authority.
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The second type of situation in which the legal accountability model applies is
when an agency official is accused of violating criminal or civil law (Cooper P. J., 2007,
pp. 247-250). In such a case, the agency itself or a designated individual such as an
inspector general or prosecutor investigates the complaint and then determines who may
have violated the law and what administrative, criminal or civil sanctions to recommend
(Cooper P. J., 2007, pp. 247-250; US Code, 2008, pp. PL 110-409). The focus is on
individual guilt or innocence, not necessarily on the problems of the system itself, as in
the inspector general system (US Code, 2011). This focus on a single case and not on the
system as a whole is in fact a hallmark of legal accountability since, at least in the
American context, the focus is on a case by case basis and not on the whole.
The third type situation involving legal accountability concerns contract disputes
in which the court’s role is both to supervise the dispute and then decide, as a matter of
fact or law, how the dispute should be resolved (Cooper P. J., 2003, p. 145). The focus is
on a case-specific application of the law without any necessary referral to the public
interest. For example, in the case of Hughes Aircraft v. United States, the US Supreme
Court decided that a contractor was not subject to punishment for filing a false claim
since such filings were not against the law at the time they were made (Hughes Aircraft
Company v. United States, 1997). This decision was reached because even though the
prevention of false claims is in the public interest, upholding the law itself, and not the
public interest, is the core value of the legal model (Cooper P. J., 2003, p. 145).
Fourth, legal accountability is used as a way of ensuring compliance with
government obligations and standards. For example, under ARRA, any state agency that
has “received a Notification of Award (NOA) of $25,000 or greater for American
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Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) fund (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts,
2010)” is required to do full reporting of all expenditures of funds on a quarterly basis
(Recovery.gov, 2009; Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2010). The standards for
whether these reports are considered acceptable are the legal standards laid out in the
language of ARRA itself. Thus, legal accountability can be used, on a case by case basis,
to ensure that legal standards are met.
Fifth, legal accountability is used to help ensure that the processes, if not
outcomes, are consistent (Breyer, 2005, pp. 17-21). Every person might not receive the
same outcome, but they should receive the same process (Breyer, 2005, p. 18). This
might seem to be more of a bureaucratic problem, since, after all, government
bureaucracies are formed with the intent of standardizing procedures but it is indeed a
legal one because it has its very roots in that most fundamental of American legal
documents, the US Constitution and specifically the 5th and 14th amendments (Breyer,
2005). Cases in this area prove that legal accountability is essential to ensuring that due
process, and perhaps more importantly, consistent process, are applied in cases of
government action.
The Performance-Based Management Model: Measureable Standards for Success
If one reads the literature of performance accountability, one might get the
impression that it is a new model. It is not and instead traces its history back to the
scientific management movement of the 1920s and 30s. As Harvey Walker wrote in
1937, “the objective of administration is to secure the maximum beneficial result
contemplated by the law with the minimum expenditure of the social resources (Walker,
1937, p. 8).” The way to do this, Walker suggested, was via performance measures
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(Walker, 1937, p. 8). Indeed, the famous “Papers on the Science of Administration”
spend a great deal of time discussing how to apply scientific management to government
work (Gulick & Urwick, 1937).

This model’s authors tend to come from a mix of

private and public sector backgrounds and include Gore, Ostrom, Radin and Behn among
others (Behn, 2001; Gore, 1995; Ostrom, 2008; Radin, 2006).
Performance-based management starts with the assumption that government is
inherently inefficient and ineffective. In order to fix this problem, government should
use its resources in a way that most efficiently produces “performance” via measureable
standards, such as those used in the private sector (Behn, 2001, pp. 152-155; DeLeon,
1998; Kassel, 2008; Radin, 2006, pp. 240-244). This philosophy was well expressed by
President Obama in a speech to Congress in 2009 when he said, “My administration has
also begun to go line by line through the federal budget in order to eliminate wasteful and
ineffective programs (Obama, 2009c).” Such waste and ineffectiveness, performance
accountability argues, can only be minimized by utilizing measureable standards.
The approaches used by performance-based management combine application of
these performance standards with financial auditing by OMB, the GAO and other
agencies, government and the public will be able to determine how effective government
is and how government can best utilize its resources (ExpectMore.gov, 2009). Tools
such as OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) have been employed to
measure whether agencies have met these standards (ExpectMore.gov, 2009). Programs
that perform well under these standards should in theory be rewarded with increased
funds while those that do not should either reform to meet these standards or face cuts, or
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even possibly elimination (Behn, 2001, pp. 152-155; ExpectMore.gov, 2009). Whether
this actually happens in practice, however, is open to much debate.
Market Accountability: Public Choice and a Private Sector Approach
Market accountability is, for some, the parent of performance accountability and
carries echoes of one of the more constant refrains in modern American political
discourse: government needs to run more like a private business (Crawford & Bryce,
2001; DeLeon, 1998, p. 2; Ostrom, 2008, p. xii). Nevertheless, the lines between the
models are not as clear as that even though some of the main proponents of this model
are also advocate a performance approach.
The theoretical basis of market accountability is that government needs to think of
itself less as a regulator and more as a market participant (Ostrom, 2008, p. xii).
Proponents of this model assert that the market will monitor itself and thus maintain
accountability because it is in the interest of the market to do effective work in much the
same way that government does (Ostrom, 2008, p. xii). Market accountability can be
defined fairly broadly, much like a continuum. Those on one end of the continuum argue
that the basis should be usage of efficiency criteria in the way that private sector actors
would use them while the those on other end argue that government should use the type
of decentralized decision making employed in the marketplace (Moe T. M., 2002;
Ostrom, 2008).
Market accountability’s approaches therefore follow a private-sector efficiencybased model for determining success. This is a model in which efficiency is determined
in market terms, either in respect to cost, market comparisons or market choice as in
public choice models, such as vouchers (DeLeon, 1998, pp. 539-542; Ostrom, 2008, pp.
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47-54). Often, the model boils down to the basic decision rule that whatever produces
the most for the least is superior, whether or not it is a private sector or government
approach and regardless of the area being discussed. Whether this is true is a matter of
debate (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 40-46).
Unlike performance accountability, market accountability does not regard any
function of government as necessarily needing to be performed by the government itself
(Chubb & Moe, 1988, pp. 1067-1070; Ostrom, 2008, p. 16; Savas, 2000, pp. 237-258).
If, for example, public safety services could be provided more efficiently by the private
sector, market accountability would suggest that this path be taken even though public
safety is viewed by virtually every other accountability model as an inherently
governmental function. Also unlike performance accountability, the standards for
determining success under market accountability come from the marketplace and, at
most, include limited input from the public sector (Ostrom, 2008, pp. 47-54). Whereas in
performance accountability, agencies such as the OMB and GAO play a key role in
setting and enforcing standards, market accountability does not believe their input should
matter much, if at all.
Ethical Model: Subjective Standards Based on Various Ethical Norms
Even though the law may mean different things in different contexts, decisions
arising in cases of legal accountability still begin from the rules and laws as they are
written. Ethical accountability is not so clearly defined. Instead it is based on value
choices which are then framed as accountability rules. A number of theorists have
approached ethical accountability from different perspectives, including Terry Cooper,
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John Rohr, Anthony Downs and Joseph Fletcher (Cooper T. L., 2006; Downs, 1965;
Fletcher, 1965; Rohr, 1989)
There are three primary considerations with regard to the theoretical basis for
ethical accountability. First, ethical accountability is based in the fundamental belief
system of a group, culture or person (Fletcher, 1965; Rohr, 1989). In short, they are the
morals or values of different individuals or groups. Second, ethical accountability is
unchecked by any formal system (Fletcher, 1965; Rohr, 1989). While formal systems
may certainly rely on ethical accountability, the essential check with regard to ethical
systems is through informal systems in which group norms may result in pressure for
conformity but not in the same manner as formal rules. Third, ethical accountability
changes relatively slowly because it is typically based on closely held values which are
not themselves easily changed (Rohr, 1989, pp. 65-75). This is unlike legal
accountability, where change in the legal system can happen much more quickly since it
does not rely on changing closely held values.
Although many types of ethical accountability that exist within modern
government, three are particularly important. First, the regime ethics approach relies on a
society’s values for determining what the correct path to follow is. As John Rohr writes,
“Regime values refer to the values of that political entity that was brought into being by
the ratification of the Constitution that created the present American republic. (Rohr,
1989, p. 68)” Government should therefore be accountable on the basis of the regime’s
values expressed formally through its law and informally through society at large (Rohr,
1989, pp. 68-75).
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The second approach to ethical accountability is known as the personal ethics
model and asserts that professionals are best able to determine whether their actions are
ethical (Cooper P. J., 2007, p. Ch. 13). This is similar to the professional bureaucratic
model in that professionals make the key decisions. The key distinction is that there is no
necessary check on the exercise of individual ethical decision-making, arguably leading
to a hodgepodge of disparate ethical choices (Cooper P. J., 2007, p. Ch. 13; Downs,
1967).
The third approach to ethical accountability is situational ethics and involves the
substitution of personal or organizational principles or criteria in place of what would
otherwise be regarded as recognized or accepted legal and moral criteria (Fletcher, 1965;
Price, 2006). As Joseph Fletcher writes in his classic "Situation Ethics", this kind of
ethics, “calls upon us to keep law in a subservient place, so that only love and reason
really count when the chips are down (Fletcher, 1965, p. 31). (Emphasis in original)”
Situational ethics are oftentimes referred to in other literature as “groupthink (Janis, 1972,
p. 9)” since they often result from justifications of otherwise unethical actions taken by
groups. This is particularly important for public administrators since they must often
balance not only legal but ethical concerns as well (Cooper T. L., 2006, pp. 66-84). As
Terry Cooper’s well-known decision making model shows, the appropriate decision for a
public administrator requires balancing moral rules, considering alternatives that fit
within an organization’s norms, consulting ethical principles and then finally seeing if the
resulting decision fits within a person’s moral framework (Cooper T. L., 2006, p. 20).
This application of situational ethics is not easy to do but is nonetheless essential to
effective and accountable public administration.
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Managerial/Organizational Accountability: Looking at Accountability from a Leadership
Point of View
Closely related to the professional/bureaucratic model is the so-called managerial
model. What differentiates the two is that this model focuses on managerial decisions
rather than on day to day decisions by professional public administrators. This model
relies on the work of organizational theorists such as Mintzberg, Perrow and Romzek and
Ingraham.
The theory behind this model is that accountability is ensured primarily by
balancing formal and informal systems in an organizational setting from a management
perspective (Mintzberg, 1983, pp. 23-28; Perrow, 1986; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000, pp.
242-243). This model is most concerned with what drives management decisions, with
the model positing several considerations that managers balance based on the situation
(Romzek & Dubnick, 1987, pp. 227-230).
As for its decision rules, Romzek and Ingraham provide one approach by positing
that there are four main types of accountability--two formal and two informal (Romzek &
Ingraham, 2000, pp. 242-243). They are: (1) traditional hierarchical accountability,
which relies on maintaining accountability via formal top-down organizational methods;
(2) legal accountability, which relies on formal compliance with external legal constraints
and laws; (3) professional accountability, which relies on informally allowing
professional discretion to play a role in key day to day decisions; and (4) political
accountability, which relies on informal responsiveness to external stakeholders, whether
they are politicians, interest groups or simply the public at large (Romzek & Ingraham,
2000, pp. 242-243). Under this model, those at the top begin the formal decision-making
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process by setting basic goals about what an organization can and should do (Mintzberg,
1983, pp. 23-28; Perrow, 1986; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000, pp. 242-243). Internal, often
hidden, processes then influence how these decisions are actually implemented.
Contract Accountability: Negotiated Relationships in the Public Eye
While legal accountability focuses primarily on vertical relationships within the
legal system, contract accountability focuses on the horizontal relationships that exist
throughout the entire contracting process. Since modern government contracts out so
much of its work, contracting accountability has become a primary concern for modern
governance. It relies heavily on the work of theorists such as Cooper and Keyes (Cooper
P. J., 2003; Keyes, 2000)
From a theoretical perspective, contracting accountability focuses on how best to
manage contractual relationships in order to get a good deal for the public (Cooper P. J.,
2003, pp. 1-13). This relationship is essentially negotiated and yet must operate in a
public setting (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 1-13). This requires that accountability operate at
the intersection of both the private relationship between multiple parties and the public
nature of government work (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 1-13). At its root, contracts are
individual sets of relationships, each with its own rules of operation and requirements for
accountability.
The decision rules of contracting accountability rely on a complex balance of six
main factors: (1) economy or cost; (2) efficiency; (3) effectiveness; (4) responsiveness to
the public; (5) responsibility or accountability to the government and (6) equity (Cooper
P. J., 2003, pp. 1-7) . Contracting choices inevitably involve trade-offs between these
criteria (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 1-7). For example, a focus on economy, which typically
39

means a lower-priced contract, will often require a higher level of continuing
governmental oversight and thus may cost more to make accountable than a low-cost
contract (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 143-155; Strayhorn, 2006, pp. 28-38).
As noted above, a focus on contract accountability throughout the process is
essential because, among other things, a contract is a negotiated agreement that can be
changed at any time. Particularly with longer-term contracts, one must assume that
conditions will change and that there will be a need for what are known as change orders
(Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 106-108; Keyes, 2000, pp. 14-22). Although some contractors
may have a history of abusing change orders, most change orders are necessary parts of
the contracting process due to changing market conditions, such as an increase in fuel or
steel prices (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 106-108; Keyes, 2000, pp. 474-476).
WHY THESE FOUR MODELS? IMPORTANCE TO THE LITERATURE,
APPLICABILTY TO THE CASE AND DELINEATION OF DIFFERENCES
The question has been asked why this study chose to focus only on political,
performance, professional and legal accountability. While there is certainly a case to be
made that other models have value, the choice of these four models is proper for three
primary reasons. First, the four selected models are all important to contemporary
accountability literature. Political accountability is foundational to understanding both
how politicians act to serve their own constituents as well as their role in overseeing the
government. Professional accountability is important to understanding how and why
professional administrators act as they do. Legal accountability is important to
understanding how the legal system and the rule of law impact government action.
Finally, performance accountability is important to understanding the value of numerical40

based data in ensuring government efficiency and effectiveness. Indeed, one could make
an argument that the other four models highlighted in this chapter flow from these four
basic models and there is strong evidence in the literature to suggest that. The bottom
line is that the literature review shows that these four models are more prominent and
important than the other alternatives.
Second, the four models chosen are clearly present in the cases chosen. One does
not have to look far to find examples of each of these models in both TARP and ARRA.
In relation to TARP, for example, Congress authorized creation of both a special
inspector general, which focused primarily on legal accountability, as well as a
congressional oversight panel, which focused primarily on professional, performance and
political accountability. In relation to ARRA, the Recovery.gov website alone contains
data such as “jobs created or saved (a classic exercise of political accountability as well
as performance accountability) and the implementing regulations from OMB rely heavily
on legal accountability and professional accountability in order to ensure their
effectiveness (Recovery.gov, 2010). Since these models are present in the case, they are
clearly appropriate models for this case.
Third, choosing these four models allows for fairly clear lines to be drawn
between the models. This is particularly important for legal and performance
accountability. If ethical accountability were added, the lines between what is a matter of
legal accountability and what is a matter of ethical accountability could get blurred and
make clear findings difficult. In relation to performance accountability, were market
accountability added, it could be difficult to distinguish between what is a market
accountability-type standard and what is more traditional performance accountability
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standard. Therefore, to avoid this needless confusion, only these four models have been
chosen.
In the end, it is likely that including all eight of these models, instead of only four,
could increase the value of this study in some respects. However, the purpose here is to
test individual models that are more widely used in the field and more importantly
perhaps, are clearly at use in this case. It is certainly the case that future research to
examine the explanatory power of the other four models along with the findings of this
study could be valuable.
LITERATURE GAPS; SEPARABLE MODELS, LACK OF TESTING OF MODELS
SIDE BY SIDE, LACK OF CONNECTION BTWEEN POLICY TOOLS AND
ACCOUNTABILTY MODELS IN POLICY DESIGN
While the eight accountability models described above cover much of what
government needs to consider in terms of accountability, there are three areas where the
current literature falls short. The first is that the literature posits that these models of
accountability are separable and that there is generally one right way to ensure
accountability. The second is a lack of side by side testing of accountability models. The
third is a lack of connection between policy tools and accountability models in policy
design. These gaps will be briefly discussed in the section below.
As stated above, the first literature gap this study will address is that the literature
posits that these models of accountability are separable and that there is generally one
right way to ensure accountability. For example, Ostrom argues that the best way to view
accountability is a private-sector market-based approach while Mayhew argues that the
best way is via a political approach (Mayhew, 2004, pp. 22-25; Ostrom, 2008, p. xii).
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The fact of the matter is that there is no one right way to ensure accountability and that no
accountability model exists in a vacuum by itself. Instead, these accountability models
are best applied in concert with one another. For example, while it is clear that TARP is
primarily concerned with performance-based accountability as one can see through its
limited rules on the expenditure of funds by TARP recipients, TARP also utilizes at least
three other models: (1) political accountability (through the creation of the Congressional
Oversight Panel (COP)), (2) legal accountability (through the monitoring of the Special
Inspector General for TARP (SIGTARP) and (3) to a certain extent, professional
accountability (as a result of the fair amount of discretion given to the US Treasury in
dispersing TARP funds) (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009; SIGTARP, 2009).

It is

this study’s assertion that any one model alone only explains, at best, part of the policy
tool choices in either of these two cases.
Second, the literature consists largely of authors who advocate their particular
model and thus do not present side by side applications with other models. For example,
Robert Behn writes repeatedly that the only correct way to approach government
accountability is to utilize “tactics and strategies that seek to enhance the performance of
the public sector-to improve the ability of government agencies and their nonprofit and
for-profit collaborators to produce results (emphasis in original) (Behn, 2001, p. 26).”
Behn is but one example of the accountability literature’s refusal to utilize a comparative
side by side approach. It is this study’s belief that utilizing a multi-model approach will
explain significantly more than a single-model approach.
Third, there exists a lack of literature connecting accountability models and policy
tools are applied together in policy design. This is somewhat understandable as policy
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tools are a relatively new field and the literature as a whole is still relatively small. This
study believes addressing this gap is important because if we are to be able to design
accountable policies, knowing which accountability models match up best with which
policy tools will help us do. While this study will not by itself fill this gap, it may go a
fair distance to start to fill it.
These are not the only literature gaps present in the accountability literature.
However, they represent three of the most important issues in accountability literature
today. Filling these gaps will significantly help improve the state of the literature.
Conclusion:
Now that this study has outlined the study as a whole, its methodology and
research strategy and the status of the literature, it will now proceed to discuss the two
specific cases at hand. In the next two chapters, first TARP and then ARRA will be
described as a case and findings will be presented as to what the top policy tools were
and the accountability models they appeared to rely upon. This will set the stage for the
final chapter where we will discuss what it all means for both the cases specifically and
the literature as a whole.
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Chapter 3: The Story of TARP
The following two chapters will discuss the background, policy tools and
accountability models present in each of the two cases, beginning with TARP in this
chapter. This chapter will first describe the background of TARP and the history that led
to the need for TARP. Next, this chapter will describe how the policy was designed
relative to policy tools and accountability models. This chapter will then move on to
discuss the top four policy tools used in TARP and which accountability models were
applied in relation to each policy tool. It will also discuss additional models that were
expected to be used or asserted as being used but were not, in fact, utilized, such as
economic regulation.
This chapter will reveal that there were four main policy tools used in relation to
TARP and that three of the four policy tools (the exception being grants) can be at least
partially explained by more than one accountability model. This reveals that for the most
part, the contention that multiple accountability models better explain policy tool choice
is correct.
This chapter will begin however, with a discussion of how TARP became
necessary in the first place since this crisis was a long time coming. As one
Congressional Research Service report put it, “The roots of the crisis go back much
further (Jickling, 2010, p. 2)” than just 2007-2008. This chapter will then discuss how
credit default swaps and derivatives work so as to explicate may understand the main
factors that led to this crisis.
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A PROBLEM LONG COMING: HOW DEREGULATION AND IGNORING
WARNING SIGNS LED TO A FINANCIAL MELTDOWN
The financial crisis of 2008 did not come out of nowhere. Something like it had
been predicted for years but little was done to stop it. Instead, the mantra of the
beneficial effects of deregulation had been going since at least the Carter administration
(Cooper P. J., 2009, pp. 15-21). This section is divided into four components: first, the
savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s, second, the deregulation of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, third, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 and fourth, the corporate
governance scandals of 2001-02. Each of these events was a watershed moment in
deregulation that helped lay the groundwork for the 2008 financial crisis.
The Savings and Loan Crisis:
Savings and loans, also known by their original name of “thrifts”, trace their roots
back to 1831, as a community-based, not-for-profit way to loan and save funds (Mason,
2010, p. 1). Before the creation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac after World War II,
savings and loans were perhaps the primary way by which middle and lower income
people were able to buy homes (Mason, 2010, pp. 1-2). Savings and loans dealt
primarily with what is known as an “amortizing mortgage”, in which a person paid back
both the principal and the associated interest at the same time over an extended period
(originally eight to ten years) (Mason, 2010, pp. 1-2). This type of mortgage is the
model for most home mortgages in the modern marketplace. Indeed, a broad expansion
in home ownership was exactly what the savings and loans wanted; they “believed they
were part of a broader social reform effort and not a financial industry (Mason, 2010, pp.
4-5).”
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Savings and loans also had a specific advantage in that they could afford to
provide higher interest rates to depositors since their loans were generally considered
safer and it was much harder to withdraw funds because only limited amounts could be
withdrawn at any time. That, combined with longer term loans, led to rapid growth in the
industry. In 1945, savings and loans held about $8.7 billion in assets; by 1965 that sum
had exploded to more than $129 billion. By 1965 savings and loans controlled 26 percent
of consumer savings and provided 46 percent of loans for single-family homes (United
States Savings and Loan League, 1966, p. 92).

This threatened the established

commercial banking sector, which engaged in rate wars in which banks and savings and
loans would periodically increase interest rates for depositors (Mason, 2010, pp. 8-10).
These rate wars became so severe that they ultimately prompted Congressional action.
In 1966, Congress passed laws setting specific rates for both banks and savings
and loans, with savings and loans only being allowed to provide marginally higher rates
than commercial banks (Mason, 2010). This put dramatic limits on the industry’s growth
and ended up leading to the consolidation of smaller savings and loans into larger ones.
Although the assets held by savings and loans increased to $579 billion by 1979, the
number of savings and loans plummeted from 6,071 in 1996 to 4,709 in 1979 (United
States Savings and Loan League, 1980, pp. 48-51). Even with increasing size, many in
the savings and loan industry still argued that regulation was holding them back. With
demand rising to deregulate the industry and a favorable attitude towards deregulation set
by President Carter, Congress passed laws removing rate controls in 1979 (Mason, 2010,
pp. 7-8). This proved not to be enough to help savings and loans as the doubling of oil
prices led to both higher interest and inflation, threatening the savings and loan industry
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as a whole (Mason, 2010, pp. 7-8). In response, Congress passed two laws, the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St.
Germain Act of 1982, which together allowed savings and loans to act like banks and not
just home lenders, but without the oversight that was a part of normal commercial banks
(Mason, 2010, pp. 9-10).
For a while, this appeared to work. Even though some savings and loans failed,
the industry grew as a whole. Nonetheless, problems quickly emerged. Lender fraud and
corruption became epidemic, with the failure of Empire Savings in Texas costing
taxpayers nearly $300 million in 1984 (Mason, 2010, pp. 9-10). In addition, and
although most deposits were insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC), many were insured by far less financially stable state systems
(Mason, 2010, pp. 9-10). These systems began to crack as deregulation led to unwise
lending, runaway growth and investments in industries other than traditional home loans.
In a tale that seems all too familiar today, this led the savings and loan industry to the
brink of insolvency. In 1987, GAO declared the FSLIC insolvent, although Congress
delayed resolution of the problem for a few years by replenishing FSLIC’s funds. In
1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act,
which regulated and bailed out the industry (Cooper P. J., 2009; Mason, 2010; Barth,
1991). By the time the smoke had cleared, the savings and loans crisis had resulted in the
loss of more than $600 billion in assets previously held by savings and loans--a warning
that deregulation was perhaps not the panacea it was often said to be.

48

Privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
The Federal National Mortgage Association, better known as Fannie Mae, was
created in 1938 to provide federal funds to banks in order to allow for greater home
ownership (Pickert, 2008, p. 1). Fannie Mae effectively created what is known today as
the secondary mortgage market, which allows banks to make more loans by buying
Federal Housing Agency (FHA) insured mortgages (Alford, 2003). This policy worked
especially following World War II as more and more people bought homes (Alford,
2003).
For nearly thirty years, Fannie Mae was effectively the only player in the
secondary mortgage market. In 1968, however, Fannie Mae was split into two entities, a
publicly financed organization on the one hand and a private corporation on the other
(Koppell, 2001, pp. 469-470). The publicly financed organization, colloquially known as
Ginnie Mae, continued to guarantee the value of mortgages to veterans and government
employees while the original Fannie Mae no longer guaranteed the value of mortgages to
most of the market (Reiss, 2008, pp. 1027-1033). In 1970, and in order to increase the
size of the home loan market, Congress passed the Emergency Home Finance Act of
1970, which created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, better known as
Freddie Mac (Alford, 2003). Freddie Mac took the secondary mortgage market to a new
level by creating “mortgage backed securities”, under which mortgages would be pooled
and sold as a group. This increased the amount of funds available for home loans and
once again increased home ownership. As with the post-1968 Fannie Mae, there was no
actual guarantee that the government would back failed loans, but there was an assumed
guarantee of sorts (Reiss, 2008, pp. 1042-1045). Specifically, it was assumed that the
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government would bail out Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac if it was ever needed so that the
risk was far lower than might otherwise be thought. In fact, CBO director Daniel
Crippen told Congress in 2001 that “debt and mortgage-backed securities of GSEs are
more valuable to investors than similar private securities because of the perception of a
government guarantee. (Crippen, 2001).” This implicit but not actual guarantee
contributed much to the 2008 financial crisis. The assumption was why worry if Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac were going to be bailed out if there was ever a problem. This
assumption would also be sorely tested in the 2008 financial crisis.
Repealing the Glass–Steagall Act:
When the economy crumbled during the great depression, one of the greatest
governmental concerns was ensuring the stability of the remaining banks. A major
concern at the time was that banks were engaging in both deposits/loans and investments,
thereby putting depositor funds at risk in the case of market downturns (Freidman &
Schwartz, 1993, pp. 71-77). Many in Congress argued that this had to change and that
banks should be split into two categories. The first would be commercial banks, with
deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which would be
able to engage in short-term loans and accept deposits (Burns, 1974, pp. 77-90; Kennedy,
1973, pp. 140-145). The second were investment banks, which would be allowed to take
funds and invest them in the broader marketplace (Burns, 1974, pp. 77-90; Kennedy,
1973, pp. 140-145). These changes were codified into the Banking Act of 1933, better
known as the Glass-Steagall Act after its chief sponsors, Senator Carter Glass (D-VA)
and Representative Henry Steagall (D-AL). The law overwhelmingly passed Congress
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and was signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on June 16, 1933 (Burns,
1974, pp. 77-90; Kennedy, 1973, pp. 140-145).
The most important, and for some problematic, aspect of the act was the creation
of so-called firewalls which separated the commercial and investment halves of banks
(Hendrickson, 2001, pp. 849-852). This meant that they could not coordinate with each
other and would in effect have to operate as separate entities. By ensuring that there were
two distinct parts to banks that had to operate as separate entities, this would, it was
thought, decrease the risk of bank failure by providing for a separation of different
activities with different sets of incentives. Although it restricted bank growth in the short
term, the long term effect on stability of the system was considered more important by
those behind Glass-Steagall (Burns, 1974, pp. 77-90; Kennedy, 1973, pp. 140-145).
Although constant attempts were made to repeal it, the law largely stood
untouched for more than sixty years. In the early 1990s, however, pressure built to
change the law as commercial banks complained that their growth was hurt by limits on
their investment opportunities (Hendrickson, 2001, pp. 849-852). Reform was broadly
supported by many in Congress as well as the administration. President Clinton himself
argued that the Glass-Steagall Act needed to change and pushed strongly for its repeal
(Glater, 1995, p. C1). President Clinton argued that the act was no longer appropriate to
the current environment (Clinton, 1999b). As he said when a repeal was eventually
signed “It is true that the Glass-Steagall law is no longer appropriate to the economy as it
was presently formed. It worked pretty well for the industrial economy, which was highly
organized, much more centralized and much more nationalized than the one in which we
operate today. But the world is very different (Clinton, 1999b).”
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In 1995, an attempt to repeal the act, led by Representative Jim Leach (R-IA)
failed. After the 1998 elections, Leach chose to try again. In 1999, the Senate passed a
law repealing the separation of commercial and investment activities on a party line vote
(Hendrickson, 2001, pp. 849-852; US Senate, 1999). The House took a far more
generous view and passed the repeal by a vote of 343-86 (Clerk of the US House, 1999).
Shortly thereafter, President Clinton willingly signed the repeal (Clinton, Statement on
Signing the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, 1999). The firewalls were gone and the banking
sector was now allowed to openly engage in both commercial and banking activities as a
single unit. This action has been widely credited with being perhaps the single largest
regulatory change that allowed the financial crisis of 2008 to occur (Cooper P. J., 2009,
pp. 67-68, 73-74; Markham, 2010; White, 2010)
The Corporate Governance Scandals of 2001-02, the Case of Enron:
In 1979, the Northern Natural Gas Company was reorganized as the largest
subsidiary of a holding company known as InterNorth, a company which specialized in
investments in energy industries and plastics (BBC, 2002). In 1985, InterNorth
purchased the Houston Natural Gas Company, a leader in the growing natural gas
industry (BBC 2002). InterNorth was reorganized and renamed Enron later that year
(BBC 2002).
For approximately the first eight years of its new existence, Enron was a growing
company specializing in delivering power and natural gas (and later water as well),
growing comfortably but not spectacularly (Gilliam & Martin, 2007, p. 930). In 1993,
however, Enron began to engage in “limited liability special purpose entities (Gilliam &
Martin, 2007, p. 931)” (SPE), which allowed it to tout its profits but hide its liabilities
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from public view. This allowed Enron to grow rapidly and it quickly became the darling
of the corporate world--even being named “America’s Most Innovative Company” for six
straight years by Fortune Magazine (Gilliam & Martin, 2007, pp. 930-932).
Unfortunately, Enron’s profits were not real and the company was increasingly
teetering on the brink of collapse for three reasons (Gilliam & Martin, 2007, pp. 930933). First, Enron was using these SPEs to hide losses and was, in addition, lying about
its profits. As one analysis wrote “Contrary to the perception that leverage disciplines
management (Jensen 1986), it appears Enron used leverage to manipulate reported
earning (Gilliam & Martin, 2007, p. 931).” Second, Enron’s auditor, the well-respected
firm Arthur Andersen, failed to detect and report potential problems (Gilliam & Martin,
2007, pp. 930-933). Third, Enron incentivized short-term gains, which were often
illusory, over long-term sustainability (Gilliam & Martin, 2007, pp. 930-933). This set
Enron up for a collapse, and collapse it did-- declaring bankruptcy in November 2001.
In response to the corporate governance and regulatory failures of Enron and
similar cases such as WorldCom, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002
(Kimmel, Kieso, & Weygandt, 2009, p. 337). Among other things, the act created the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, required additional auditor independence,
made corporate executives more responsible for accurate reporting, increased required
financial disclosures and tried to limit conflicts of interest between stock analysts and the
industries they analyzed (Kimmel, Kieso, & Weygandt, 2009, p. 337). However, the law
was attacked as too restrictive almost immediately upon its passage, and many in
Congress sought to limit the funds provided for its enforcement (Kimmel, Kieso, &
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Weygandt, 2009, p. 337). The result was that the increase in regulations was largely
illusory.
Derivatives: A Largely Unregulated and Large Marketplace
One of the main financial instruments that led to the 2008 crisis was derivatives.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency defines derivatives as follows “A
derivative is a financial contract whose value is derived from the performance of
underlying market factors, such as interest rates, currency exchange rates, and
commodity, credit, and equity prices. Derivative transactions include an assortment of
financial contracts, including structured debt obligations and deposits, swaps, futures,
options, caps, floors, collars, forwards, and various combinations thereof (Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, 2013).” Derivatives are largely not traded on public
exchanges. As the Economist notes, the total derivative market in 2012 was estimated at
$700 trillion, with only $83 trillion traded on public exchanges (The Economist, 2012, p.
83). The result was that the market was, and remains, largely unregulated, and is an
extremely high risk environment in which to operate.
In 2008, these derivatives were a huge part of the financial crisis. As Professor
Michael Greenberger said before a hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
“What you have is a $600 trillion notional value market that is completely unregulated
and dark; therefore regulators don't know what's happening out there, market observers
don't know what's happening out there, and that led to a belief that we needed to rescue
the entire market in the fall of 2008 (Greenberger, 2010).” This unregulated market of
derivatives presented a huge potential pitfall for the economy and was problematic to
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rescue as well. After all, how can something be rescued if the value of the item being
rescued isn’t specifically established?
Credit Default Swaps: Private Loan Insurance
There is an old saying on Wall Street that if allowed to do so, the financial
markets will find a way to make money on anything. Such is the case with credit-default
swaps (CDS), which were created by Blythe Masters of JP Morgan Chase in 1994
(Simkovic & Kaminetzky, 2011, pp. 118-124). A CDS is essentially another form of
loan insurance. Specifically, someone issuing a loan will sell a CDS to a buyer who
purchases a loan with the assurance that if the loan defaults, the buyer will receive the
value of the loan (Simkovic & Kaminetzky, 2011, pp. 118-124). The cost of the swap is
typically determined by the risk of the loan. It works even if the loan defaults as long as
the asset on which the loan is based does not substantially decline in value (Simkovic &
Kaminetzky, 2011, pp. 118-124)
Credit default swaps were largely unregulated. Even though some investment
entities, most notably AIG, sold insurance for credit default swaps, they were not
required to hedge such insurance in case the value of the assets behind these credit
default swaps decreased. When it did decrease during the 2008 financial crisis, AIG was
in trouble and something like TARP was needed (Economist 2009). TARP, and the
events leading up to it, are explained more fully in the next section.
Conclusion:
These actions set the stage for what would become the financial crisis of 2008.
Decades of deregulation and the ethos that the private sector worked best when it was
least watched by the government left the door wide open to abuse. Abused it was, with
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the greatest financial crisis since the great depression as a result. This chapter will now
discuss the specific legislative history and design of TARP.
THE CASE OF TARP, ATTTEMPTING TO STEM A FINAN CIAL SECTOR CRISIS:
The specific policy that became TARP developed as a result of four sets of
events, all of which took place between September 7 and October 3, 2008. These were:
(1) the initial collapse and the resulting events it triggered, (2) the immediate policy
reactions, (3) the initial failure of the first version of TARP in the US House and (4) the
final design and passage of the bill. These stages represent both the crisis itself and the
initial attempts to respond, first by executive action and then via Congress.
The Initial Collapse:
There had been mounting signs for years that the US housing market was at a
breaking point. Lack of regulation, overbuilding in growing markets and risky loans had
made the housing industry very vulnerable. Economist Robert Shiller foresaw the
housing market collapse in 2005, arguing that "The home-price bubble feels like the
stock-market mania in the fall of 1999, just before the stock bubble burst in early 2000,
with all the hype, herd investing and absolute confidence in the inevitability of continuing
price appreciation (Laing, 2005, p. 1)." Yet unlike the economic collapse of 2000, the
housing market and the industries that relied on it, such as construction and the financial
services industry, were far more integral to the overall economy than the tech companies
had been. Indeed, the Bureau of Economic statistics estimates that the housing market
directly, in and of itself, accounts for about 18% of GDP, with the financial services
industry adding another 8% of GDP (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009).
Things came to a head on September 7, 2008, when the US Treasury seized
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control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which had become unable to continue providing
the financing needed to properly collateralize the loans (Paulson, 2008). This action
wiped out the investors who had bought stock in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in order to
attempt to save the company. This response was, in the words of Federal Housing
Financing Agency director James Lockhart "one of the most sweeping government
interventions in private financial markets in decades (Lockhart, 2008). “ Yet given the
alternative--that loans would be unable to be issued for many individual home
purchasers--the action was seen as necessary (Goldfarb, Cho, & Appelbaum, 2007). As
several members of the House Financial Services committee noted in a September 2008
hearing, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac posed such “systemic risk (US House Financial
Services Committee, 2008, p. 58)” to the financial system as a whole that action had to be
taken to keep them from collapsing (US House Financial Services Committee, 2008, pp.
58-60).
For all the doom and gloom that the collapse of the housing market foretold, it
was dwarfed eight days later by the dual collapse of both Merrill Lynch (which was
purchased by Bank of America) and Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 (Goldfarb,
Cho, & Appelbaum, 2007; US House Financial Services Committee, 2008). This caused
widespread panic in the financial markets for one major reason. If the crisis could take
down two of the most respected investment firms in the country, nothing appeared to be
safe (US House Financial Services Committee, 2008). As Secretary Paulson said in the
House Financial Services Committee hearing noted above, “We must do so in order to
avoid a continuing serial of financial institution failures and frozen credit markets that
threaten American families’ financial wellbeing, the viability of businesses both small
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and large, and the very health of our economy (US House Financial Services Committee,
2008, p. 26).” Sadly this was nowhere near the worst for the economy. Indeed, things
would get worse for the government and the country rather quickly, as events forced the
US Treasury into further action the next day.
The Immediate Federal Response:
On September 16, 2008, only 24 hours after the dual collapse of Merrill Lynch
and Lehman Brothers, the financial market was rocked by another dual set of blows. The
first related to American International Group (AIG) and the second was the money
markets “breaking the buck.”
AIG had long been a leader in the insurance industry, amassing some $81 billion
in assets by early 2005, making it one of the largest financial services companies in the
world (Zuill, 2009). AIG typically specialized in providing insurance to larger
companies, and was very successful. However, after years of having grown comfortably
but within established rules, AIG began to take some serious risks in the early 2000s,
moving into areas such as derivatives and credit default swaps (Insurance Journal, 2004).
These largely unregulated areas provided problematic for AIG as it was hit with a series
of penalties from 2002-2005, which totaled nearly $2 billion for violating regulatory
protocols and as a result of “steering” business to insurers from whom AIG received
illegal kickbacks (Woehr, 2010; Insurance Journal, 2004; Zuill, 2009). Unfortunately,
these penalties (which amounted to a fraction of AIG’s next worth), did not do much to
change their behavior as they sunk a lot of money into credit default swaps, which would
prove to be AIG’s downfall (Woehr, 2010; Insurance Journal, 2004; Zuill, 2009).
Early on September 16, 2008, AIG’s credit rating was downgraded (Morgenson,
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2008). The downgrade led to the requirement that AIG post additional collateral when
looking to make credit default swaps. The company did not have the cash on hand to
fulfill this requirement (Morgenson, 2008). This led to a 95% drop in AIG's stock price
in little more than a week, and it raised the fear that the company was about to collapse
(Morgenson, 2008). This was a serious problem since “AIG was so interconnected with
many large commercial banks, investment banks, and other financial institutions through
counterparty credit relationships on credit default swaps and other activities such as
securities lending that its potential failure created systemic risk (Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, 2011, p. 352).” This had been allowed to happen because AIG took
advantage of the loose regulatory infrastructure to increase its business in largely
unregulated markets, including credit default swaps (Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, 2011, pp. 350-354).
Moving quickly, the Federal Reserve acted late on September 16, 2008 and
authorized $85 billion to purchase nearly 80% of AIG in an attempt to stave off this
collapse (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008). This was necessary
because, in the Board’s own words "The Board determined that, in current circumstances,
a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market
fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, and
materially weaker economic performance (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 2008).” In other words, if AIG collapsed it was feared it might take the whole
financial system with it. Indeed, “Without the bailout, AIG’s default and collapse could
have brought down its counterparties, causing cascading losses and collapses throughout
the financial system (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. 352)."
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The second shock to hit the markets on September 16 was the money markets
"breaking the buck", meaning that investors lost money on essential transactions needed
to finance short term debt and operations (Condon, 2008). This historic failure was
principally caused by the Lehman Brothers collapse. The oldest money market in the US,
the Reserve Primary Fund, broke the buck and dropped to 97 cents after writing off
Lehman's debt (Condon, 2008). This was only the fourth time (and the first since 1994)
in the 37 year history of the money market system that a fund had broken the buck
(Condon, 2008). After this drop in value, there was nearly a run on the money market
system as a whole, with net outflows outpacing net inflows by nearly 20 to 1, threatening
to collapse this key source of funding for normal business operations (Investment
Company Institute, 2008). Moving quickly, the Federal Reserve announced on
September 19 the creation of an optional program to extend financing to help lenders
purchase commercial paper and to eliminate fears of the money market's collapse
(Gullapalli & Annand, 2008). This approach, which required a fee paid by participating
funds, would essentially insure that the federal government would back the fund's value.
It worked and the immediate panic was averted (Gullapalli & Annand, 2008).
In order to prevent additional failures, the SEC also took a key additional step by
banning so-called “naked short selling” on September 17, 2008. As the SEC wrote in its
press release that day "In an ordinary short sale, the short seller borrows a stock and sells
it, with the understanding that the loan must be repaid by buying the stock in the market
(hopefully at a lower price). But in an abusive naked short transaction, the seller doesn't
actually borrow the stock, and fails to deliver it to the buyer. For this reason, naked
shorting can allow manipulators to force prices down far lower than would be possible in
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legitimate short-selling conditions. (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008)”
The fear was that if naked short selling was allowed to continue unabated, stock markets
would collapse. The SEC's actions both banned naked short selling and provided stiff
penalties for violators (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008).
Yet for all the federal government was able to do by executive action, it wasn’t
nearly enough. The crisis grew and it was readily apparent to all involved that there
would have to be far more significant actions. The focus turned to Congress.
The Initial Stages of TARP’s Development and its Failure in the US House:
On September 20, 2008, the federal government circulated the first draft of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), of which TARP was the biggest
part. In order to resolve the problems caused by the collapse of the housing bubble, the
US Department of the Treasury asserted that it needed to help banks remove so-called
"distressed assets (US Department of the Treasury, 2008b)” from the financial system in
order to stabilize banks and other financial institutions. As the US Department of the
Treasury stated in proposing the first version of what later became TARP, “When the
financial system works as it should, money and capital flow to and from households and
businesses to pay for home loans, school loans and investments that create jobs. As
illiquid mortgage assets block the system, the clogging of our financial markets has the
potential to significantly damage our financial system and our economy, undermining job
creation and income growth. (US Department of the Treasury, 2008b)." TARP proposed
to do so by adopting an approach similar to that used by the federal government in the
savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s, when the government had provided temporary
loans to financial institutions in order to ensure their stability (Seidman L. W., 2000).
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Once they were able to do so, these financial institutions would then pay back these
loans, thus meaning that the cost to the federal government would be far less than the
initial $700 billion price tag (Seidman L. W., 2000; US Department of the Treasury,
2008b)
The proposal developed and expanded over time, growing from an only three
page bill designed to give the Treasury Secretary nearly unlimited authority to do what he
wished with TARP funds. The initial proposal, which was kept short in order to allow
for and force quick Congressional action, was strongly panned by many in Congress and
public. The proposal then expanded from one that focused almost entirely on purchasing
failing mortgage-backed securities in order to stabilize the market. Yet, even that wasn't
enough since it only addressed US-based banks. On September 21, foreign financial
institutions with a presence in the United States were included (Paulson, 2008). On
September 23, the Senate Banking Committee rejected this plan (Ahrens, 2008). Echoing
the comments of many, Senator Dodd said, “After reading this proposal, I can only
conclude that it is not only our economy that is at risk, Mr. Secretary, but our
Constitution, as well (Mullins, 2008).” Criticism of the plan came from both the left and
the right and in both the House and the Senate.
The tumult against the plan continued to grow both outside and inside the beltway
in the coming days. On September 24, 2008, a letter from over 100 leading economists
was released critiquing the plan for three primary reasons (Wolfers, 2008). First, the
letter asked whether it was fair to in effect bail out those institutions for their own bad
choices. Second, the letter challenged the plan's ambiguity, as its writers were concerned
that it granted too much authority to Secretary Paulson. Third, the letter was concerned
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whether the infusion of cash would have unintended consequences and weaken the
financial markets far beyond the current crisis due to moral hazard (Wolfers, 2008).
Indeed, one of the biggest concerns that many had in relation to TARP was the
problem of “moral hazard.” Paul Krugman defined the problem of moral hazard as “any
situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while
someone else bears the cost if things go badly (Krugman P. R., 2012, p. 37).” More
simply put, moral hazard exists when businesses are willing to take risk that might
otherwise be deemed unwise because they will be assisted and saved by others if they
fail. This was certainly the case in the great depression, as those institutions which were
insured failed at a rate significantly higher than those that were uninsured (Grossman,
1992, pp. 817-819). Further buttressing the claim that moral hazard is real is the fact that
the World Bank reports that all 100 of the largest banking crises prior to the year 2000
were resolved in substantial part by government bailouts (Boyd, Gomis, Kwak, & Smith,
2000, pp. 1-3). This shows that there is a wide-spread perception that government will
save financial institutions if they fail (Boyd, Gomis, Kwak, & Smith, 2000, pp. 1-3).
Moral hazard has been a big concern in American financial bailouts, perhaps most
notably in the response to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s (Shoven, Smart, &
Waldfogel, 1991, p. 3). Due to the fact that savings and loans knew they would likely be
bailed out if they failed, they were willing to take more risks, increasing the need for
government intervention and leading to more reckless behavior (Hellman, Murdock, &
Stiglitz, 2000, p. 147). Not only was this a problem in this specific case, as noted above,
but it was seen as setting a dangerous precedent for future crises (Cole, McKenzie, &
White, 1995, pp. 30-32). This would be proven true, as is discussed below.
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The concern over moral hazard was one of the primary criticisms of the design of
TARP. As Harvard economist Jeffrey Mirron wrote, “Government purchase of bank
stock, therefore, is a transfer from taxpayers to people who took huge risks and lost. . . .
[This] will generate even greater problems down the line (Mirron, 2008). ” Indeed, many
who supported TARP agreed with this point, arguing that economic regulation was
necessary. As Secretary Paulson said in November 2008, “it is already clear that we must
address a number of significant issues, such as improving risk management practices,
compensation practices, oversight of mortgage origination and the securitization process,
credit rating agencies, OTC derivative market infrastructure and regulatory policies,
practices and regimes in our respective countries (Simons, 2010, pp. 43-44).” Yet the
argument was that such work could wait. As Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
said in late 2008, “You want to put the fire out first and then worry about the fire code.
(Simons, 2010, p. 46)” So the decision was made to focus on bailing out the banks and
other financial institutions that were in danger of failure, without focusing on economic
regulation, since the risk of inaction was too great. The result is that, as John Cochrane
wrote, “As long as some firms are considered too big to fail, those firms will take
outsized risks. (Cochrane, 2010, p. 34)”
In spite of these and other misgivings, there was a realization by many in
Congress that they could not simply do nothing. As Congressman Bauchus (R-AL) said,
the proposal was "a gun to our head" (Wilson K. , 2008) but many in Congress believed
they had to act. There was widespread concern, largely from the President's own party,
that the plan gave too much power to Secretary Paulson on how to disperse the funds
appropriated under this measure (Vekshin & Rowley, 2008). The original proposal had
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even exempted the secretary's actions from judicial review, something which was
reversed in the final proposal (Washington Post, 2008)
This accountability concern was no small thing as, in fact, one of the biggest
problems with TARP was that programs were announced for political reasons without
full consideration of how to implement them (Baum, 2013). The federal government
would often announce a program such as with housing or foreclosure relief and would
then set up measures on the fly (Baum, 2013). The result was little to no accountability
measures and no penalties in programs to make them accountable or mandatory (Baum,
2013).
In the wee hours of September 28, 2008, Congressional leaders and the White
House reached a deal on a final proposal. President Bush expressed confidence the plan
would pass Congress and a vote was scheduled for the next day, September 29 even
though media reports suggested that many in the President’s own party were opposed
(Washington Post, 2008). Underestimating the opposition, the plan failed 205-228, with
133 Republicans and 95 Democrats voting against it (Clerk of the US House, 2008). The
immediate response to this was panic, as the stock markets dropped 8% the following
day, the largest drop since Black Monday in 1987 (Isidore, 2008). Congressional leaders
scrambled to find something that could pass and thus the stage was set for the final
passage of TARP.
The Final Passage of TARP:
Recognizing that the bill must pass in order to ensure the stability of the US
financial system, media reports suggested that the US Senate chose to combine the bill
with one that proposed tax breaks for renewable energy usage (in order to garner
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Republican votes), mental health parity (in order to garner some reticent Democratic
votes) and a series of earmarks (in order to garner the support of several other members
of Congress) (Hulse, 2008). This earmark-laden measure easily passed both houses of
Congress and was signed into law by President Bush on October 3, 2008 (US Senate,
2008; Clerk of the US House, 2008b; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,
2008)
While originally intended as a program designed to purchase toxic assets in order
to stabilize financial institutions, TARP in fact spent very little money purchasing such
assets ($5 billion as of September 30, 2010) (SIGTARP, 2010, p. 237). Instead, TARP
spent by far the most funds pursuing three primary tasks: (1) purchasing an estimated
$280 billion in stock in trouble banks and investment institutions such as Citigroup, JP
Morgan and Bank of America; (2) providing $40 billion in loans to prevent the
potentially catastrophic collapse of American International Group (AIG) and (3)
providing nearly $80 billion in loans to American auto manufacturers in order to prevent
their collapse (SIGTARP, 2010, p. 237). An additional $45 billion was appropriated to
help prevent home foreclosures but as September 30, 2010, only $600 million had
actually been spent and the administration had yet to come up with a plan to spend the
remaining funds in this area (SIGTARP 2010, 237). Of the total of $387 billion actually
expended under TARP, greater than 90% of it went directly to assisting banks,
investment houses, AIG or auto manufacturers, far from the original intent of purchasing
toxic assets (Mihm & al, 2013).
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ACCOUNTABILITY IN TARP: CONGRESS, GAO, TREASURY, SIGTARP AND
COP:
Despite what many might assert, TARP was very concerned with accountability.
In fact, TARP used a five-pronged accountability approach, with Congress leading the
process and relying on four other organizations to ensure overall accountability. Two of
these organizations previously existed (the GAO and the US Department of the Treasury)
and two were created specifically by the law, the Special Inspector General for TARP
(SIGTARP) and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP). This section briefly
introduces the role and approaches that each of these five organizations were given.
Congress’s Role: Political Accountability, Systemic Stability and Avoiding Abuse
Congress took the lead role in ensuring accountability for TARP (and later on
ARRA), holding constant hearings and keeping the pressure on both the Bush and Obama
administrations in order to ensure that the program remained effective and accountable.
Congress focused on three primary things. First, accountability for the money, where it
was going and to whom, to which specific banks and businesses. Second, avoiding, or at
least limiting, potential waste, fraud and abuse. Third, and perhaps most importantly,
stopping the crisis and ensuring overall system stability (Green, 2013).
In this vein, many in Congress were concerned about lack of staffing in the US
Treasury’s Office of Financial Stability (OFS). This was due to the transition between
Bush and Obama and what many in Congress saw as a lack of concern for accountability
(Green, 2013). Treasury’s relationship with Congress was strained because it wasn't
staffed up to deal with the program. Programs weren't well designed in the view of many
in Congress and were often left up to agencies to design them, or perhaps most
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worryingly, to the banks that were receiving the funds themselves (Green, 2013). This
was a point echoed by other organizations. Many in Congress also had large concerns
about how the law was structured to favor larger firms. The government was unwilling to
use the full authority the law gave provided for fear that it would be seen as running
private organizations. The government did not want to be seen as doing that because it
smacked of over-reach of government in private sector (Green, 2013). As a result, a lot
of light touch was used, with the hope being that incentive would encourage private
parties to do the right thing.
Congress had strong relationships with COP, SIGTARP and GAO. They
frequently used the work of these organizations to amplify their own findings (Green,
2013). Congress would also use their investigations to set the issues on which Congress
would hammer away. Congress also used these organization’s reports to stir political
outrage, largely as to who was benefiting from the law. This strong formal and informal
interplay played a key role in ensuring TARP accountability (Green, 2013).
GAO: A Broader Quicker Mission Than Before
The GAO has a long and distinguished history as the nation’s premier government
accountability organization, dating back nearly 90 years to the Progressive Era (Mihm &
al, 2013). Typically, GAO has been a slower-moving organization, very deliberately
considering every report it produces and taking about 3-6 months to produce each report.
However, in the case of TARP (and later ARRA), GAO was asked to produce reports
both quickly and in larger number, with the first reports due less than 2 months after
TARP was enacted into law (Mihm & al, 2013). All indications are GAO was up to and
met this task with its customary professionalism and quality.
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The GAO undertook this task with a focus on institutions, choosing to focus more
on the banking and financial sectors rather than on any one organization. GAO focused
primarily on the internal controls and oversight of the process as a whole (Mihm & al,
2013). In order to complete this work, GAO primarily reassigned people internally,
hiring only two new people whom were experts in the market and valuation.
GAO started off by focusing the Office of Financial Stability (OFS), especially
since OFS was heavily staffed by contractors at the start of the process. GAO had to
report every 60 days. This was a challenge at first but once GAO got in the rhythm of
writing these reports, it was able to get the job done (Mihm & al, 2013).
GAO had strong coordination with SIGTARP, COP and Congress. SIGTARP,
COP and GAO were given identical mandates but had different approaches. GAO was
more or less objective, while SIGTARP and COP were more aggressive, albeit in
different ways. This allowed the three organizations to approach the same issues with
different lenses and thus more fully ensure accountability from many different angles
(Mihm & al, 2013).
During the study period, GAO produced 40 different reports related to TARP and
also testified before Congressional committees numerous times (Mihm & al, 2013).
These reports were both descriptive and analytical, focusing in one specific aspect of
TARP or another. They would both describe the situation as it existed and then provide
recommendations to improve both the tracking of money and programmatic effectiveness
overall. GAO took a broader and deeper view than any of the other organizations to
ensure accountability.
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The US Department of the Treasury: Tracking Money and Reporting Results
In the beginning, the US Department of the Treasury (DT) asked had basically
asked for a blank check, which it did not get, although what it got was not far removed
(Paulson, 2008). In order to track the funds as they were going out, the DT established an
Office of Financial Stability, within the existing Office of Domestic Finance, that would
be headed by an Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability. In theory, this person was
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, although no such appointee was
confirmed until June 2011, meaning that the Office was headed by an interim director
during this study period (US Office of Financial Stability, 2012). This office was
responsible both for expending and then tracking and recovering TARP funds.
The DT produced and still produces daily and monthly reports on the status of all
investments made as a result of TARP. These reports consist of lists of transactions as
well as any holdings or loans the government has made under TARP. Beyond these
numerical reports, the DT produced 14 monthly reports related to overall TARP
spending/loans and 13 “tranche” reports related to the expenditure of funds as well.
These reports help us understand how the agency primarily responsible for expending
TARP funds actually spent, tracked and recovered them.
The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP): An
Inspector General to Ensure Compliance
In order to ensure that funds were expended, tracked and recovered in concert
with existing laws, Congress authorized creation of SIGTARP as part of the overall
TARP law (SIGTARP, 2013c). The special inspector general who would head SIGTARP
would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The person initially
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chosen (and who remained in charge during the entire study period) was Neil Barofsky.
Barofsky had a long distinguished career as a prosecutor of financial crimes in the
Southern District of New York, which includes all of Manhattan and thus Wall Street
(Associated Press, 2008).
SIGTARP produced 22 full length reports during the study period as well as
sending out numerous letters to agencies and businesses handling TARP funds, asking
them to report information on how they spent, tracked and recovered these funds
(SIGTARP, 2013). These reports concerned themselves primarily with two things. The
first was general auditing of funds and ensuring that all senior individuals who handled
these funds, whether in a public or private organization, were acting in concert with the
law. The second was management structure and effectiveness, specifically from a legal
perspective. In other words, that they tracked whether these structures met legal
standards and whether individuals were operating in concert with the law (SIGTARP
2013). This legal individual perspective stands in stark contrast to the work done by
other organizations and was a key part of ensuring accountability for TARP.
The Congressional Oversight Panel (COP): The Overall View of the Legislation and Its
Programs
The second oversight body created specifically to ensure accountability for TARP
was the Congressional Oversight Panel or COP. COP consisted of five members, one
each appointed by the Speaker and the Minority Leader of the US House, one each
appointed by the Majority and Minority Leaders of the US Senate and one appointed
jointly by the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate (Wilkerson,
2013). Now-Senator Elizabeth Warren was selected by the five members as COP’s chair,
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with associate AFL-CIO general counsel Damon Silvers selected as vice-chair. COP was
given a broad mandate to track both TARP overall as well as individual programs, and it
was asked to produce reports on at least a monthly basis (Baum, 2013).
COP saw its primary role as overseeing Treasury’s use of its authority. COP
focused on ensuring money was being tracked and assessing its use. This was especially
important when TARP programs crossed over different federal departments and
preexisting programs (Baum, 2013). COP’s decision on what to report was determined
primarily by two factors. Most importantly, what the panel wanted to focus on, with the
input of the professional staff being paramount. The panel would listen to what Congress
wanted but wouldn’t necessarily respond to every request. This was necessary in order to
establish COP’s independent credibility, by showing that COP was not just reacting to
what Congress wanted. The other factor that determined what COP focused on was what
the law required it to focus on, specifically the later legislative requirement that COP
focus on farm loans (Baum, 2013).
COP enjoyed a close relationship with Congress, SIGTARP and GAO. They
would often consult formally and informally on what each other was working on. This
was so they would complement and not duplicate each other’s work. Sometimes COP
would lead the way with an initial report. They would then let SIGTARP and GAO
follow up with other more detailed work (Baum, 2013). COP would also hold joint
Congressional hearings with GAO/SIGTARP and would communicate informally with
Congress on a regular basis (Baum, 2013). COP was able to be more flexible than other
two organizations because it was not beholden professional audit standards while
SIGTARP and GAO had to deal with established standards. By contrast, COP was an
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audit body with a political purpose, rather than a more typical auditing or accountability
one.
COP produced 21 reports on TARP during the study period (Wilkerson, 2013).
They began first as analyses of TARP as a whole and then moved down to individual
programs, such as the aid to AIG and to the auto companies. These reports were largely
descriptive but also included recommendations on how to improve both the tracking of
funds and programmatic effectiveness. On more than one occasion, the members of COP
disagreed on some points and so minority recommendations (nearly always those by the
GOP-appointed members) were appended to those of the majority. COP also testified
before Congress numerous times on its findings. COP’s findings proved invaluable in
giving Congress yet another way to ensure TARP was effective and accountable.
Now that this chapter has described the organizations responsible for ensuring
accountability in TARP, the next section will tell more of the story of how it came about
and what it consisted of. This chapter will then describe the policy tools used for TARP
and the accountability models used to evaluate its usage.
POLICY TOOLS IN TARP: DIRECT GOVERNMENT, LOAN GUARANTEE,
DIRECT LOAN AND GRANTS
The remainder of this chapter will discuss the policy tools utilized in TARP in the
following manner. First, this section will identify the top policy tools used in TARP,
recognizing that while there were certainly other policy tools being used, four were
paramount: (1) direct government, (2) loan guarantees, (3) direct loans and (4) grants.
Each of these tools will be discussed first in terms of how the tool is defined in the
literature as discussed in chapter two. Second, each tool will be discussed in the context
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of where each is utilized in the legislation. Third, this section will discuss the extent to
which the four accountability models appear to be used in relation to these policy tools.
In some cases all four were present, while in others only one or two were. Fourth, this
section will briefly discuss three policy tools that were expected to be present, or
arguably should have been, but were not in fact present. They are (1) economic
regulation; (2) government as a corporation and (3) public information. Identifying these
tools will help us begin to answer the question how policy tools and accountability
models may line up. These tools will then be further analyzed in chapter five as this
study will attempt to uncover the significance of what has been learned to the literature
and to the practice of either accountability models or policy tool usage.
Direct Government:
Direct government is defined as “the delivery or withholding of a good or service
by government employees (Lenan, 2002, p. 49).” Direct government is utilized when the
government directly provides a service or undertakes an activity (Lenan, 2002, pp. 4143). This is as opposed to indirect government, where government provides such a
service via a third party, as is the case in contracting (Lenan, 2002, pp. 41-43). Direct
government services are highly visible and the spending for them is easily apparent in the
government’s budget (Lenan, 2002, pp. 41-43).
In the case of a major economic collapse such as this, one of the first things that
often comes up in legislation is the need for direct government action. Such was the case
with TARP. Direct government action was utilized by TARP in one major way. As
already noted the US Department of the Treasury created the “Office of Financial
Stability (OFS)” to ensure the long-term financial market sustainability and to manage
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TARP ( (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008; US Office of Financial
Stability, 2012). As also noted, this office was to be headed by an Assistant Secretary for
Financial Stability, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. However,
such a person was not confirmed until 2011, so for the purposes of this study period this
office was run by an interim director. Nonetheless, the creation of this office was a usage
of the “Direct Government” policy tool.
All four types of accountability were utilized in regards to this policy tool.
Political accountability was utilized in two ways. First, Congress had a role in approving
the director of the new Office of Financial stability (Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, 2008; US Office of Financial Stability, 2012). In fact, the decision not to
approve this director immediately is a form of political accountability because it
represents a potential form of disapproval for this choice. Second, Congress had a key
role in holding oversight hearings related to the money market policy. It did so on
several occasions (Green, 2013; Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009e, pp. 52-62;
Doardo G. , 2009, pp. 4-10); the act of holding these hearings is a form of political
accountability.
Legal accountability existed in the oversight of SIGTARP in ensuring that the
Treasury correctly implemented its duties under this law. SIGTARP played a key role in
double-checking the results of the OFS’s actions and also ensuring that individual
persons followed the law as directed (SIGTARP, 2009d, pp. 3-8). This legal
accountability was essential in ensuring that the actions of individuals were in concert
with the law as it existed. Especially given the concerns in TARP’s design over having
too much authority placed in the hands of a few individuals, this was essential.
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Professional accountability was present in two ways. First, OFS’s work was
evaluated based on established professional standards related to tracking of funds (Mihm
& al, 2013). Second, OFS had a key role in ensuring that the money market actions were
undertaken in concert with professional standards (Mihm & al, 2013). These actions
represent a key usage of professional accountability. This is important in terms of
counterbalancing the political accountability of the policy itself, especially as it was a
concern that TARP was going to be overly controlled by political appointees (Mihm & al,
2013).
Performance accountability was present in relation to the money market actions.
Specifically, such actions were designed to avoid “breaking the buck” and performance
metrics, however informal, were utilized to ensure that this standard was met (Baum,
2013). This was not necessarily the most important usage of performance accountability
but it certainly was one such usage.
Loan Guarantees:
Loan guarantees exist when “the government enters into a contractual agreement
to make full or partial payment to the lender in case the borrower defaults on the agreed
loan. The private lender originates the loan, secures the government guarantee and
services the loan according to government regulations or minimum standards (Stanton,
2002b, p. 381).” In effect, loan guarantees allow the government to provide stability to
the marketplace without expending as much in funds as would be needed if the
government made direct loans (Stanton, 2002b, pp. 381-383).
In order to ensure skittish markets that it was safe to invest, the federal
government had to both give loans directly and guarantee loans as well. Loan guarantees
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were a key part of TARP, particularly in relation to the housing market (Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008; Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009b, pp. 38). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were given loan guarantees in order to ensure the
overall market that it was safe to invest and that the federal government would ensure
that the housing market wouldn’t collapse (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, 2008). Loan guarantees were also attempted in relation to individual foreclosures,
but concerns about how this was going to be implemented kept them from being fully
utilized.
All four accountability models were present in relation to this policy tool.
Political accountability was present in two ways. First, loan guarantees were given to
secure the future of politically important (as well as financially important) institutions
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009d, pp. 3-8;
SIGTARP, 2009b, pp. 5-12). This represents a usage of political accountability because
these institutions were seen as important to political stakeholders. Second, political
accountability existed in the oversight of such guarantees through Congress, both directly
and through the creation of both the COP and SIGTARP (Congressional Oversight Panel,
2009d, pp. 3-8; SIGTARP, 2009b, pp. 5-12). These congressional organizations were
classic examples of political oversight accountability.
Legal accountability was not particularly present in relation to this tool except in
one important respect. SIGTARP ensured that these loan guarantees were properly
administered in concert with the law (SIGTARP, 2009b). Beyond that, legal
accountability was limited.
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Professional accountability existed in two main ways. First, the US Treasury
played a key role in deciding where and when to issue loan guarantees (United States
Department of the Treasury, 2008). This discretion, in concert with established
professional standards, is a classic usage of professional accountability. Second,
SIGTARP audited the decisions on where and how loan guarantees were given
(SIGTARP, 2010, pp. 8-11). GAO additionally utilized professional standards from the
federal government’s “green book” and “yellow book” to determine how and whether
these loan guarantees were properly administered (Mihm & al, 2013). This focus on best
practices and on meeting the standards established in the federal auditing guidelines was
crucial to successful tracking of these policies.
Performance accountability was utilized because the success of this particular
policy tool was, at least partially if not substantially, evaluated on the basis of market
outcomes and performance. For example, in the case of the money market loan
guarantees, the performance standards were whether the market no longer “broke the
buck” and was therefore stabilized (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, pp. 353365; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008). In many cases, the
guarantees of possible loans, rather than the loans themselves, were enough to move the
needle to show adequate performance improvements as a result of TARP. While this is
more of a market accountability standard than a performance one, performance
accountability is certainly a model which borrows from market accountability, and what
it borrows clearly applies here.
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Direct Loans:
Direct loans are utilized when “the government makes a direct loan…(and) after
making the loan, the government then services the loan (Stanton, 2002b, p. 381).” Direct
loans, simply put, are loans which are given out directly by the government for which the
government earns interest and expects repayment (Stanton, 2002b). They have been
commonly used for decades to help provide needed financing when private funding is not
forthcoming.
Direct loans were utilized in four primary areas. First, as part of an attempt to
stop individual foreclosures, the program was set up and funds appropriated (although it
was not fully implemented) (Federal Housing Authority, 2009; Baum, 2013). Second,
direct loans were given to AIG in order to prevent its collapse (SIGTARP, 2009f, pp. 39). Third, direct loans were given to the so-called big three auto manufacturers in order
to avert their collapse (SIGTARP, 2009h, pp. 11-15; Government Accountability Office,
2009e, pp. 5-10). Fourth and finally, many banks and other financial institutions were
given loans, in addition to having other assets purchased, to help stabilize the financial
system (SIGTARP, 2009h, pp. 11-15; Government Accountability Office, 2009b, pp. 510).
The accountability models that applied in relation to direct loans were mainly
political, professional and performance, with only a tiny usage of legal accountability.
Political accountability was present in three major ways. First, political accountability
exists in the decision to focus on loaning funds to politically important institutions, most
notably Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Baum, 2013; Green, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).
Given the important role Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play in the home loan business,
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this was no small thing. Second, political accountability existed in the decision to
provide loans to politically important businesses, most notably the automobile industry
(Green, 2013; SIGTARP, 2009f, pp. 3-9). While once again, there clearly are plenty of
policy reasons to avoid this industry’s collapse, the political cost of losing such a key
industry could have been immense. Indeed, the fact that TARP saved this industry
arguably was one of the key factors in Obama’s 2012 reelection. Third, political
accountability existed in the oversight of such loans through Congress both directly and
through the creation of both the COP and SIGTARP (Mihm & al, 2013; SIGTARP,
2009h, pp. 11-13) . These congressional organizations were classic examples of political
oversight accountability.
Legal accountability was not particularly present in relation to this tool except in
one important respect. SIGTARP had the responsibility to track these loans and ensure
that none of the parties violated the law. Beyond that, legal accountability was limited.
Professional accountability existed in two main ways and was very similar to that
in relation to loan guarantees. First, the US Treasury was responsible for deciding where
and when to issue loans (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. Ch. 22; Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008). Although they were guided by the
policy itself, the decision of how to issue loans, and at times where to issue them, was
one left to professional discretion and thus professional accountability. Second,
SIGTARP audited these loans based on professional standards (SIGTARP, 2009h, pp. 511). As with loan guarantees, GAO utilized professional standards from the federal
government’s “green book” and “yellow book”; to determine whether these loans were
properly given and administered (Mihm & al, 2013). This focus on best practices and
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meeting standards established in the federal auditing guidelines was crucial to successful
tracking of these policies (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009c, pp. 2-6)
As with loan guarantees, performance accountability was utilized because the
success of this particular policy tool was, at least partially if not substantially, evaluated
on the basis of market outcomes and performance. For example, in the case of loans to
AIG, the basis for evaluation was whether AIG survived as a result of getting these loans
from the federal government (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008).
Direct loans were necessary when combined with the loan guarantees in order to prevent
this collapse. They were, in effect, a tandem approach. While, as with loan guarantees,
this is more of a market accountability standard than a performance one, performance
accountability is certainly a model which borrows plenty from market accountability, and
what it borrows clearly applies here.
Grants:
A grant is defined as a “gift that has the aim of either ‘stimulating’ or ‘supporting’
some sort of service or activity by the recipient (Bean & Conlan, 2002, p. 341).” Grants
do not disabuse the government of responsibility for a service but they transition
responsibility for actually undertaking it to a third party, whether private, nonprofit or
government (Bean & Conlan, 2002). They are commonly used to help achieve either
political or policy goals.
While by no means a major part of TARP, grants were included in TARP in order
to get the bill through Congress after it failed the first time. The federal government
issued grants in areas ranging from county and forest payments, to transportation
subsidies and to research in order to ensure that individual members of Congress would
81

vote to approve TARP (Green, 2013). This sort of action is, of course, extremely
common in relation to bills with a significant dollar value, and it is therefore not
surprising that this was the case here.
The accountability model utilized in this case was almost entirely political--so
much so that it does not make sense to discuss the use of other models. While one can
argue that professional accountability was used to track these grants, the real motivation
was political (Green, 2013; Mihm & al, 2013). These grants were given to specific
persons or groups that were politically important or well-connected. The grants were a
necessary political evil to get an essential bill passed.
Policy Tools Expected or Asserted but Not Utilized:
For a variety of reasons, TARP might have been expected to contain some
elements that were in fact absent. The policy tools described below were either
supposedly part of TARP according to its proponents or are surprising exclusions from
TARP. For example, while economic deregulation led to the crisis, no real effort was
made to include economic regulation in the actual TARP law. On another track, there
were constant assertions that public information about those getting funds would be
provided in order to impact the behavior of actors in the marketplace. Finally, there was
a mistaken assumption that government was acting as a corporation. This section
describes these tools, why they were assumed or thought to be present and how they were
not.
Economic Regulation:
Economic regulation is defined as something that “imposes formal limitations on
activities considered undesirable (Salamon, 2000, p. 1652).” Economic regulations
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“intervene directly in market decisions such as pricing, competition, market entry, or exit.
(OECD, 1997, p. 11).” The point of economic regulation is to restrict undesirable
activity, to prevent marketplaces from being monopolized or to provide a fair and free
playing field to consumers. While many argue that economic regulation restricts
economic growth, others argue that proper economic regulation ensures growth is
balanced across the system.
Given the history of deregulation as described in the early part of this chapter, one
could well assume that TARP would reverse this trend. As Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben Bernanke said in a September 2008 hearing before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, “the shortcomings and weaknesses of our financial
markets and regulatory system must be addressed if we are to avoid a repetition of what
has transpired in our financial markets over the past year (Bernanke, 2008, p. 4).” Others
at the same hearing agreed, including SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, who said “the last
six months…have made abundantly clear that voluntary regulation doesn’t work. This is
a fundamental flaw in the statutory scheme that must be addressed, as I have reported to
the Congress on prior occasions (Cox, 2008, pp. 5-6).” There was clearly broad
understanding that financial regulation needed to increase to help resolve the problems
that necessitated TARP’s creation.
However, no further regulation actually happened at the time. There are two
principal reasons why. First, and as expressed by Bernanke, “the development of a
comprehensive proposal for reform would require careful and extensive analysis that
would be difficult to compress into a short legislative timeframe now available
(Bernanke, 2008, p. 5).” Stated another way, it was felt that although additional
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regulation was going to be necessary, increasing regulations would be too time
consuming and money instead needed to flow immediately to recipients who were in
trouble at the time. Second, some in the Bush administration argued that, while some
further regulation was warranted, it was not, in fact, the root cause of the problem. As
Secretary Paulson told a Senate Committee “that root cause (of the crisis) is the housing
correction (Paulson, Testimony by Henry Pauslon Before the Senate Banking Committee,
2008b, pp. 1-2).” While Paulson and others later admitted that further regulation was
necessary, they believed that regulation was not the root cause of the market’s failure.
Thus, economic regulation was not a part of TARP, even though many assumed it would
or should be.
Public Information:
“Information is a tool for eliciting desired policy outcomes (Weiss, 2002, p.
218).” The public information policy tool can be said to exist when the government
attempts to use public information in an attempt to change behavior by one or more
targeted groups. Perhaps the simplest example is food labels, which are intended the
buying choices of the general public.
Part of the case for TARP was that the amount of money being allocated and put
into the marketplace made it was necessary to disseminate information on these policies
as widely as possible. If the public was going to trust that the government was
responsibly going to responsibly send out funds at this magnitude, constant and complete
information to the public was required (Baum, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013). To that end, OFS
created a database, updated daily, which contained information on any transactions using
TARP funds and the present value of any assets held by the government that were
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purchased with such funds (Wilkerson, 2013). This database was used both by the public
and by those evaluating the policy’s accountability and effectiveness. In addition, any
company that had a loan or had stock purchased a result of TARP funds was required to
reveal significant information publicly (Green, 2013). This information was intended to
force the companies to be accountable and more responsive to the public, which, it was
thought, would surely use this information to decide which companies to support.
However, this did not occur (Mihm & al, 2013; Baum, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013). Instead,
and as SIGTARP commonly stated, this public information did not appear to change the
behavior of market actors and was not provided as such (SIGTARP, 2010, pp. 2-5).
Government as a Corporation:
Government corporations exist when “a government agency, owned and
controlled by the government (is) set up as a separate corporate entity legally distinct
from the rest of government (Stanton & Moe, 2002, p. 81).” Government as a
corporation does not exist simply when government is a market participant, although
many assume it does. Instead, there must be a more business-like, yet government
owned, activity, such as Fannie Mae.
It might appear that government as a corporation was perhaps the biggest tool in
TARP in that governments have the funds to make purchases and infuse cash into a cashstarved marketplace (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009d; Government Accountability
Office, 2009c). The OFS purchased and held billions of dollars in stocks, preferred
assets and other private assets of companies ranging from AIG to banks to auto
manufacturers (US Office of Finanical Stability, 2010; Congressional Oversight Panel,
2009f). The government has, and still is, attempting to sell of all of these assets as it took
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the dominant position in some companies. However, despite the intentions to act as a
corporation, there was no separate government corporation created as a part of this law,
just government purchasing private assets as a market participant. Consequently, the
government as a corporation model was not actually utilized
Conclusion:
This chapter has shown that in three of four cases multiple accountability models
explain the policy tool choices. This tends to prove that the research hypotheses are
correct and a multiple-model approach has greater explanatory power than a single-model
approach in almost all cases.
Nevertheless, it is also clear that TARP was notably complex but also
significantly different than what was either originally intended, as stated by the
proponents of the law, and that TARP contained different tools than we might expect.
Much of this doubtless stemmed from the decision to focus on the outcomes of the crisis
rather than fixing the system as a whole. As stated above, this was an understandable
choice. Whether or not it was the “right choice” is not for this study to say. This study
will now turn to the design of ARRA and the accountability models and policy tools it
utilized.
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Chapter 4: The Story of ARRA
This chapter will first tell the story of how ARRA was designed and how its
review was intended to be undertaken. It will then discuss the main policy tools used in
ARRA and which accountability models were applied in relation to each policy tool.
This chapter will reveal that all but one of the policy tools (the exception being tax
expenditures) are at least partially explained by more than one accountability model.
This reveals that for the most part, the contention that multiple accountability models
better explain policy tool choice is correct.
Before we go any further, however, this chapter will set the stage for ARRA by
discussing additional aspects of the roots of the crisis. As with TARP, the events that led
to the need for ARRA did not begin in 2008 or 2009. Instead, they began at least as far
back as 1995 with the beginning of the cycles of jobless recoveries as well as
deregulation. The following section will describe that trend in greater detail.
THE ROOTS OF THE CRISIS:
As with TARP, the roots of the crisis that led to ARRA have existed since at least
1995. In 1995, the mean income of the American family was about $80,000, which was
up about $20,000 from the early 1980s (Krugman P. R., 2012, p. 74). Since 1995,
however, the mean income has actually dropped slightly, even without adjusting for
inflation (Krugman P. R., 2012, p. 74). In that same time period, from the early 1980s to
2012, the income of the top 1% of American earners has more than doubled (Krugman P.
R., 2012, p. 74). Why did this happen? The root cause lies in the cycle of jobless
recoveries and deregulation. The following section will describe the two recessions that
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occurred in the early 90s, as well as the tech bubble burst of 2000-2001, both of which
were precursors to the so-called “Great Recession” of 2008.
The Recession of the Late 1980s/Early 1990s:
On October 19, 1987, known in the financial community as “Black Monday
(Carlson, 2007, p. 7)” the stock market dropped 22% in one of the biggest single day
declines in US history (Carlson, 2007, pp. 5-9). There were many causes, not least of
which was the savings and loan crisis discussed in chapter 3, but one of the major causes
was deregulation, and perhaps most importantly, rampant borrowing and margin calls
that allowed traders to buy stocks with money they did not have (Carlson, 2007, pp. 1214). When these margin calls could not be met, as rules of the time required, the bottom
fell out of the market (Carlson, 2007, pp. 12-14).
This market crash immediately sent the worldwide economy into recession, with
the United States and the rest of the developed world particularly affected (McKnees,
1992, pp. 1-3). However, it quickly looked like the economy was going to recover quite
well, as government spending ahead of key elections in the United States and other
developed nations provided a brief moment of respite, with both consumer spending and
consumer confidence rising quickly. Unfortunately, this rise was short-lived as by 1989
inflation had spiked to 5.9% and economic growth had slowed to a crawl, a factor further
exacerbated by the Federal Reserve’s decision to raise interest rates in order to avoid runaway inflation (McKnees, 1992, pp. 3-6). The problem was then further exacerbated by
the 1990 Gulf War and the resulting spike in the price of oil from $17 a barrel to $36 a
barrel in just a few months (Taylor, Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, 1993, pp.
197-202). This sent the US economy into recession, with unemployment rising from
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5.5% in 1991 to 8% two years later (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). The effects were
widespread, economic, cultural and political. For example, this recession was most likely
directly responsible for the defeat of President George HW Bush and the election of
President Bill Clinton in 1992.
This recession was followed by the greatest economic expansion since World War
II. Although this growth was based on part on technological changes, it was at least
somewhat illusory. As Joseph Stiglitz wrote, “The Internet was rightly judged to be a
transformative innovation. But the irrational exuberance on the part of investors went
well beyond anything that could be justified (Sitglitz, 2012, p. 84).” Leaders and
investors pumped money into companies they knew, or should have known, were
probably losers and the legions of tech companies that received funding and had high
stock prices even though they never made a dime in profits created a bubble that although
it helped dig the US out of one recession, set the stage for the next one ten years later
(Sitglitz, 2012, pp. 83-86).
The Tech Bubble Bursts:
In the run-up to the 2000 election, the US economy was widely perceived as
booming. The average standard of living had risen substantially, the government was
actually running a surplus and the world was relatively peaceful. However, trouble
lurked just below the surface as the massive bubble that had fueled much of the tech
bubble threatened to burst (Lowenstein, 2003, pp. 114-115).
Some in the US government had seen this day coming. For example, the Federal
Reserve raised interest rates six times between 1998 and 2000, raising the prime interest
rate from 4.5% to 6.5% in an attempt to control run-away growth and ease the US
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economy into a soft landing (Federal Reserve Board, 2013; Lowenstein, 2003, pp. 114115). Unfortunately, this did not work as banks continued to lend to companies that had
never made a profit, with the mantra of growth over profit ruling the day.
The first tremors of the upcoming bursting of the bubble began to occur in March
2000 as NASDAQ dropped from a high of around 5000 to just 1700 a year later
(Willoughby, 2000, pp. 1-2). Companies began crashing left and right as profits finally
became more important than growth. The list of major tech firms that crashed in that
period is full of names that many Americans would recognize, such as Pets.com,
Broadcast.com and Geocities (Economist, 2000). These failures, referred to by some as
“.Dot Bombs (Economist, 2000)” represented the collapse of the tech sector. Yet,
matters were about to get far worse.
The September 11, 2001 attacks provided an economic shock that exacerbated the
already existing problems. These effects were primarily felt in three industries:
insurance, tourism and the airline industry. Insurance was impacted both directly by the
crisis and indirectly by how it changed future practices. As a Congressional Research
Service report noted, “The loss of life and property gave rise to the largest
property/casualty claim in history, estimated at $40 billion (Makinen, 2002, p. 4).” In
addition, this report noted that future insurance for terrorist attacks was more expensive,
limited and harder to come by (Makinen, 2002, pp. 3-4). The airline industry was
obviously directly affected by the crisis but it also helped push over the edge an industry
that had been teetering (Makinen, 2002, pp. 3-6). Not only was overall airline use down
but a drop in tourism due to fears related to travel was a dual blow to both industries
(Makinen, 2002, pp. 3-6).
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Nonetheless, the impact of the economic crisis began to abate in 2002, with GDP
rising as the economy dug itself out of its tailspin (Bureau of Ecnomic Analysis, 2013).
Even as the growth of GDP continued and the jobless rate dropped, however, much more
of the growth was in GDP than in jobs, making this largely a “jobless recovery (Krugman
P. R., 2012, pp. 228-229).” More to the point, the jobs that were created were at lower
income levels, even as productivity continued to climb (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2013b).
What does all this have to with the 2008 financial crisis? The growth of income
inequality and the jobless recovery were part of the overall economy and thus became a
key factor in the 2008 economic crisis. In fact, income inequality in 2007 was about as
bad as it was in the years leading up to the great depression of the 1930s (Krugman P. R.,
2012, pp. 79-84).
Yet, others argue that while income inequality might be a part of the problem the
main cause of the downturn was the government’s own failures. Taylor, Rogoff and
others instead argue that, for example, government’s policy decisions to encourage home
ownership among those that could not reasonably be expected to afford a home played a
role in the crisis and that the government’s interference in the marketplace generally does
more harm than good (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009; Taylor, 2008; Rose & Spiegel, 2009).
As a result of this, they argue that government should not act to try and fix these
problems but instead largely leave it to the private sector to sort them out.
THE CASE OF ARRA: ATTEMPTING TO KICK START A STALLED ECONOMY
Let us now fast forward to late 2008. The following section will provide the
background behind ARRA and describe the need for, development of, passage and
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components of this critical piece of legislation. First, this chapter will describe the initial
need for a further stimulus package. Second, this chapter will describe the development
of the proposal between the Obama White House and Congress. Third, this chapter will
describe the final passage and design of ARRA. The case history is far less complex and
more straightforward than with TARP but it is no less important.
The Initial Need for a Further Stimulus Package:
Keynesian economics is based on the fundamental assertion that when economic
times are slow, the best way to move forward is for government to spend more in order to
fill the gap in demand not being filled by the private sector (Keynes 1936). As Keynes
himself wrote to FDR in 1933, “The United States is ready to roll towards prosperity if a
good hard shove is given in the next sixth months. (Keynes, 1933).” During the great
depression, FDR listened to such advice and created programs such as the Works
Progress Administration to provide jobs to citizens in order to decrease, at least slightly,
the huge unemployment problems of the times. Similar problems, although not nearly as
widespread, beset the United States during the 2008 economic crisis.
Even with TARP’s hefty price tag, it was clear to the incoming Obama
administration that TARP alone would not avoid further economic deterioration since,
among other things; it only assisted a small part of the American economy. Specifically,
TARP attacked the problems in the financial markets but did nothing to stop the jobs
crisis that had put millions of Americans out of work. Moreover, TARP was never
intended to attack the jobs problem (Baum, 2013).
The need for an additional stimulus bill was perhaps best highlighted in a national
radio address aired by then President-elect Obama on January 8, 2009, in which he spoke
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of the need for a sweeping stimulus bill (Obama, Obama's Speech on the Econmy, 2009).
Obama set out six goals that any stimulus legislation should accomplish: (1) creating
three million new jobs-80% in the private sector, (2) doubling renewable energy
production and renovating old buildings, (3) rebuilding infrastructure, (4) updating and
computerizing the health care system, (5) building “21st century classrooms” and (6)
providing tax relief to 95% of Americans (Obama, Obama's Speech on the Econmy,
2009). As Obama said in the same speech, "I don't believe that it's too late to change
course, but it will be if we don't take dramatic action as soon as possible. If nothing is
done, this recession could linger for years. The unemployment rate could reach doubledigits. (Obama, 2009). “To help prevent such a jump in unemployment, Obama proposed
a broad counter-cyclical stimulus designed to create jobs, both directly and indirectly as
much to prevent further job losses in areas such as education and healthcare (Obama,
2009) . Obama's team then predicted that its proposed stimulus plan would keep
unemployment under 8% and that unemployment could otherwise be expected to reach or
exceed 10% (Romer & Bernstein, 2009, p. 4).
Yet, there was not broad agreement among all economists that spending and tax
expenditures would actually help. As Kenneth Rogoff wrote in 2008, “A large expansion
in debt will impose enormous fiscal costs on the US, ultimately hitting growth through a
combination of higher taxes and lower spending (Rogoff, 2008).” Despite this and other
concerns, Obama pushed ahead with his plan and began development of it in earnest
shortly thereafter as described in the next section.
Proposal Development Between the Obama White House and Congress:
Even before he took office, President-elect Obama met constantly with leaders
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from both houses of Congress so that a stimulus bill could be designed and voted on as
quickly as possible. Obama set a goal of getting the law to his desk for signature by
February 16, less than a month after he took office (Obama, 2009). The basis for the
bill’s design was the framework Obama set out in his January 2009 speech (Obama,
2009).
Many economists agreed that a stimulus bill was necessary and that the only
question was how big and how to design and approach it. Yet this feeling was far from
universal. In a January 2009 ad published in the Wall Street Journal by the Cato
Institute, several leading conservative economists argued that, “it is a triumph of hope
over experience to believe that more government spending will help the U.S. today. To
improve the economy, policymakers should focus on reforms that remove impediments to
work, saving, investment and production. Lower tax rates and a reduction in the burden
of government are the best ways of using fiscal policy to boost growth. (Cato Institute,
2009).” These economists argued that Obama had it all wrong and that the proposed plan
would therefore do far more harm than good.
On the other side, some, such as Paul Krugman, thought the proposed stimulus
bill was too small to achieve the hoped for outcomes (Krugman P. , 2009). As Krugman
wrote, “Whatever the explanation, the Obama plan just doesn’t look adequate to the
economy’s need. To be sure, a third of a loaf is better than none. But right now we seem
to be facing two major economic gaps: the gap between the economy’s potential and its
likely performance, and the gap between Mr. Obama’s stern economic rhetoric and his
somewhat disappointing economic plan (Krugman P. , 2009).” While some agreed with
Krugman that the bill was too small, many others thought either that the bill was well
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designed and of the right size (Center for American Progress Action Fund, 2009) or that
the bill should focus more heavily on tax relief and cutting the size of government as
noted above (Cato Institute, 2009).
The initial version of ARRA was introduced as HR 1 on January 26, 2009,
sponsored by Appropriations Committee Chair Rep. David Obey (D-WI) (HR 1, 2009).
The House bill focused on three broad categories of spending (HR 1, 2009). The first,
was tax expenditures, primarily focused on helping those who were unemployed or
middle or low income (HR 1, 2009). Second, the act proposed a “state stabilization fund’
in order to backfill lost revenue in state and local budgets (HR 1, 2009). Third, the act
proposed broad direct federal spending in areas such as infrastructure and health care in
order to provide jobs and to fill gaps not currently being filled by the struggling private
sector (HR 1, 2009). The House version of ARRA was priced at approximately $827
billion (Congressional Research Service, 2009c, pp. 1-4). 206 amendments were
scheduled for floor votes but were combined into only 11 so as to ensure quick passage
(Congressional Research Service, 2009c, pp. 1-4). On January 28, the House passed HR
1 by a vote of 244-188, with 11 Democrats and the entire House GOP caucus voting
against the bill (Clerk of the US House, 2009).
The Senate had already introduced its own version of ARRA on January 1, 2009,
S. 1, with the lead sponsor being Senator Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) (S 1,
2009). There were three major differences between the House and Senate bills. First,
Senate Democrats proposed a one year extension of revisions to the Alternative
Minimum Tax (AMT), which added $70 billion to the bill's cost (Congressional Budget
Office, 2009, pp. 4-5). Second, Senate Democrats proposed cutting aid to states and
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providing additional aid to the elderly (Congressional Budget Office, 2009, pp. 2-5).
Third, Senate Democrats favored spending on health care and renewable energy while the
House favored spending on education, infrastructure and aid to the unemployed
(Congressional Research Service, 2009b, pp. 1-4; Congressional Budget Office, 2009, pp.
2-5). The final Senate version was priced at approximately $820 billion (S 1, 2009).
In spite of these differences, the Senate still realized it had to move quickly. The
results of failing to act were seen as potentially catastrophic by many in Congress,
especially by those on the President’s side of the aisle (Associated Press, 2009). As
Congressman David Obey (D-WI) said on the US House floor on January 28, 2009, “This
bill is hugely expensive. But it is not nearly as costly as continuing business as usual. It
has a big price tag because we are dealing with a big problem (Congressional Record,
2009, p. H620).” The Senate took up the bill on February 6 and debate moved quickly.
The Senate invoked cloture on February 7 by a vote of 61-36 (US Senate, 2009). The
Senate then passed its version of the bill on February 10 by a vote of 61-37 with Senators
Snowe and Collins of Maine and Specter of Pennsylvania being the only Republicans to
vote in favor while all Senate democrats voted in favor of the amended HR 1 (US Senate,
2009b).
A conference committee was created immediately upon the Senate's passage of
HR 1. A conference report was quickly agreed on and largely stuck to the Senate version
of the bill when it came to bridging the gap. (Conference Commtitee on HR 1 (2009),
2009) Specifically, the conference report kept the Senate’s AMT changes, although it
slightly raised the level at which relief was provided (Conference Commtitee on HR 1
(2009), 2009, p. Part 2). The conference report also increased the so-called "Making
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Work Pay" tax credit (Conference Commtitee on HR 1 (2009), 2009, pp. Part 1-Sec
1001). It also provided COBRA subsidies for workers who had been laid off in order to
make it easier for them to afford health care, as well as other provisions (Conference
Commtitee on HR 1 (2009), 2009, pp. Part VI, Sec. 1889F). The cost of the conference
report bill was lower than either the Senate or House bills, primarily because the
conference committee chose to provide less direct aid to individuals than had been
proposed by either chamber (Congressional Research Service, 2009). The final bill
proposed a $250 onetime payment to low income workers/retirees instead of the $300
proposed by the Senate and the $450 proposed by the House (Congressional Research
Service, 2009).
The conference report was completed on February 11. The House voted on the
revised bill on February 13, approving the conference report by a vote of 246-183, again
without a single Republican “yes” vote (Clerk of the US House, 2009b). The Senate
approved the conference report later that same day by a 60-38 vote, with the same three
republicans in favor and every Democrat voting in the affirmative (US Senate, 2009c).
President Obama signed the bill into law on February 17, 2009 (ARRA, 2009).
The Design of ARRA:
ARRA is composed of three primary components (Recovery.gov, 2010c): (1) a
$288 billion package of tax cuts and tax expenditures for both business and personal
taxpayers; (2) $224 billion in aid to states to help preserve entitlement programs
(primarily unemployment benefits), health care and education programs which were
otherwise in danger of being cut; and (3) $275 billion in federal contracts, grants and
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loans3 to fund a series of projects, from infrastructure to research to environmental
preservation and beyond (Recovery.gov, 2010c; Congressional Budget Office, 2009). It
is this last $275 billion that has received by far the most scrutiny since it is the portion of
ARRA that allows for the greatest spending discretion and thus required the closest
scrutiny. Projects often had to be shovel-ready. As a result, money wasn't necessarily
going to be used where it might arguably have been most needed. This concerned many
members of Congress since it meant that only governments already prepared to spend
funds actually got them.
This was no WPA-style approach like that seen back in the Great Depression
(Krugman P. R., 2012, pp. 118-123). Although direct spending to create jobs occurred in
addition to amounts used to backfill state budgets, this was a very small part of the
overall picture (Krugman P. R., 2012, p. 121). Much of this spending on infrastructure
projects was also designed from the start to utilize contractors rather than direct spending,
further adding to the costs of the programs since the contractors had to make a profit
(Krugman P. R., 2012, pp. 121-124; Sitglitz, 2012, p. 271). Even if all the money that
had been designed to be spent on direct job creation was in fact spent, this would have
amounted to two percent of total economic activity during the three year period over
which many, including Krugman, expected the crisis to last (Krugman P. R., 2012, p.
122). As a result, there could be no fundamental fix here.
Adding to the problem was the fact that during this time, there was no approved
head of the office of federal procurement policy (OFPP) (Office of Management and

3

According to Recovery.gov, as of late 2010, 174,195 grants were issued under this section of ARRA, along
with 34,191 contracts and 1,600 loans (Recovery.gov, 2010c).
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Budget, 2011). In fact, a head of OFFP was not appointed and confirmed until October
2009, several months after ARRA’s passage (Office of Management and Budget, 2011).
This meant that there was no one in charge of policy changes needed to implement this
large amount of government spending. This likely had an impact on ARRA’s
implementation, but may also have affected its design since there was no person at OFPP
to help design or implement these regulations.
OMB took a very unusual approach for ARRA by being very open to comments
and by getting the initial regulations out and then constantly adapting them (Mihm & al,
2013). OMB is usually far more insular, more willing to dictate what will happen than
being willing to listen to how it should happen. This was due to the accountability
community insisting on involvement from the start (Mihm & al, 2013). Attempts were
made to involve state and local auditors, but they left out many cities and smaller
governments (Mihm & al, 2013). Most notably, the accountability systems set up in
ARRA responded to the concerns of entities with the capacity to respond to these
requirements but did not allow for smaller cities to be able to take advantage of ARRA
funds as they could not afford the staff time to account properly for their expenditures as
the law required (Mihm & al, 2013).
SETTING THE STAGE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: GAO AND RATB
In order to ensure accountability for ARRA, the law relied primarily on two
organizations, one of which previously existed (the GAO) and one which was created by
the legislation (the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board or RATB). This
section briefly introduces the role and approaches that each of these two organizations
took in carrying out their responsibilities in this case.
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GAO: A Broader and Quicker Mission
Since the GAO was already introduced in chapter 3, this chapter will move
immediately to describe its role in this case. During the study period, the GAO produced
49 different reports related to ARRA and also testified before congressional committees
numerous times. These reports were of three primary types. First, reports which
summarized ARRA more generally and considered its overall effectiveness. Second,
reports which analyzed specific aspects of ARRA and made suggestions, primarily
concerning how to better manage aspects of its implementation (Mihm & al, 2013).
Third, reports tracking state level spending of ARRA funds in select states. Simply put,
GAO created a select group of representative states and tracked the spending of ARRA
funds in them (Mihm & al, 2013). Regardless, GAO took a broader and deeper view than
any of the other organizations established to ensure accountability under ARRA.
GAO’s primary focus was on the 11 mandates it had under the law (ARRA).
GAO particularly focused on two main ones, state and local government spending and
job numbers (Mihm & al, 2013). GAO encouraged Congress to focus on how many jobs
were funded rather than created or saved since this was seen as a more reliable metric.
GAO also sought to help Congress’s own internal controls and reporting. GAO reported
constantly but their main reports came out on a bimonthly basis (Mihm & al, 2013).
In order to track state and local funds, GAO placed teams in 16 different states.
GAO picked states to focus on based on money and population. GAO started with big
states and then looked to fill the gap in what was not represented, such as the South and
Midwest. GAO ended up with teams in states representing about two thirds of the money
and people. GAO was given $25 million to help track ARRA and hired over 100 new
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employees, many of whom were former auditors or GAO employees,, most of whom
were sent to one of the new field offices (Mihm & al, 2013). The field teams would
observe and send data back to GAO’s DC headquarters where topic experts would
confirm it, as is normal GAO procedure. When the money ran out to fund GAO's ARRA
operations in late 2010, all of the temporary offices were closed. GAO then continued
reporting on those states, albeit from afar instead of on the ground (Mihm & al, 2013).
GAO focused on four primary measures. First, was the money sent out? Second,
was the money tagged properly? Third, where did the money actually go? Fourth, how
many jobs were created or saved? This led to a focus on real time reporting and maps
(Mihm & al, 2013). This was not something GAO was used to. Accountability is usually
reactive and this was more proactive. Nonetheless, it was a useful approach and one the
GAO asserts will help improve work processes in the future. As one GAO employee said
“Tracking money in real time will help us learn better what we should be alert for during
the normal report-writing process, even as it remains mostly after the fact and not realtime (Mihm & al, 2013).”
GAO viewed ARRA as a pure political calculus. This was because a lot of focus
was on being able to brag about projects locally. In the GAO’ s view, ARRA ended up
becoming almost a grant program, providing temporary aid to distressed governments in
order to help replace revenue lost by the recession (Mihm & al, 2013).
The RATB: Inspector Generals Tracking ARRA’s Implementation
In order to ensure that the funds expended in ARRA were spent in an efficient,
effective and legal manner, ARRA created an 11-member board, known as the RATB,
which oversaw ARRA’s implementation. This board consisted primarily of inspectors
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general from federal agencies which received funds under ARRA. They were
responsible for tracking funds, receiving reports from those that spent ARRA funds
(specifically from any organization that spent more than $25,000 in ARRA funds) and for
running the Recovery.gov website, which was the primary public portal for information
on ARRA (Office of Management and Budget, 2009, p. 14).
Unlike the other organizations that were part of ensuring accountability for TARP
or ARRA, RATB did not write many reports. In fact, RATB only wrote six fairly general
reports on ARRA implementation and accountability during the study period. Instead,
RATB’s role was to track expenditures of funds, ensure proper utilization of metrics such
as “jobs created or saved” and ensure compliance of individual actors with the law
(Recovery.gov, 2010). Given the inspector general style under which the RATB
operated, this was not surprising. Reports by inspector generals are rarely public.
Now that this chapter has described the organizations responsible for ensuring
accountability in ARRA, the next section will describe the policy tools used for ARRA
and the accountability models designed to evaluate their usage.
POLICY TOOLS IN ARRA: TAX EXPENDITURES, CONTRACTING, GRANTS
AND PUBLIC INFORMATION:
While TARP was focused on making sure key institutions did not collapse with
most funds expected to be returned to the taxpayers, ARRA was a more typical
countercyclical stimulus bill. There was nothing new or different about how ARRA
undertook its work; the tools were used in ways they had commonly been used before.
They were just used on a larger and broader scale.
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This section focuses on the main policy tools used in ARRA. Each policy tool
will be described as to its definition in the literature, usage in ARRA and the
accountability models relied upon. The main tools were (1) tax expenditures, (2)
contracting, (3) grants and (4) public information. These are by no means an exhaustive
list of the policy tools used in ARRA but they are the main ones and are in agreement
with those listed in OMB’s initial ARRA guidance, which listed the rules for each
program by policy tool (Office of Management and Budget, 2009; Office of Management
and Budget, 2009b).
Tax Expenditures:
A tax expenditure is defined as “a provision in tax law that usually encourages
certain behavior by individuals or corporations by deferring, reducing or eliminating their
tax obligation (Howard, 2002, p. 411).” Tax expenditures, in effect, “expend” funds
through the tax code indirectly rather than through direct spending. The cost may be the
same, but the tool and approach are different. Tax expenditures are broadly used by
government to encourage behavior in a number of areas (Howard, 2002, pp. 410-415).
Some classic examples include those designed to encourage home buying by allowing
taxpayers to deduct mortgage costs, as well as targeted tax credits/deductions to
encourage purchase of energy-efficient vehicles or home items.
Of the three main parts of ARRA, tax expenditures were arguably the least
controversial. Although there was debate over which tax expenditures made the most
sense, there was widespread agreement that significant tax expenditures were necessary
for any stimulus bill. Tax expenditures in ARRA totaled $288 billion, more than any
other single part of the bill (Government Accountability Office, 2010, pp. 2-6). They
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were split into several parts, with $237 billion earmarked for individuals, mainly in
Alternative Minimum Tax and Payroll Tax changes and $51 billion for corporations
(ARRA, 2009, p. Title I). These tax expenditures, most of which were temporary,
constituted 37% of ARRA’s total cost (ARRA, 2009, p. Title I; Recovery.gov, 2010b).
In spite of the high cost of these tax expenditures, there was almost no
accountability for how the funds were spent and how effective they were. Only the
political model of accountability was really put into effect here. While there are certainly
many legitimate policy reasons why tax expenditures were the right choice to make, there
was no tracking by GAO, RATB or anyone else in determining the impact these tax
expenditures had on the economy or on jobs created or saved (Government
Accountability Office, 2010, pp. 2-6). They were, as GAO’s Chris Mihm stated “purely
political (Mihm & al, 2013).” For example, and given the administration’s stated goal of
assisting those most directly affected by the economic downturn, reducing FICA taxes in
particular was both a political and policy win for the Obama team. Members of Congress
had to be able to bring something tangible home to their districts in order to sell ARRA to
a public already skeptical about bailing out the financial sector a few months earlier.
As Senator McCain (R-AZ) said in the Senate’s final debate on ARRA, “We are
on a spending spree of unprecedented and historic proportions. We are committing what
some of us have called generational theft because we are laying this debt on our children
and our grandchildren (Congressional Record, 2009b, p. S2311).” However, this does
not mean that there was a lot of accountability; beyond political accountability there was
not (Government Accountability Office, 2010, pp. 4-5; Mihm & al, 2013).
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Contracting:
Contracting is defined as a “business arrangement between a government and a
private entity in which the private entity promises, in exchange for money, to deliver
certain products or services to the government agency or to others on the government’s
behalf (Kelman, 2002, p. 282).” Contracting is one of the most pervasive tools utilized in
government today, with many services formerly directly provided by government being
contracted out (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 1-20). It is important to note, however, that, even
when services are contracted out, government is still responsible for ensuring the quality
of contracted goods and services, and should take due care to ensure they are efficiently
and effectively provided (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 1-20).
While many ARRA funds went directly to state and local governments to help fill
their budget holes, most new projects were contracted out. These funds, mainly in the
areas of infrastructure and energy efficiency, were designed to give business directly to
the private sector. Most of these funds were dispersed via “pass through” methods which
involved giving state and local governments the balance of the funds to distribute with a
smaller amount distributed by the federal government itself (Government Accountability
Office, 2010b, pp. 1-5). GAO identified more than 28,000 contracts that had been issued
by late November 2009, only nine months after ARRA’s passage (Government
Accountability Office, 2010b, pp. 1-5).
The accountability models in place for contracts were primarily legal and
professional, with some political and performance accountability thrown in. The political
accountability is fairly straightforward. The signs that were everywhere after ARRA’s
passage were intended to allow both the federal government and local representatives to
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make clear where the money was being spent in each community (Mihm & al, 2013).
Without those signs, political accountability for these contracts would likely have been
more difficult to achieve.
Legal accountability existed because of the personal and institutional
responsibility of those signing such contracts to avoid waste, fraud and abuse. The rules
set out by the RATB and OMB made clear that those receiving funds as a result of a
contract would be held personally responsible for the proper expenditure and service
delivery required under those contracts (Office of Management and Budget, 2009, p. Sec.
2; Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec 2 and 3). As the updated guidelines
on implementing contracts under ARRA stated, “The critical importance of the Recovery
Act, and the funds it will make available to stimulate the American economy, require
heightened management attention on acquisition planning. (Office of Management and
Budget, 2009b, p. 52)” Agencies were required to provide heightened scrutiny to all
contracts and to ensure that they were undertaken with full transparency and dollar for
dollar accountability (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 6). As Acting
Comptroller General Gene Doardo noted in testimony before the Senate Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, RATB also had a key role here, as it was required to
“review grants and contracts, to ensure they meet applicable standards, follow
competition requirements and are overseen by sufficient numbers of trained acquisition
and grants personnel (Doardo G. L., 2009b, p. 3).” The RATB was thus responsible for
ensuring that contracts followed all standard protocols and were in concurrence with
existing contracting laws, rules and regulations, a clear usage of legal accountability.
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Professional accountability existed in the evaluation of with whom to contract,
where to contract and evaluation of contract success. Where to contract out was a
decision based on exiting federal standards (Mihm & al, 2013; Office of Management
and Budget, 2009, p. Sec. 6) and the best professional judgment of those in the state or
agency administering these contracts. With pressure to act in order to encourage private
sector job growth, there was doubtless pressure to contract out as much as possible, but
the decisions made were still fundamentally based on professional standards. In fact,
even though there was pressure to get funds out quickly, ARRA did not authorize usage
of expedited emergency contracting procedures (Office of Management and Budget,
2009b, p. Sec. 6.2.1). Instead, agencies were required to follow normal procedures,
which are based on professional standards, in order to ensure the best outcome for each
contract. GAO reports that nearly all of the contracts issued under ARRA were issued
competitively, meaning that a professional determination was made as to who was the
best to contract with (Government Accountability Office, 2010b, pp. 1-10). Evaluation
of contract success would then be based on established professional standards, even if the
ultimate responsibility for any shortcomings was more of a legal accountability approach.
Regardless, these three areas represent a clear usage of professional accountability as it
relates to contracts under ARRA.
Performance accountability was present as well. According to OMB’s ARRA
regulations, agencies were required to produce performance plans both for ARRA
generally and for specific contracts and to ensure that these were met (Office of
Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 6). Specifically, “Agencies must provide for
appropriate oversight of contracts to ensure outcomes that are consistent with and
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measurable against agency plans and goals under the Act (Office of Management and
Budget, 2009b, p. 59).” Put briefly, agencies had to show, every step of the way, that
they were making progress towards measurable outcomes. This requirement that
performance and measurable outcomes be a direct part of any contracting decision was a
clear usage of performance accountability.
Grants:
As explained in the last chapter, a grant is a “gift that has the aim of either
‘stimulating’ or ‘supporting’ some sort of service or activity by the recipient (Bean &
Conlan, 2002, p. 341).” Grants do not excuse the government from responsibility for a
service but they transition responsibility for actually undertaking it to a third party,
whether private, nonprofit or government (Bean & Conlan, 2002, pp. 340-343). They are
commonly used to help achieve either political or policy goals.
In addition to contracts, ARRA included many grants in areas ranging from
education to technology development to community health. The idea behind these grants
was twofold. First, to use the available funding under ARRA to jumpstart research in
areas that either hadn’t been funded to the new administration’s satisfaction or had seen
the economy sap available grant funds (Office of the Inspector General for the USDA,
2009, pp. 2-7). Second, to help backfill state or local funding that had dried up as a result
of the recession (Green, 2013; Government Accountability Office, 2009k, pp. 3-8).
While contracts and grants are often confused with one another, including, at times, on
Recovery.gov, this study makes a clear distinction between contracted services, where
something tangible like a road or a direct service is to be delivered, and grants for
research or technological development that are meant to be temporary and do not
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necessarily result in a tangible outcome (Green, 2013; Government Accountability
Office, 2009k, pp. 3-8).
There was a problem, however, with issuing grants since during this period
grants.gov, the federal government’s primary grant application system, was undergoing
serious problems. For example, it was extremely difficult to submit applications to
grants.gov due to technical problems, including problems uploading needed attachments
and logging in to the system at all (Government Accountability Office, 2009l, pp. 18-22).
While this issue deals with primarily implementation and not design, the fact that
grants.gov was not fixed when it was known to be a problem before ARRA is nonetheless
worth noting.
As with contracts, the accountability models in relation to grants are primarily
legal and professional but with some performance and political accountability as well.
Unlike contracts, and since grants are not often as visible, there is not as much political
accountability except inasmuch as politicians may brag about a specific grant for their
specific districts. Legal accountability existed, as with contracts, in the tight control and
responsibility that grant recipients had for funds (Government Accountability Office,
2009k, pp. 3-8). For example, USDA Inspector General Phyllis Fong stated that the
inspectors general, both independently and as a result of ARRA, would be focusing on
monitoring all “grant planning activities (Fong, 2009, p. 7)” and would focus their efforts
on those grants deemed high-risk given their experience with the agency, recipient and
the grant in question (Fong, 2009, p. 7). Every penny had to be recorded and reported
and constant reports were required in order to discourage and hopefully avoid waste,
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fraud and abuse. As with contracts, this approach, placing a personal or organizational
onus for reporting and accountability, is a clear usage of legal accountability.
Also as with contracts, professional accountability was utilized in the grant
process. Where to issue grants was certainly directed by the legislation but broad leeway
was given within program areas. For example, although much grant funding was
designated for new renewable energy technologies, there was plenty of leeway for
professional standards to determine which technologies deserved grant funds (Office of
Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 5). The same was true when it came to deciding
who should get the grants. As was the case with contracts, expedited award procedures
were generally not authorized under ARRA (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b,
p. Sec 5.2). Instead, standard federal grant rules were used, based on professional
standards, to choose among grant applicants (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b,
p. Sec. 5.2). In fact, the actual standards were even higher, since, as OMB wrote in the
implementing regulations, “Agencies must take steps, beyond standard practice, to
initiate additional oversight mechanisms in order to mitigate the unique implementation
risks of the Recovery Act. (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, p. 49)” As for
evaluation of grants issued, professional standards as laid out by GAO and OMB were
once again the focus for evaluation (Government Accountability Office, 2010b; Office of
Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 5). These represent a clear usage of
professional accountability as it relates to the grants policy tool.
The implementing regulations for grants under ARRA require that “Agencies
must adapt current performance evaluation and review processes to include the ability to
report periodically on completion status of the program or activity, and program and
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economic outcomes, consistent with Recovery Act requirements. (Office of Management
and Budget, 2009b, p. 49)” Agencies were required to show that each grant not only met
specific performance goals but also that the overall grants structure in the agency met the
general performance goals of the required ARRA performance plan (Office of
Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 5.4.1) Agencies were also required to validate
their performance measures with the relevant Inspector General’s Office, to ensure that
they were sufficient to ensure measureable outcomes (Office of Management and Budget,
2009b, p. Sec 5.4.1).
Public Information:
As defined in the last chapter, the public information policy tool can be said to
exist when government uses public information as a way to encourage a change in
behavior, largely by private actors but possibly by public ones as well. Public
information was utilized in relation to ARRA in the broad publication of all data on those
sending and receiving funds on recovery.gov, most notably by placing all recipients on a
map with these details of the funds they were awarded clearly displayed (Recovery.gov,
2010b). These steps represent public information policy because they are intended to
influence the behavior of decision-makers on where to send funds, contracts and grants.
Knowing that their decisions will be immediately subject to public scrutiny was intended
to change the behavior of these actors since they might tend to make different decisions
knowing that their work was clearly public.
Political and performance accountability were present in relation to this tool.
Political accountability was present in two ways. First, the map-based reporting system
allowed members of Congress to demonstrate where funds were being spent locally
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(Green, 2013). This was then used to help encourage support, by some at least, for
ARRA. Second, congressional oversight was based on this localized approach and
Congress chose to evaluate ARRA’s public information based on this standard (Green,
2013).
Performance accountability was present due to the usage of the jobs created/saved
versus funds expended as based on the map-based localized approach. The focus here
was on ensuring that each community got equal, or close to equal, help from their share
of ARRA funds in various forms. This type of local approach to ensuring that each
community recovered its “fair share” of funds and that the funds were to be spent
properly is an example of performance accountability.
Conclusion:
Unlike TARP, ARRA was fairly close to what was originally intended: a broadbased stimulus bill focused primarily on direct government spending (albeit via indirect
means such as grants and contracts) and tax expenditures. Whether or not this is the right
policy mix is not for this study to say. This study will now proceed to analyze what this
all means relative to the initial research questions posed and analyze the extent to which
each accountability model does, or does not, explain policy tool choice.
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Chapter 5: Analyzing Trends and Meanings for Current and Future Research
In chapters 3 and 4, this study described the cases of TARP and ARRA. This
chapter will analyze these cases and describe what they mean for both theory and
practice. This chapter will explain the answers to the questions posed by the literature
gaps in chapter one. It will do so by focusing first on the two primary research
hypotheses, that a single model approach is insufficient to explain policy tool choice and
that a multiple model approach is superior. This chapter will then proceed to describe
what this means in relation to theory and practice, to explain what this study has added to
the literature and to provide some guidance for future research.
ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION: SINGLE MODELS INSUFFICIENT,
MULTIPLE MODELS SUPERIOR, TOOL MATCH NOT AS CLEAR
The research question for this study was how effectively any one of the four most
commonly used models of accountability explains the policy tool choices made to
address the accountability issues in TARP and ARRA. To answer this question, the study
posed two hypotheses. First, that no one model explains the policy tool choices in either
TARP, ARRA or both. Second, that using multiple models will better explain these
policy tool choices. This section will analyze both of these hypotheses before moving on
to answer the main research question.
Single Models Insufficient to Explain Policy Tool Choice:
The first hypothesis was based on the assumption that tool choices are complex
and therefore that none of the four accountability models would, by themselves, fully
explains most policy tool choices. In all but two cases, the tax expenditure tool for
ARRA and grants for TARP, the data supported this hypothesis. In order to demonstrate
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that the data back up this assertion, this section will go through each of the pertinent
policy tools in turn, beginning with the policy tools used in TARP and then moving on to
the policy tools used in ARRA, attempting to explain them using only one policy tool.
Direct Government in TARP:
Direct government was used in TARP in the creation of OFS. Political
accountability explains this choice in the requirement that the Senate approve the director
of OFS and that OFS had a key role in managing treasury’s investments in relation to
TARP (Office of Financial Stability, 2014). It might even explain the creation of
SIGTARP as a body to monitor and provide oversight, but it does not explain the
standards SIGTARP used, which focused on standard inspector general auditing
standards and procedures (SIGTARP, 2009f, pp. 1-10). SIGTARP evaluated OFS’s
decisions of where to invest its funds and how it monitored them based on the principle
of individual legal responsibility, a typical legal accountability approach (SIGTARP,
2009f, pp. 1-10). The legal accountability used in SIGTARP along with political and
professional accountability mean that the data shows that a single model does not explain
the tool choice.
Loan Guarantees in TARP:
Loan guarantees existed in TARP’s provisions guaranteeing that the government
would ensure that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be solvent so as to avoid their
(and arguably the housing market’s) collapse. Professional accountability explains part
of this choice as the US Treasury was given a role in determining where and when to
issue loan guarantees in concert with established professional standards, which after all is
the basis for professional accountability (Baum, 2013). However, professional
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accountability does not explain the performance metric by which these loan guarantees
were based on, that the areas in which they were being given remain stable and that, for
example, the money market not break the buck (Condon, 2008). Once again, therefore, a
single model approach does not fully explain tool choice.
Direct Loans in TARP:
Direct loans were utilized in TARP in the form of loans given to the big three auto
manufacturers as well as to AIG. Political accountability explains part of this tool choice
in that the institutions chosen to get loans were not only economically important but also
politically important (Wilkerson, 2013). As the two former top staffers in the COP said
in interviews, the reason why the auto manufacturers in particular had to be rescued was
as much politics as it was policy (Baum, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013). Underscoring this
point, President Bush said in relation to the auto bailout “The American people want the
auto companies to succeed, and so do I (Neuman, 2008).” However, while they were
politically important, professional accountability also demanded that these loans be made
in a way that would serve the public interest. Similarly, and in relation to AIG, the
Federal Reserve board said “a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant
levels of financial market fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs,
reduced household wealth, and materially weaker economic performance (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008b).” The loans given were therefore
evaluated by GAO and the COP on the basis of whether they were in the public interest
in concert with professional standards in place at the agencies giving the loans (Baum,
2013; Mihm & al, 2013). While a case could be made for these loans being politically
important and thus representative of political accountability, the reason behind the choice
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of direct loans can be better explained by professional accountability and thus a single
model approach once again fails.
Contracting in ARRA:
This chapter will now address the policy tools used in ARRA, beginning with
contracting. Under ARRA, thousands of contracts were issued by all levels of
government. In fact, GAO noted that 28,000 contracts had been issued under ARRA as
of November 2009, only nine months after ARRA’s passage (Government Accountability
Office, 2010b, pp. 1-5). Legal accountability explains part of this choice in that the
contracts were evaluated on the basis of contract law and other related legal standards,
most notably by GAO (Government Accountability Office, 2009f). An individualistic
legal standard was used, as was described in chapter four. However, professional
accountability explains this tool choice more fully as the decisions on when, with whom
and how to contract were designed to be made on the basis of professional judgment and
were evaluated as such (Mihm & al, 2013). More specifically, while the evaluation of the
contract was based on legal standards and legal accountability, the choice of with whom
to contract was based on professional accountability. Therefore, once again, a single
model approach is insufficient to explain this policy tool choice
Grants in ARRA:
As already noted, grants and contracts are not the same. They have a different
control mechanism, with the issuing agency holding more control over the funds and their
dispersal, than contracts, which are typically more of a partnership (Cooper P. J., 2003).
In addition, grants and contracts utilize different bodies of law and must therefore be
considered separately (Cooper P. J., 2003). Grants were also broadly utilized in ARRA
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in relation to a number of areas, such as research and development of new energy
technologies (Mihm & al, 2013). The decision on where and how to issue grants can be
partially explained by professional accountability as ARRA granted broad discretion for
agencies to expend funds earmarked for grants as they saw fit to meet policy goals, such
as energy efficiency (Mihm & al, 2013). However, OMB’s requirement that all grants be
evaluated on the basis of performance accountability makes it apparent that performance
accountability is also necessary to explain this policy tool choice (Office of Management
and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 6). Therefore, no single accountability model can fully
explain this tool choice.
Public Information in ARRA:
Public information was utilized in relation to ARRA in the broad publication of
all data on those sending and receiving funds. These steps represent public information
policy because they are intended to influence the behavior of decision-makers on where
to send funds, contracts and grants. Knowing that their decisions will be immediately
subject to public scrutiny was intended to affect the behavior of these actors since they
might tend to make different decisions knowing that their work was clearly public.
This was partly representative of political accountability as members of
Congress, and the public, could then use this data to ensure that funds were being spent
evenly across districts as well as properly within them (Mihm & al, 2013). However,
performance accountability explains some additional reasoning behind this tool choice as
the jobs created/saved metric, as well as where those jobs were created/saved, was a key
part of the pitch for ARRA (Mihm & al, 2013). Once again, a single model approach is
insufficient to explain this tool choice.
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The Two Exceptions: Tax Expenditures in ARRA and Grants in TARP
This chapter will now discuss the two cases where a single model approach is
sufficient to explain policy tool choice. The first is tax expenditures in ARRA. As noted
in chapter four, tax expenditures totaled $288 billion, more than any other single part of
the bill (ARRA, 2009, p. Title I; Recovery.gov, 2010b). They were wide-ranging,
although mostly directed towards those at the lower end of the income scale (ARRA,
2009, p. Title I; Recovery.gov, 2010b). There are sound policy and, of course, political
reasons for these tax expenditures but no metrics or other evaluations were put in place to
determine the effectiveness of these tax expenditures (Mihm & al, 2013). No part of
ARRA assigned any responsibility for tracking these tax expenditures to any of the
bodies tracking the broader law (Mihm & al, 2013). The accountability, therefore, was
purely political (Mihm & al, 2013). This was intentional. As one Senate staffer said,
members of Congress wanted something tangible to bring home to their districts and tax
expenditures were an easy way to do so (Green, 2013). Therefore, and as stated in
chapter four, this is an instance in which only one model explains the tool choice.
In relation to grants in TARP, most of the grants were given to those whom were
politically powerful in order to secure important votes (Pope, 2011). For example,
money for timber payments was included in order to get the votes of some members of
Congress in the Pacific Northwest (Pope, 2011). This decision could be explained on
other grounds but it is mostly explained by politics as a classic example of “vote-buying”
(Fenno, 1978) since it resulted in members of Congress who had voted against the bill the
first time voting in favor the second when these grants were included (Pope, 2011).
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These vote-switches were necessary to pass TARP. Thus, grants in TARP represent a
second case in which a single model approach is sufficient to explain tool choice.
Nevertheless, while there are two instances in which a single model approach
explains tool choice, the data from the rest of the policy tools indicate that a single model
approach is insufficient. In all other case, utilizing at least two models explains the other
policy tool choices more fully than one model alone. As a result, the data support the
hypothesis that a single-model approach is generally insufficient to explain policy tool
choice. This chapter will now proceed to examine the data around the second hypothesis
and evaluate whether a multiple model approach is superior for explaining policy tool
choice.
Multiple Models Have Greater Explanatory Power:
The second hypothesis was that using multiple accountability models would have
greater explanatory power in explaining policy tool choices. The reasoning behind this
was, as noted above, policy tools are complex instruments and there are often many
reasons why they are chosen, whether political, professional, legal or performance-based.
As a result of this complexity, it is typically the case that tool choices need to be viewed
from the perspectives of multiple accountability models in order to explain tool choice.
With the exception of two instances noted in the last section, the policy tools used in
TARP and ARRA required multiple models to fully explain.
This section will now evaluate the remaining tools where multiple model
approaches provide greater explanatory power. The tools used will be loan guarantees,
direct government and direct loans for TARP and contracting, grants and public
information for ARRA.
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Loan Guarantees in TARP:
One of the major ways in which TARP was designed to prevent a collapse of the
financial system was by providing loan guarantees to those in the marketplace so as to
calm skittish investors (Baum, 2013). Loan guarantees were primarily given to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac in order to shore up the housing market and make clear that
federally backed loans were secure (Baum, 2013). As discussed in chapter 3, this study
found that all four accountability models played a role in this policy tool choice.
Political accountability was present both in the choice to use loan guarantees to
save politically important institutions such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and in the
choice to give oversight for loan guarantees to the COP, which was a political body
chartered by Congress to evaluate TARP (Wilkerson, 2013). This choice to give
oversight authority to a political body is representative of political accountability.
Legal accountability was present in the role a special inspector general
(SIGTARP) had in ensuring that these loan guarantees were administered in accordance
with the law (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009d, pp. 3-8; SIGTARP, 2009b, pp. 512). These legal standards, which included, for example, whether banks had
misrepresented their financial status to the federal government before receiving TARP
funds, were based on both civil and criminal law (SIGTARP, 2012). They resulted in
SIGTARP pursuing multiple criminal and civil cases against parties that violated the law,
as one would expect in an approach based on legal accountability (SIGTARP, 2013b).
As a result they were representative of legal accountability.
Professional accountability was present in this tool choice in the discretion given
to the US Treasury in how and when to issue such guarantees as well as the established
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federal standards by which they were evaluated by GAO and SIGTARP (Mihm & al,
2013). For example, GAO evaluated whether the US Treasury was properly issuing and
monitoring these loan guarantees (Government Accountability Office, 2013, pp. 2-5).
GAO created a list of recommendations, based on professional standards, to determine if
Treasury was properly monitoring and issuing loan guarantees and then evaluated
Treasury against those recommendations (Government Accountability Office, 2013, pp.
12-17). Since these recommendations were based on professional standards, this
represents a usage of professional accountability as defined in chapter 2.
Finally, performance accountability was present in the extent to which the
performance of the market was clearly intended to be a barometer of this tool’s success
(Baum, 2013). Specifically, if an institution which was given a loan guarantee did better,
it was regarded as a success, while if it failed, it was regarded as a failure (Baum, 2013).
This market performance metric is a key way in which performance accountability can be
invoked. It certainly was the case here.
To look at just any one of these models in relation to this tool choice would be to
miss an important part of the picture. As shown above and in chapter three, more than
one model is needed to explain this tool choice. Therefore, with regards to this tool, the
second hypothesis is true.
Direct Government in TARP
Direct government was a key part of TARP. As discussed in chapter three, direct
government was a part of TARP in the money market rescue program and the creation of
OFS within the US Treasury
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All four models applied to the usage of the direct government tool in the case of
TARP. Political accountability was present in relation to TARP in the role Congress had
in confirming OFS’s director and in the oversight hearings held in relation to the money
market policy (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008; US Office of
Financial Stability, 2012). Political accountability was also present in relation to TARP
in the congressional oversight hearings related to TARP (Government Accountability
Office, 2009f).
Legal accountability was present in relation to TARP in the oversight of
SIGTARP in ensuring that the Treasury correctly implemented their duties under this law
(SIGTARP, 2013b). Specifically, SIGTARP was responsible for ensuring that
government action was within the law and that all participants were acting legally and
responsibly as determined by federal legal standards (SIGTARP, 2009h).
Professional accountability was present in relation to TARP in two ways. First,
OFS’s work was evaluated based on established professional standards related to tracking
of funds (Baum, 2013). Second, OFS had a key role in ensuring that the money market
actions were undertaken in concert with professional standards (Baum, 2013). OFS was
held to account by the professional standards of those in the COP and were evaluated
against those standards constantly, marking a usage of professional accountability in
relation to this tool (Wilkerson, 2013).
Performance accountability was present in relation to TARP in the money market
actions in that performance metrics, however informal, were utilized to ensure that the
money market was not “breaking the buck” (Baum, 2013; Condon, 2008). COP and
others evaluated the success of TARP based on whether or not they were able to keep the
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money market from “breaking the buck”. This focus on measureable standards
represents a usage of performance accountability.
It would be missing part of the picture to look at only one accountability model in
relation to this policy tool choice. As shown above and in chapter three, more than one
model is necessary to explain this tool choice. Therefore, with regards to this tool, the
second hypothesis is true.
Direct Loans in TARP:
Direct loans were another critical part of TARP. As discussed in chapter 3, loans
were given to institutions including auto manufacturers, banks and AIG. These loans
were at the heart of TARP, as it fed money back into a financial system that lacked
capital flows.
All four accountability models explain this policy tool choice to some extent.
Political accountability explains the focus on saving politically important governmentfunded institutions such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and auto manufacturers.
Although these choices could be justified on policy grounds, saving them was also
important because the political damage caused by their failure could have been
significant (Baum, 2013; Green, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).
Legal accountability explains this tool choice with the role SIGTARP was given
in tracking these loans and ensuring that none of the parties violated the law. For
example, SIGTARP ensured that banks properly accounted for the loans they received
through TARP (SIGTARP, 2013d). In one case, SIGTARP’s charges resulted in FifthThird Bank paying a $6.5 million fine as a result of the bank’s failure to properly account
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for TARP loans (SIGTARP, 2013d). This represents a usage of legal accountability in
relation to direct loans.
Professional accountability explains this tool choice in the role that the US
Treasury was given in deciding where and to whom to issue loans. It was also present in
the standards to be used by SIGTARP and GAO in evaluating such loans. Specifically,
these loans used professional standards from the federal government’s “green book” and
“yellow book” to determine how and whether these loan guarantees were properly
administered (Mihm & al, 2013).
Performance accountability explains this policy tool choice because the success of
this particular policy tool was, at least partially, evaluated on the basis of market
outcomes and performance (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009). Specifically, the
concern was whether companies benefited as a result of these loans. If they did, that was
considered a success under TARP’s performance standards (Congressional Oversight
Panel, 2009). This is representative of performance accountability in relation to this
policy tool.
Once again to look at any one of these models in isolation only gets to part of the
picture. All four models can help explain this policy tool choice. Once again, a multiple
model approach is superior and this hypothesis is validated.
Contracting in ARRA:
Contracting was a critical part of how ARRA dispersed funds. In order to
undertake the actual projects authorized under ARRA, federal, state and local
governments largely contracted out the performance of this task. As already noted,
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28,000 contracts were issued under ARRA as of November 2009, only seven months
after ARRA’s passage (Government Accountability Office, 2010b, pp. 1-5).
As noted in chapter four, this study found that although accountability in relation
to this tool was primarily legal and professional, there was some performance and
political accountability as well. Political accountability existed in the specific selection
to award contracts to those that were politically powerful (Green, 2013; Mihm & al,
2013). Some evidence appeared to suggest that big political contributors might have
gotten bigger contracts under ARRA (Hoover, 2010). However, an academic study
argues this point, stating that there is limited evidence to suggest that contracts were
awarded based on political factors (Boone, Dube, & Kaplan, 2014). Nonetheless, it
appears that politics probably played at least some role in awarding contracts.
Legal accountability existed because of the personal responsibility of the
organization and persons in the organization responsible for signing such contracts to
avoid waste, fraud and abuse (Mihm & al, 2013). Specifically, GAO evaluated whether
those receiving contracts were administering them in concert with state law (Government
Accountability Office, 2009d). This type of focus on the legal procedures and rules is
representative of legal accountability.
Professional accountability existed in the evaluation of whom to contract, where
to contract and evaluation of contract success. Where to contract out was a decision
based on exiting federal standards (Mihm & al, 2013; Office of Management and Budget,
2009, p. Sec. 6) and the best professional judgment of those in the state or agency
administering these contracts. GAO evaluated whether both states and the RATB
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followed these standards in relation to contracts (Government Accountability Office,
2009d, pp. 5-7).
Performance accountability was present in that, according to OMB’s ARRA
regulations, agencies were required to produce performance plans both for ARRA
generally and for specific contracts and to ensure that these were met (Office of
Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 6). This is a usage of performance
accountability in relation to this tool.
In short, the choice to utilize the contracting policy tool was based on all four
models. This makes sense because contracts really do draw on all aspects of
accountability. As a result, multiple accountability models are present in relation to the
contracting policy tool in ARRA.
Grants in ARRA:
ARRA included a variety of grants in areas ranging from education to technology
development to community health. As already noted, this study makes a clear distinction
between contracted services, where something tangible like a road or a direct service is to
be delivered, and grants for research or technological development that are meant to be
temporary and do not necessarily result in a tangible outcome (Green, 2013; Government
Accountability Office, 2009k, pp. 3-8).
All four accountability models explain part of this policy tool choice. Political
accountability existed inasmuch as grants were given to individual districts, where local
members of Congress were able to brag about them to their constituents. For example,
Oregon Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) openly asserts that securing ARRA grant funds for
the state is proof that he can deliver for his constituents (Oregon's Senator Jeff Merkley,
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2014). This sort of behavior is what that would be expected for a policy predicated in
part on political accountability.
Legal accountability existed, as with contracts, in the tight control and
responsibility that grant recipients had for funds (Government Accountability Office,
2009k, pp. 3-8). For example, USDA Inspector General Phyllis Fong stated that
inspectors general, both independently and as a result of ARRA, would be focusing on
monitoring all “grant planning activities (Fong, 2009, p. 7)” and would focus their efforts
on those grants deemed high-risk given both their experience with the agency, recipient
and the grant in question (Fong, 2009, p. 7).
Professional accountability explains this tool choice in the role that agencies were
given in determining where, with whom and how to evaluate grants. The guidelines
under ARRA gave broad latitude to agencies to issue grants to specific recipients as they
felt best served the public interest (Office of Management and Budget, 2009c, p. Sec. 3).
For example, although much grant funding was designated for new renewable energy
technologies, there was plenty of leeway for professional standards to determine which
technologies deserved grant funds (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 5).
As for evaluation of grants issued, professional standards as laid out by GAO and OMB
were once again the focus for evaluation (Government Accountability Office, 2010b;
Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 5). .
Performance accountability was present in this tool choice since the implementing
regulations for grants under ARRA required that, “Agencies must adapt current
performance evaluation and review processes to include the ability to report periodically
on completion status of the program or activity, and program and economic outcomes,
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consistent with Recovery Act requirements. (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b,
p. 49).” These plans are representative of exactly the sort of metrics used in a
performance-accountability case.
If one were to consider only one accountability model, one would miss a key part
of the picture. Approaching this tool choice from a multi-model perspective increases
what can be explained. Once again, the hypothesis that a multiple model approach is
superior is confirmed.
Public Information in ARRA:
As noted in the prior section, public information was utilized in relation to ARRA
in the broad publication of all data on those sending and receiving funds. These steps
represented public information policy because they are intended to influence the behavior
of decision-makers on where to send funds, contracts and grants. Political accountability
explains this tool choice in that the map-based reporting system allowed members of
Congress to demonstrate that funds were being spent locally (Green, 2013). In addition,
congressional oversight was based on this localized approach and Congress chose to
evaluate ARRA’s public information based on this standard (Green, 2013).
Performance accountability explains this tool choice due to the usage of the jobs
created/saved versus funds expended as based on the map-based localized approach.
The focus here was on ensuring that each community got equal, or as close to equal, help
from their share of ARRA funds in their various forms (Boone, Dube, & Kaplan, 2014,
pp. 1-3).
Although the public information tool did not utilize all four models, looking at
only one model is missing part of the picture. It is not enough, for example, to say that
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the map-based approach was utilized only because of political reasons when the
reasoning behind it was performance-based as well. Once again, the hypothesis that a
multiple model approach is superior is supported by the evidence.
Summing Up the Results: Multiple Model Approach Superior
As shown here, as well as in chapters three and four, a single model approach
leaves out important factors that policy makers considered in determining which tools to
use and therefore only gets to part of the picture. Utilizing a multi-model approach has
greater explanatory power in relation to tool choices in every instance except tax
expenditures for ARRA and grants for TARP. As a result, it is clear that the hypothesis
that a multi model approach explains more about the tool choice than a single model
approach is true.
POLICY TOOL CHOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODELS: EXPLANATORY
POWER STRONG IF UNEVEN AND STILL POSSIBLE TO LEARN MUCH
This chapter will now consider the question “How effectively does any one of the
four most commonly used models of accountability explain the policy tool choices
chosen to address the accountability issues in TARP and ARRA?” The answer differs
between the two cases but the answers are largely the same in that accountability models
do explain policy tool choice.
For TARP, the definition of the policy problem has a significant impact on the
connection between policy tools choice and accountability models. In this case, the
decision not to focus on economic regulation appears to have fallen victim to the
definition of the policy problem as needing to solve the immediate causes of the crisis
rather than the reasons the crisis happened in the first place. Specifically, the policy
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problem for TARP was defined as needing to solve the results of the crisis rather than the
cause of it in the first place.
Doubtless part of the policy problem definition was due to the speed with which
the policy was adopted, with the policy being enacted about two and a half weeks after its
original inception. This speed meant that accountability was not as well-defined as many
would have liked and arguably that it was not therefore as likely to be as well thought out
a policy as many would have liked. As John Taylor said in February 2009, “the
government’s intervention plan had not been fully thought through (Taylor, 2009).” This
speed and lack of full policy development that Taylor and others noted meant that policy
tool choices were not necessarily those that were originally said to be part of the bill,
most notably in the areas noted in chapter three.
Nonetheless, and as noted in chapter three and this chapter, accountability models
do explain some of the tool choices and help us understand how they were both set up
operationally and how the accountability of these tools would be determined. If one did
not consider the accountability models in relation to the direct loan tool, for example, the
evidence suggest that it would not be possible to understand the role professional
standards played in determining which companies got loans, at what rates and how they
were tracked.
In relation to ARRA, the link between policy tools and accountability models is
more apparent. This is due primarily to three factors. First, ARRA was a more
conventional bill than TARP and so was working with more established approaches; and
the accountability models that are tied to the policy tools used in those approaches are
fairly well established. Second, GAO and others in the accountability community
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insisted that policy tools be tied to clear accountability standards, at least when it came to
areas other than tax expenditures (Mihm & al, 2013). The accountability community
asserted that it was critical that this be done because the large sums of money being
expended under ARRA in a very public manner demanded clear standards tied to policy
tool approaches (Mihm & al, 2013). Third, OMB’s own regulations concerning ARRA
break down the bill’s approaches into individual policy tools and the standards on which
they will be evaluated relative to each are clear (Office of Management and Budget,
2009c). This was unusual as there does not appear to be another case in which OMB so
clearly states the policy tool choices and ties them to accountability models.
Policy tool choice, at least in relation to TARP and ARRA, is explained in a
variety of significant ways by accountability models. The extent to which it is may differ
and its impact but this is nonetheless a clear and unique approach to connecting policy
tools and accountability models.
EVALUTING TARP AND ARRA: LESSONS THAT CAN BE LEARNED
The following section will provide some lessons that can be learned from TARP
and ARRA. It will evaluate how the policies were undertaken, how the circumstances in
which they were created impacted them and what this tells us about policy design,
accountability and policy tools.
Lessons that can be Learned from TARP:
When faced with a decision on how to resolve a problem as daunting as the great
recession, TARP was a unique policy that responded to the major problems posed by this
crisis. The following section will discuss and analyze this study’s three main findings
related to TARP alone. They are: (1) the decision to attack the results of the problems
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cause by the economic crisis of 2008 rather than the source itself; (2) the speed of
response impacted tool choice; and (3) the fact that accountability was not initially as
present as had been publicly asserted prior to the bill’s passage. This is not an exhaustive
list of findings but they are the three most important.
Attacking the Results of the Problem Rather than the Cause: Lack of Regulation
As discussed in chapter three, the economic crisis of 2008 came about in no small
part due to decades of deregulation. The system had been left vulnerable to abuse as
deregulation allowed riskier and riskier investments to take place with little to no
government oversight. The system was indeed abused. It was apparent to many that part
of the solution to this crisis needed to be re-regulation of some sort so as to control and
prevent such events from occurring again (Krugman P. , 2009; Stiglitz, 2012, pp. 22-25).
While this would later happen in part with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, it did not in TARP (US Congress, 2010; Krugman P. R., 2012,
pp. 86-89).
Congress did not address regulation at all in TARP except in the very limited
sense that executive bonuses were supposedly to be limited for those receiving
government funds (although this didn’t turn out to be the case) (Green, 2013). Instead,
TARP made a conscious choice to attack only the results of the problem and not the
underlying problem itself (Green, 2013; Mihm & al, 2013). For example, it provided
loans to AIG and the big three auto manufacturers but did not reform the underlying
regulations governing these industries (Mihm & al, 2013).
This is not an invalid policy choice by any means but it did not get at the root of
the problem. It was also unlike the response to the savings and loan crisis since the focus
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there was both on saving the system and on re-regulating it (Krugman P. R., 2012;
Stiglitz, 2012).
TARP’s decision to focus on the results of the crisis did not address the
fundamental problems of the system, as Dr. Cooper points out (Cooper P. J., 2009). This
left the system open for future abuse. TARP may have helped put out the fire started by
the economic crisis of 2008 but it did little to make the financial system fire-proof for the
future.
Speed of Response Impacted Tool Choice:
There was no question that members of Congress felt that they had to respond
quickly. The markets agreed, with the precipitous drop after Congress failed to pass the
first version of TARP being clear evidence of this. Add to that looming presidential and
congressional elections and this was a situation in which members of Congress believed
that they had to find a way to pass a bill that provided quick and politically sellable
benefits (Baum, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013). Treasury sensed this too, which is why its
initial proposal was only three pages; this initial proposal was designed specifically to
force Congress to act quickly and to give Treasury broad authority to respond quickly
(Paulson, 2008). Although this initial proposal was not reasonable or feasible, since few
in Congress were prepared to turn over that much unchecked power, it was yet one more
thing putting pressure on Congress to act quickly and not get bogged down in the details.
This decision to act quickly impacted the choice of tools that were in TARP in
three primary ways. First, in multiple cases, as demonstrated in chapter three, some of
the tools that were originally intended for the bill, or that one would expect to find in the
bill, were not actually in the bill. Most notably, proponents of TARP said it was going to
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use public information and government as a corporation but TARP did not do so (Baum,
2013; Wilkerson, 2013). This was probably due, at least in part, to the speed with which
the bill was put together.
Second, tools were often put in place without clear implementing guidelines. In
several cases, according to those at GAO and COP, programs were announced without
any implementing guidance just so that Congress and the President could demonstrate
that they had taken action (Baum, 2013; Mihm & al, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013). While this
certainly happens in normal cases as well, those at GAO and COP believed that it
happened far more often with TARP (Baum, 2013; Mihm & al, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).
The agencies and the administration would then let the administration write the rules.
Thus, it was clear that the speed with which the legislation was implemented impacted
the tool choice.
In addition, the tools TARP did utilize were different than what might have been
expected. As discussed in chapter three, for example, there was almost no usage of
economic regulation as a policy tool. Instead, the focus was on fixing the results of the
failure rather than the causes of the failure itself.
While there were many legitimate reasons for Congress to move with speed, there
is no doubt that speed had an impact on the design of the bill. The next section will
discuss how this focus on speed of response impacted accountability.
Accountability Missing?
Lack of accountability was one major reason why Secretary Paulson’s initial
three-page bill was rejected. Most in Congress simply did not trust him with that kind of
power (Green, 2013). As it emerged from Congress, TARP was inlaid with
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accountability mechanisms but they were not as strong as many thought at the time
(Baum, 2013; Mihm & al, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013). Some of this was likely due to the
lack of further time for reflection.
Under section 125 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 or
EESA, the act which contained TARP, Congress authorized creation of the COP
(Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008, p. Sec. 125). COP was vested
with a broad mandate to “review the current state of the financial markets and the
regulatory system. (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008, p. 125)” COP,
however, was not vested with real authority, as its purpose was simply to report on both
the markets in general, and the impacts/implementation of TARP more generally (Baum,
2013; Wilkerson, 2013). None of its recommendations were required to be implemented
by anyone and, in fact, due to the one-per-month speed at which COP produced reports,
there was little time for feedback or study before the next one came along (Baum, 2013;
Wilkerson, 2013). Ultimately COP could do little more than sound the alarm about
potential or real problems. It could not enforce additional accountability as problems
arose.
Further complicating COP’s work was the fact that many of TARP’s programs
were described only in the most basic terms in the legislation, with the details to be filled
in later (Baum, 2013; Green, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013). As noted, this happens in many
cases, but it happened far more often here than in general (Baum, 2013; Green, 2013;
Wilkerson, 2013). A classic example of this, cited by multiple COP staffers as well as a
Senate staffer in interviews, was the attempt to use TARP funds to do something about
the home mortgage crisis (Baum, 2013; Green, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013). The Obama
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administration pushed ahead and announced that it was going to undertake a plan to solve
the foreclosure problem but did not have any implementing standards in place (Baum,
2013; Green, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013). This put COP in the difficult position of trying to
evaluate a program which, although ostensibly a key part of the policy, did not have any
standards by which to measure it (Baum, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013). The result was that
while COP did the best it could, COP was not as able as one might have wished to ensure
accountability in this area. COP was only able to report generally on this and several
other key programs.
Similarly, section 121 of the EESA authorized the creation of SIGTARP
(Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008, p. Sec. 121). SIGTARP was
granted broad authority to ensure that the actions of the Secretary of the Treasury or any
agencies or private entities receiving TARP funds followed federal law (Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008, p. Sec. 121). SIGTARP was granted the same
authority to subpoena information as any other inspector general, and its
recommendations and reports, in theory, carried potential consequences (Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008, p. Sec. 121). In fact, as of early April 2013,
SIGTARP claimed to have successfully prosecuted 91 persons and recovered more than
$3.8 billion in court ordered restitution (SIGTARP, 2013b).
Nonetheless, SIGTARP got off to a slow start. In all five of the quarterly reports
produced during the period primarily covered by this study, SIGTARP wrote that
Treasury was either unwilling or unable to comply with its most basic recommendation
that recipients of TARP funds fully report on their usage (SIGTARP, 2009, pp. 97-99;
SIGTARP, 2009i, pp. 135-137; SIGTARP, 2009c, pp. 186-189; SIGTARP, 2009g, pp.
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165-167; SIGTARP, 2010, pp. 137-140). The reasons behind this refusal were
supposedly because such information was either not readily available or because the
recipients did not want to provide it (SIGTARP, 2010, p. 139). After much trying,
SIGTARP declared a victory of sorts when it got Treasury to report very basic usage of
funds information (SIGTARP, 2010, pp. 137-140). In fact, all SIGTARP ended up
getting was a basic report on whether or not recipients could have undertaken business as
they did without usage of TARP funds, which although arguably important is not perhaps
what SIGTARP was looking for (SIGTARP, 2010, pp. 139-140).
In short, even where TARP created accountability structures, they did not have as
much power or authority as the public or Congress may have wanted to believe (Baum,
2013; Green, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013). The policy’s quick design, leading to an
undeveloped approach and a lack of full tool development, left some aspects of
accountability lacking. This is not entirely surprising since, as Cooper has routinely
observed, emergency situations often result in lowered accountability because the
perceived risk to the public of waiting to respond is seen as greater than the risk that
funds would not be properly tracked or spent (Cooper P. J., 2003). In a true emergency,
the argument goes, what other choice do you really have?
ARRA: A More Typical Stimulus Bill, Attacked the Right Problem and Multiple Models
Used
As described in chapter four in particular, ARRA was a broad and complex
response to one of the worst economic crises in US history. When faced with a decision
on how to resolve a problem as daunting as the great recession, ARRA had to be both
complex and broad. The following section will discuss and analyze our five main
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findings related to ARRA alone. They are: (1) ARRA was a relatively typical stimulus
bill; (2) ARRA attacked something closer to the problem it was originally intended to
resolve; (3) accountability was clear and well defined within policy tools; and (4) yet did
not address the long-term unemployment issues. This is not an exhaustive list of possible
findings but they are the four most important in this case.
A More Typical Stimulus Bill:
When governments respond to economic crises, they often utilize countercyclical
policies. These policies, perhaps most notably favored by Keynesian economics, argue
that when the economy is weak, the government should spend more money in order to fill
the gap created by a lack of private sector spending (Keynes, 1933). Keynesian
economics suggests that this spending should be as broad and as deep as practicable in
order to counteract the effects of the downturn (Keynes, 1933).
Although some, such as Krugman, have asserted that ARRA was too small, this is
basically what ARRA did. It took a large amount of money ($787 billion), injected into
the economy and spread it around broadly. While TARP may have been an atypical
approach to the problem that it faced, ARRA was not. ARRA was more of a typical
stimulus bill and thus fits more neatly into the categories and methods of analysis applied
to such bills.
Attacked Something Closer to the Root of the Problem:
Similarly, and while TARP can be criticized for attacking the outcomes of the failure
to regulate and therefore not attacking the root cause of the crisis, ARRA more closely
attacked the problem it was originally meant to resolve. It did so in a number of ways.
The following section will address how it did so in relation to each of its three major
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components: tax policy, backfilling state budget holes and direct/indirect spending on
new projects.
The tax expenditures in ARRA were designed to provide economic support through
broad-based tax benefits to most Americans. Although accountability was lacking, the
policy nonetheless was broad, deep and fast, as one would have hoped.
In relation to the backfilling of state budgets, ARRA again addressed the root
problem. Although ARRA did not come close to filling all of the gaps created by the
economic downturn, it nonetheless addressed a specific portion of the gaps and stopped
more significant job loss. Once again, the policy attacked the problem it was originally
intended to resolve in this area and did so promptly.
The new direct and indirect federal spending, was designed to create quick jobs, and
fund needed infrastructure improvements. One can quibble over how and where this
money was spent and whether it was spent well but it did help provide new jobs and
quickly inject money into the economy. It certainly was designed, therefore to address
the problem of addressing the jobs crisis that was the administration’s main concern in
relation to ARRA.
In sum, the data show that ARRA did in fact address the right problem, and the
problem that it was set out to address. One can rightly quibble with ARRA’s design and
its size but it is hard to argue that ARRA was not framed to address the right problem.
ARRA is therefore different than TARP in this way.
This fact is further emphasized by the fact that the policy tools used were the result of
work with the accountability agencies. OMB took great care to make clear how it was
doing ARRA work, what tools it was using and how. The tool choice, although quick,
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was clearly intentional, based on known variables and represented a far more organized
response than TARP.
Accountability Generally Clear and Broad:
There is no question that accountability is hard to achieve in an emergency. As
GAO’s Chris Mihm said “The only way to ensure no waste, fraud or abuse in a program
is not to spend any money on it. (Mihm & al, 2013)” Still, unlike TARP, ARRA had clear
accountability systems, and there are three primary reasons why.
First was the factor of time; TARP was put together in about two weeks, while ARRA
was designed over a period of a few months. While many of the details of ARRA were
up in the air until the last minute, it was no secret that President-elect Obama and
Congressional Democrats wanted to pass the bill and, as noted in chapter four, had begun
negotiating before Obama even took office (Obama, 2009). There was a much more
deliberative process for ARRA than for TARP.
Second, the accountability community very forcefully insisted on greater tracking.
GAO and others went to the administration before ARRA was passed and insisted on
provisions in the law in order to ensure accountability (Mihm & al, 2013). This led, for
example, to the ARRA implementation guidelines being grouped by policy tools,
something that made it easier for the accountability agencies to track spending (Office of
Management and Budget, 2009; Office of Management and Budget, 2009b).
Additionally, GAO was given far more funding to track ARRA than TARP, allowing it to
set up field offices to track expenses on the ground and to do a more complete job (Mihm
& al, 2013). This is so even though tax expenditures, fully one third of the bill, had very
little accountability.
140

Third, the public nature of the spending played a key role in ensuring accountability.
While TARP raised constant concerns about how much government should intrude into
private enterprise, there was no such concern with ARRA. Nearly all of the spending
was undertaken directly by or on behalf of public agencies (Mihm & al, 2013). These
agencies, which provided multiple filters to ensure accountability, were also used to
tracking standard spending and thus could do so publicly and effectively (Mihm & al,
2013). While it is arguable that spending through contractors was harder to track, this
spending was still done and tracked via established procedures related to contractors.
And unlike TARP, all spending was public.
This is not to say that accountability was always clear for ARRA. Nonetheless,
accountability was far more clear and present with ARRA than with TARP.
Failure to Address Long-Term Job Challenges:
For all that ARRA attacked the current problems of unemployment by trying to
increase demand through government spending, it did nothing to address the long-term
challenges revealed by the crisis. Very little actually went to solve the jobs problem,
either in the short-term or long-term (Krugman P. R., 2012, pp. 120-123). For example,
there was no 1930s style WPA program to create broad public works and directly hire the
unemployed. In fact, such an approach was never seriously discussed by policymakers
and never came close to being included in the final bill (Krugman P. R., 2012, pp. 120123; Stiglitz, 2012, pp. 232-234).
To be fair, it is not entirely clear what could have been done since, as Stiglitz
observes, solving the long-term unemployment problem requires a “structural
transformation (Stiglitz, 2012, p. 233).” That is to say that globalization has
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fundamentally changed what Americans should be doing in the workforce and therefore
the changes in training and time needed to shift many in the American workforce to new
types of work was beyond anything a policy of this size could have accomplished. After
all, these problems had been brewing for at least the past few decades and so the idea that
ARRA could fix these long-term problems is highly questionable at best. Still, it is worth
noting that this policy was not designed to solve these challenges.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE AND IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The primary research question led to two hypotheses: no single accountability
model would fully explain most policy tool choices and utilizing multiple accountability
models would result in a more complete picture. This was particularly apt in this case as
accountability was a chief concern with regard to both TARP and ARRA. This concern
makes drawing connections between accountability models and policy tools clearer. As
noted earlier in this chapter, except for one tool choice each in TARP and ARRA, there is
clear evidence that a single model does not fully explain policy tool choices and there is
equally clear evidence that a multiple models approach is superior.
This study offers several lessons for both accountability and policy tools
literature. Consider first the accountability literature. As noted in the literature review
in chapter two, there is a tendency by many, especially those who back performance
accountability, to assert that their model is the best and only correct model for ensuring
accountability. This sort of thinking has led to policies such as the Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA), which is a “one-size-fits-all, government-wide
approach to management reform that…does not fit easily into the third hole, the reality of
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policy design and politics (Radin, 2000, p. 127).” Indeed, policies such as the GPRA
oversimplify the problem of accountability by assuming that a single model provides the
best and only way to understand and ensure it.
This kind of assertion is not limited to performance accountability. Some authors
in the political accountability literature, make similar claims for their model. For
example, Adsera, Boix, & Payne argue that “How well government functions hinges on
how good citizens are at making their politicians accountable for their actions (Adsera,
Boix, & Payne, 2003, p. 445).” While political accountability and responsiveness are
certainly factors in accountability as a whole, they provide only a part of the overall
picture.
The same is true for professional and legal accountability, although there are few
who claim that these forms of accountability are sufficient by themselves. As this study
has shown, no one model of accountability insufficient to explain complex policy designs
such as TARP and ARRA.
Accountability literature therefore needs to consider multiple forms of
accountability when deciding how to create and evaluate accountable policies. Although
some authors such as Mulgan rightly argue that “accountability is a complex and
chameleon-like term (Mulgan, 2000, p. 555)” that encompasses multiple different forms
of accountability, including performance, professional and political, he and others do not
go far enough (Mulgan, 2000, pp. 555-558). Instead, they claim that external control is
still a necessary part of accountability, which it may be in many cases, but it may not be
for example in professional accountability since the standards inherit within are internal
to the profession (Mulgan, 2000, pp. 555-557). If, instead, we were to understand policies
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with a sensitivity for multiple accountability models this study suggests that we would
have a more accurate and complete picture of the policy, the tools it uses, and the ways in
which it addresses accountability. This point is particularly relevant in these cases
because of the stated focus on accountability in their formulation.

A focus on a multiple

accountability model approach is therefore essential for the advancement of the literature
and practice.
One other important contribution that this study suggests is that too often the
accountability literature has focused on implementation or failures rather than paying
attention to accountability in designing policies to be accountable in the first place
(Romzek & Dubnik, 1987, pp. 228-230). The accountability literature in public
administration, like Romzek and Dubnick’s famous piece on the Challenger crisis does a
great job describing the organizational breakdowns that lead to that disaster but does not
describe how to make organizations accountable in the first place. Accountability is too
often reactive, rather than proactive. This study asserts that knowing how to work with
the accountability models at the front end in the policy design phase might help design
accountable policies in the first place rather than just being reactive.
From a practical perspective, GAO employees told me in interviews that placing
the accountability more on the front end of the policy design in ARRA had a significant
impact on accountability (Mihm & al, 2013). By having it be more clearly part of the
policy and focusing on real-time, rather than reactive accountability, GAO employees felt
it resulted in a different perspective that they feel might be valuable (Mihm & al, 2013).
So therefore, this proactive approach might produce different, and perhaps better, results
for accountability in practice as well as in theory.
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This proactive approach is arguably especially important in cases where
accountability is a key component of the policy, such as TARP and ARRA, but it is not
exclusive to these types of cases. Yet more generally, accountability in policy
formulation would seem to be something the literature, and practice, should discuss but
does not. This is perhaps one of the more significant contributions of this study.
Policy Tools Literature and Practice:
One of the questions this study attempted to answer is how policy tools and
accountability models were connected in terms of how the choice of one informed the
other. Policy tools literature in general seeks to “highlight the political consequences of
particular tools, as well as their underlying assumptions about problems, people and
behavior (Sidney, 2006, p. 82).” This study provides evidence that accountability models
played a significant part in the choice of a number of particular policy tools chosen for
the designs of these two policies. There was certainly consideration of these factors in
policy tool selection for both TARP and ARRA. For example, TARP’s choice of loans
and loan guarantees was a direct response to the assumption that money was needed to be
provided in the form of a loan to troubled financial and other institutions. In the case of
ARRA, the choice of tax expenditures was a political one grounded in the belief that such
an approach was needed in order to get the public to accept the bill. This is not
something that is clearly addressed in the existing policy tools literature.
Second, the study suggests something about the relationship between policy tool
choice and formulating policy in an extremely stressed policy making in the context of a
need for accountability. That is, policy tool choice appears to be impacted by the need to
create a policy to solve an immediate problem. More generally, policy tool choice was
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impacted by how the policy problem was framed. Put another way, the way in which the
problem definition behind a policy is defined matters. In this case, as Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke said in late 2008, “You want to put the fire out first and then
worry about the fire code. (Simons, 2010, p. 46)” This clearly colored policy tool choice
in this case.
More generally, this point that policies created in emergency situations have
different tool choices may be new to the literature of policy tools (as Cooper has
highlighted for example with contracting) and is it is relatively new to the literature of
accountability as well. There is only limited research in this area in either field. Indeed,
there exists for example, ample evidence that contract accountability changes in crisis
situations. For example, in the case of the Hurricane Katrina response, accountability
was a secondary concern to getting supplies and aid out to affected persons as quickly as
possible (Koliba, Mills, & Zia, 2011, pp. 215-217). In this case, the decision not to focus
on economic regulation appears to have fallen victim to the definition of the policy
problem as needing to solve the immediate causes of the crisis rather than the reasons the
crisis happened in the first place.
This point that policies created in emergency situations result in different tool
choices is one that the policy tools literature has not explored but should. While it is the
case that in only maybe 5% of cases policy makers operate in an emergency framework,
knowing how and why they operate in that framework as they do is important. Learning
how and why these decisions differ in these situations is important. Do only the process
and outcomes differ or do those making the decisions differ as well? This is arguably
particularly important as Congress seems perpetually lurching from crisis to crisis in
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major policy making, whether it is the “fiscal cliff”, the debt limit, sequestration or
something else. As a result of this, if the literature could examine how and why
policymakers utilize policy tools differently in crisis situations is perhaps even more
important than previously thought. Regardless, if the goal of policy tools literature is to
get at the underlying assumptions behind policy tools, knowing how this and other factors
impact how and when these tools are utilized would be important for literature, and
invariably practice as well.
In addition, this study argues that incremental policymaking is not without its
problems. While Lindbolm and others argue that incremental policy making will slowly
but surely solve problems, it does not necessarily do so (Lindblom, 1959, pp. 80-82).

In

this case, incremental policy making in the area of regulation arguably led to the crisis
itself. Perhaps the emergency mindset, rather than the incremental one, would therefore
be better to solving big policy problems since you can always pick around the edges once
a major policy is in place, but if you only do things incrementally it can be hard to make
major changes.
In the case of ARRA, a different dynamic for policy tool choice occurred because
GAO and others in the accountability community insisted on being involved in the design
of ARRA’s implementing regulations (Mihm & al, 2013). This contrasted with OMB’s
typical role in such cases, which is to pass down regulations to GAO and others in the
accountability community largely without consulting them (Mihm & al, 2013). This
focus on accountability at the front end did have at least some impact on the regulations,
most notably in the decision to organize the implementing regulations by policy tool.
While it remains unclear as to what impact this decision actually had on the
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accountability design or implementation of ARRA and whether it resulted in better or
worse outcomes, it is nonetheless a unique approach for OMB to take and is certainly
worth noting here.
Questions for Future Research:
This study began with the recognition that it presented a number of limitations. In
light of the findings of this study, these limitations lead to possible questions for future
research, in particular due to concerns about case choice and policy implementation. In
addition, this study’s findings have also presented additional questions for future research
that could certainly prove fruitful.
First, due to the unique nature of both the events that led to the creation of TARP
and ARRA as well as TARP and ARRA themselves, it might well be that some of the
policy tool choices were atypical. It would therefore be useful in future research to
address the question whether policy tool choices differ in cases in which the policy is
enacted in times of stress or crisis rather than the normal course of business. For
example, how does policy tool choice for the Dodd Frank financial reform bill differ
from TARP and ARRA since Dodd Frank underwent a year-long process of committee
hearings, policy development and deliberation and what explains the differences between
the two types of policies? This is certainly a fertile area of research for policy tools
literature and can answer the limitation presented by case choice.
This limitation also brings up two additional interesting questions. Namely, how,
if at all, do policy makers consider the relationship between tool choice and
accountability models? If so, which policy contexts are more likely to link accountability
models and tool choice? The answer to these questions might help us understand why
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and how accountability plays a role in tool choice and policy design in some areas and
not others and if it can, or should be, expanded to the areas where it is not currently as
linked.
Another potential imitation was the choice to focus on only four of the eight
accountability models discussed in this literature review even though that review shows
that they are the most widely used models. Further research might therefore look to
understand the role that contract, ethical, market and managerial/organizational
accountability explain policy tool choices differently than the four models chosen for this
study.
A related and fourth a potential limitation of this study was that does not evaluate
the effectiveness of the policy tools choice or the resulting policy. This is because the
focus of this research was on policy formulation rather than design. Even so, it might be
useful to look at policies over time to see how important the relationship between
accountability and tool choice in practice during the implementation of the policy. This is
not a question that this study can answer, or to be frank anyone can for a few more years
at least, but is at the heart of this study to begin with. After all, TARP and ARRA were
created to solve the huge problems necessitated by the 2008 economic crisis and it would
be helpful to learn how this linkage between policy tools and accountability models
changed or did not change during implementation.
One could also ask whether these findings can be extended beyond the American
context. For example, could they be applied in a system such as Canada or the UK’s that
utilizes a parliamentary government and does not put as much trust in federalism? Does
legal accountability, in particular, rely on a common law legal system or could these
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findings do just as well in a civil law system? These questions are certainly worth
exploring, especially as it comes to evaluating the policy design of the economic recovery
packages proposed and implemented by other countries. This is particularly challenging
in non-western societies due to the different framework under which they operate. How,
for example, did Vietnam or Singapore or Egypt, construct policies in a similar way in
emergencies? They are all non-western governments and they are all significantly
different from each other both in the formulation of their economies and governments.
Regardless, knowing whether these findings hold up in relation to those policies is
certainly an area worth pursuing.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, while there are important questions for future research, this study adds to
the accountability and policy tools literatures. It shows that a single model approach is
insufficient to explain policy tool choice, that a multiple model approach is superior and
that there is a connection, at least in these two cases, between policy tools and
accountability models. It highlighted the importance of making accountability more
proactive than reactive, how the policy problem is framed in tool choice, as well as the
important considerations related to emergency policy. It presented many lessons that can
be learned from TARP and ARRA, their histories and presented several questions for
future research. This study is but one step in the growing fields of accountability and
policy tools literature and will hopefully serve as a platform from which much can be
learned and future research can be done. After all, something like the events of 2008 will
likely occur again sometime in the future. As Mark Twain famously said “History
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doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme (Twain, 1903, p. 64)” and we had best be able to
respond well when it does.
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Appendix A: Coding of Documents
In order to evaluate which models and tools were at use in each case, this study
coded 237 different documents based initially on 125 different codes. These codes
consisted of one each for case one of Salamon’s policy tools was applied without an
apparent accountability model, one for each of the eight accountability models identified
in this study where they were applied without regard to a specific policy tool and then
eight each for each policy tool as it was applied in concert with the accountability
models. After an initial review of the documents and analysis of the trends of which
policy tools and accountability models were being utilized, the number of codes was
reduced to 39 as the data showed that there were seven total policy tools in play, each of
which got one code, and four accountability models in play, each of which got one code
and four codes for each of the seven policy tools where accountability models were
applied in concert with policy tools. These documents were then fully reviewed twice
more to find all cases where these codes could be applied. Following these reviews, an
analysis was conducted to determine where the intersections of policy tools and
accountability models occurred. In cases where there were several instances where the
two were coded together, it was determined that there was a link. It is believed that given
the same set of documents although others might have relied upon different codes and a
different approach, the results of this coding could be substantially reproduced by another
researcher and thus are repeatable as recommended by standard methodological
standards.
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Appendix B: Interview List
The following is a list of the persons interviewed as part of this study, their role and
importance in relation to the policies and the location and dates of each interview.

Interviewee: Naomi Baum
Organization and Title (former): Congressional Oversight Panel, Executive Director
Date/Location: February 11, 2013, Washington, DC
Role: Oversaw the Congressional Oversight Panel’s work as it evaluated various aspects
of TARP.

Interviewee: Betsy Cody
Organization and Title: Congressional Research Service Analyst
Date/Location: February 12, 2013, Washington, DC
Role: Helped evaluate projects in the natural resources area in relation to ARRA.

Interviewee: Andrew Green
Organization and Title: Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee Staffer
Date/Location: February 11, 2013, Washington, DC
Role: Helped Senator Merkley undertake accountability in relation to both TARP and
ARRA.
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Interviewee: Chris Mihm, et. Al.
Organization and Title: Government Accountability Office, Managing Director for
Strategic Issues.
Date/Location: February 13, 2013, Washington, DC
Role: GAO had a fundamental role in evaluating both TARP and ARRA; Mr. Mihm
assembled a group of staffers who had worked on one or both policies in order to help me
understand GAO’s process and role in evaluating both policies.

Interviewee: Tewana Wilkerson
Organization and Title (former): Congressional Oversight Panel, Deputy Executive
Director
Date/Location: February 11, 2013, Washington, DC
Role: Helped oversee the Congressional Oversight Panel’s work as it evaluated various
aspects of TARP.

191

